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This thesis examines the relationship between institutional quality and regional economic 
development in African countries. It analyses three elements of institutional quality: the impact 
of institutional quality on economic development, the drivers of poor institutional quality, and 
interventions that can be adopted to improve institutional quality. 
 
The first paper of this PhD, published in the Journal of Development Studies and co-authored 
with Neil Lee and Andrés Rodríguez-Pose, examines the relationship between sub-national 
government quality and economic development across 356 regions in 22 African countries. We 
create a novel index of sub-national government quality using Afrobarometer survey data, and 
we use high resolution night-time satellite images as a proxy for economic activity. We find 
that a reduction in sub-national government quality causes decreases in regional economic 
activity. 
 
In the second paper, I examine one of the drivers of sub-national government quality in African 
regions – armed conflict. I find that armed conflict leads to a deterioration in sub-national 
government quality. Contrary to the existing literature which suggests that armed conflict leads 
to a loss of government legitimacy, I find that this occurs because sub-national governments 
divert resources away from delivering services and towards crisis response. As a result, I find 
that armed conflict does not lead to a reduction in national government quality as national 
governments possess much greater resources. Therefore, national governments are able to 
respond to crises without significantly reducing the quality of service delivery. 
 
The third paper, co-authored with Neil Lee, examines the impact of national government 
quality on spatial inequality within African provinces. We create, for the first time, an index of 
within-province inequality using high resolution satellite imagery. We find that national 
government quality is just as important as differences in geographical endowments in driving 
spatial inequality within provinces. This is primarily because national governments in African 
countries have a history of city-specific favouritism – i.e. creating policies that benefit a 
particular city (typically due to corruption, nepotism or clientelism). This city-specific 
favouritism does not spill-over and benefit the wider province. Instead, it creates and 
exacerbates inequality within provinces. 
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The final paper qualitatively examines an intervention conducted by an NGO, SEMA, to 
increase the quality of service delivery in Kampala, Uganda. I analyse whether accountability 
interventions (i.e. designed to make officials more accountable to citizens) is a more powerful 
intervention than bureaucratic insulation (i.e. interventions designed to insulate bureaucrats 
from top-down and bottom-up perverse incentives). I find that accountability interventions are 
a promising way of creating non-financial incentives to improve the performance of 
government officials. However, such interventions on their own are ultimately unable to tackle 
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During my master’s degree, I found myself in Kampala speaking with many Ugandans to try 
and understand why their tradeables sector had stagnated over the previous decade. I had come 
to Uganda with a range of hypotheses about this stagnation: that high interest rates stifled the 
ability of firms to access finance, that volatile electricity had impacted the productivity of 
factories, or that Uganda’s complex land tenure system had led to business owners losing their 
property as someone else had a legal claim to their land. As an outsider experiencing East 
Africa for the first time, my Ugandan colleagues at Makerere University would constantly 
remind me that the assumptions I had developed back in London would not be relevant on the 
ground in Kampala. They were, as usual, correct. 
 
I had the privilege of speaking with sole traders, informal workers, and even employees from 
some of the largest multinational companies. Despite the varying backgrounds of the people I 
spoke with, over the course of many interviews and discussions, one pattern emerged – there 
were systemic issues with sub-national governments. At the same time donors discussed how 
they were increasingly working with sub-national governments in the face of widespread 
devolution across Africa. Wanting to learn more about sub-national government quality – not 
just in Uganda, but across the continent – I turned to the academic literature. However, upon 
searching, I was struck by how little had been written about sub-national institutions in African 
countries. Given national governments and donors alike were preaching the importance of 
devolution, I realised this absence of literature was a significant omission. 
 
Therefore, over the past four years I took it upon myself, through this PhD, to contribute in 
some small way to providing an understanding of the dynamics of both sub-national 
governments and sub-national economic development in African regions. Given this PhD came 
out of my own policy-related questions, I wanted the thesis to not just contribute to academia 
– but to be relevant to policymakers. As such, this PhD goes beyond simply detailing the 
importance of institutions in spurring local economic development. Instead, I evaluate methods 
of trying to improve institutional quality. Furthermore, my co-authors and I create a number of 
novel indicators in this pursuit – the first index of sub-national government quality in African 
regions; and the first index of within-province spatial inequality derived from high-resolution 
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satellite imagery. It is my hope that the research and tools contained herein can help other 
researchers and policymakers – as I was – to develop interventions that improve economic 
development and raise living standards. 
 
In the first chapter of this thesis I, along with my co-authors Neil Lee and Andrés Rodríguez-
Pose, create a novel index of sub-national government quality (SNGQ) for 22 African 
countries. We examine the causal impact of SNGQ on regional economic development. In the 
second chapter, I investigate the drivers of SNGQ and focus specifically on the role of armed 
conflict in causing deteriorations of SNGQ. In the third chapter, Neil Lee and I create a new 
measure of within-province spatial inequality and investigate the role of national government 
quality in spurring spatial inequality within the provinces of 52 African countries. Finally, 
chapter 4 involves a qualitative analysis of a citizen-feedback intervention in Kampala, that 
has been designed to improve service delivery. In summary, this PhD looks at the impact of 
sub-national and national government quality on regional economic development, the drivers 
of SNGQ, and interventions that can be introduced to improve institutional quality.  
 
This introduction goes on to discuss why these topics deserve to be further studied, I then 
provide a summary of the individual chapters and their main contributions, and finally I 
conclude by discussing the policy implications and suggest further areas for research. 
 
2. Institutions and regional economic development in African 
countries 
 
2.1 The role of sub-national institutions in African regions 
 
Quality of government is defined by Rothstein and Teorell (2008) as “the impartiality of 
institutions that exercise government authority”. It involves the respect for private property 
rights, freedom from official corruption, and the ability to provide high quality services to 
citizens (Fan et al., 2009). 
Over the past two decades there has been an upsurge in studies, galvanised by 
Acemoglu et al.’s seminal 2001 paper, which established two main findings. First, that the 
quality of historical institutions subsequently impacted the quality of present-day institutions; 
and second, that present-day institutions are a fundamental driver of economic growth. This 
paper subsequently launched further studies that confirmed the central role of institutions in 
explaining economic growth (e.g. Easterly, 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Rothstein, 2011; 
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Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). However, the vast majority of these studies have focussed on 
the role of national institutions. Sub-national governments have, due to data availability 
constraints, received much less attention.  
 
More recently, a handful of studies have considered sub-national institutions in Europe, China 
and South America. For instance, Charron et al. (2014) created the first sub-national 
government quality index for 172 European regions across 18 countries. They found strong 
evidence that high quality regional governments are associated with higher levels of GDP, 
health and education. Rodríguez–Pose and Garcilazo (2015) extend this analysis to address 
reverse causality concerns by instrumenting present-day sub-national institutional quality with 
literacy rates in the Austro-Hungarian empire. They find that there is a causal relationship 
between sub-national government quality and regional innovative performance in Europe. 
Similarly, Revilla Diez et al. (2016), use data from the World Bank’s Doing Business surveys 
to come up with a proxy for regional institutional quality in Ukraine. They find that investors 
are attracted to regions with good quality regional institutions – typically the capital – which 
subsequently improves the performance of multi-national firms. In China, Rodríguez–Pose and 
Zhang (2019) use a novel dataset to link 2,700 firms located across 25 cities with their 
institutional environment. They find that institutional deficiencies in rule of law, corruption 
and weak regulatory quality of local government institutions are a primary barrier to firm-level 
innovation. Meanwhile, Niedzwieci (2016) investigates sub-national institutions in Argentina 
and Brazil and finds that sub-national institutions hinder local service delivery. This is 
primarily the case in which the responsibility for certain welfare programs have been devolved 
to local governments. However, variations in local government implementation are pinned 
down to political factors (e.g. different parties operating at the local level to the national level); 
as well as poor institutional clarity over which level of government is responsible for the 
delivery of specific programs. 
 
Given these studies suggest there is a fundamental relationship between sub-national 
institutional quality and economic development; it is surprising that sub-national institutions 
in Africa have been previously overlooked. This becomes even more surprising given the 
central role of sub-national institutions in African countries. 
 
There are two primary reasons why sub-national institutions in African countries deserve 
further interrogation. First, many African countries have experienced ongoing devolution over 
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the past two decades, which has seen sub-national governments becoming more responsible 
for driving regional development agendas (Bratton, 2012; Erk, 2015). This is partly because 
national governments in Africa have historically lacked the capacity to govern effectively 
across all regions in a country. They have found it challenging to administer the rule of law, 
and to levy taxes – particularly in more rural areas (Herbst, 1997). Devolution was thus thought 
to be a solution to these governance problems. As a result, many countries in Africa underwent 
a wave of decentralisation throughout the 1990s and 2000s, whereby sub-national governments 
were handed more authority to implement regional economic development programs (Handley 
et al., 2009).  
 
Second, sub-national institutions have historically played an important role in shaping 
economic activity within African countries. Colonisation in Africa frequently saw European 
empires exercising power indirectly by empowering local state apparatuses – usually Native 
Authorities – to rule on their behalf (Mamdani, 1999:867). This form of colonisation was 
known as ‘indirect rule’ – separate to the ‘direct rule’ experienced in colonies such as South 
Africa, Rhodesia, the Gold Coast, and Kenya; whereby Europeans settled and set up institutions 
to directly rule over the locals (Mamdani, 1996). Indirect rule was first introduced by the British 
to Nigeria, Uganda and Tanganyika in the early 20th century, after which it was emulated by 
the French after 1918, the Belgians in the 1930s and the Portuguese in the 1950s. Moreover, 
even in settler colonies, most colonial states did not extend the administrative apparatus of their 
institutions beyond the capital city. Therefore, areas outside the capital were typically more 
influenced by local governance apparatuses than by the colonial national government (Herbst, 
1997). Thus, sub-national governments have – in one way or another – played a long-spanning 
role in organising people within African societies.  
 
Studying sub-national institutions in Africa becomes even more important once we understand 
that institutional quality persists over time. Tabellini (2008), for instance, found that variations 
in culture influenced differences in the performance of governments. Institutional culture – a 
broad and complex topic – involves certain normative values and morality, which can be passed 
down from generation to generation. Culture can dictate what is considered right or wrong. It 
governs how people act and how governments themselves behave (Duranton et al., 2009). 
Therefore, if there is a long history of sub-national governance in African states, ‘institutional 




Thus, given both the recent trend towards devolution and the history of sub-national 
governance which may have shaped the institutional culture of present-day institutions; sub-
national governments deserve more attention. This will help us better understand the 
institutional architecture of African states – the role that sub-national institutions play in 
driving regional economic development; the drivers of SNGQ; and what can be done to 
improve sub-national governance. This is therefore a major motivation for this PhD.  
 
2.2 The regional impact of national institutions in African countries 
 
National governments, however, still play an important role in African countries – yet their 
regional impact in Africa has remained under-studied. Again, due to data availability 
constraints – whereby there is a lack of official sub-national data – it has been difficult to 
quantify the impact of national governments on spatial inequality within African provinces.  
 
Spatial inequality is widely considered to be associated with negative economic development 
outcomes. For instance, studies have found that it leads to conflict and crime (Østby et al., 
2009), fragmentation between urban and rural areas (Galor and Moav, 2004), uneven 
experiences of poverty reduction across countries (Te Velde and Morrissey, 2005), and overall 
lower levels of economic growth (Achten and Lessmann, 2020). Moreover, high levels of inter- 
and intra-regional inequality have been associated with growing political cleavages, 
particularly where local income differences reflect different ethnic or nationalist groups 
(Kanbur and Venables, 2005). Based on this, a wide range of literature interrogates patterns of 
spatial inequality, its causes, and its consequences (see Guo et al., 2020; Lee and Luca, 2019; 
Rodríguez‐Pose & Tselios, 2009; Glaeser et al., 2009). 
 
Africa specifically has experienced increased spatial inequality in recent times. Average 
regional income inequality within African countries (measured through the Gini coefficient) 
has increased every year since 2009, and grew from 0.32 to 0.38 between 1992 and 2013 
(Mveyange, 2018). A new set of research has been using satellite imagery of night-time 
luminosity as a proxy for economic activity (see Lessman and Seidel, 2017; Alesina et al, 
2016), as a method of overcoming the paucity of official data on spatial inequality. These 
studies have focussed on inequality at the country-level by comparing variations in economic 
activity between sub-national regions. This however overlooks the drivers of spatial inequality 
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at the sub-national level – in other words spatial inequality within African provinces. These 
prior studies assume that if certain cities or municipalities within a province benefit from either 
regional favouritism or natural endowments, then the entire province benefits. This, however, 
is an assumption that needs to be reconsidered given the sheer size of African provinces. The 
average African province is 37,000 square kilometres – roughly the size of the Netherlands. 
Thus, if certain cities or municipalities within a province benefit from the regional favouritism 
of national governments or favourable natural endowments, it is likely that this would cause 
inequality within provinces. 
 
Further investigating the role of national governments in creating spatial inequality is 
warranted in the African context given the long history of regional favouritism. This 
favouritism has involved national governments implementing policies that benefit particular 
cities due to nepotism, clientelism and corruption. For example, in Zaire (now Democratic 
Republic of Congo), former president, Mobutu Sese Soko, transformed his former hometown, 
Gbadolite, (which had 1,500 residents during the 1970s) into a lavish city with five-star hotels, 
three palaces and a 3.2km runway for a Concorde jet (Wrong, 2000). Similarly, in 1983, former 
Ivory Coast president, Félix Houphouët‐Boigny, declared his hometown, Yamoussoukro, as 
the nation’s capital. He built palaces, an airport that could also land a Concorde, and the world’s 
largest church at a cost of $300 million USD (Ahlerup and Isaksson, 2015). 
 
Thus, if (local) policy makers wish to address inequalities that have been caused or exacerbated 
by national governments, the first step is to develop a better understanding of within-province 
spatial dynamics. As previously discussed, most African countries have provincial-level 
governments which are responsible for driving significant changes to regional economic 
development. Thus, if local policymakers have a way to measure within-province spatial 
inequality in the absence of official statistics; as well as have an understanding of what drives 
these inequalities; they will be better equipped to implement redistributive policies to ensure 
that city-level endowments or favouritism can spill over and benefit the wider province. This, 
therefore, serves as motivation for the third paper in this PhD, whereby we develop a new 





3. Overview of the PhD 
 
3.1 Paper 1 – Quality of sub-national government and regional development 
in Africa 
 
The first paper in this PhD, published in the Journal of Development Studies (2021), 
investigates the impact of sub-national government quality on regional economic development. 
In this paper, my co-authors and I create a novel index of sub-national government quality for 
356 regions across 22 African countries. This index is constructed using large-scale survey 
data from Afrobarometer. We measure regional economic activity using high resolution 
satellite imagery of night-light luminosity as a proxy for GDP. To address causality concerns, 
we instrument sub-national government quality with data on the institutional quality of pre-
colonial societies (given institutional culture persists over time, as discussed previously). Our 
results show a positive and significant relationship between sub-national government quality 
and regional economic development, even when controlling for the quality of national-level 
institutions. We therefore find that better sub-national governments are a powerful but often 
overlooked determinant of development in Africa. 
 
3.2 Paper 2 – Examining the drivers of sub-national government quality in 
African regions: the role of armed conflict 
 
Where the first paper of this PhD focussed on the impact of SNGQ, this paper extends the 
analysis by examining one of the causes of SNGQ – armed conflict. Paper 1 found that 
variations of sub-national government quality (SNGQ) impact economic activity in African 
regions. However, given data availability constraints, little has been historically done to 
understand what drives deteriorations in SNGQ. I aim to fill this gap in the literature by 
examining the impact of armed conflict on SNGQ in 460 regions across 27 African countries 
between 2013-2018. Despite Africa experiencing more armed conflict than any other continent 
over the past 20 years, little is known about how and to what extent this has impacted 
institutional quality. I use conflict data from the Upsala Conflict Data Program and assess its 
impact on SNGQ using the index constructed in paper 1. To determine causality, I instrument 
armed conflict with exogenous changes in world agricultural prices as reductions in agricultural 
revenue lowers the opportunity cost of farmers engaging in armed conflict.  
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The results demonstrate that armed conflict has a negative, significant and causal impact on 
SNGQ in African regions. I also find that this reduction in SNGQ is caused by a deterioration 
in the quality of services that sub-national governments provide, rather than an upsurge in 
corruption. This is because sub-national governments need to direct resources towards crisis 
response, and away from its usual services. Finally, contrary to the existing literature, I find 
that an upsurge in armed conflict does not impact national government quality. This may be 
because national governments are better resourced than sub-national governments. Therefore, 
when violent conflicts occur, the cost of crisis response is proportionally lower for national 
governments than it is for sub-national governments.  
 
3.3 Paper 3 – Spatial inequality within African provinces: a story of national 
government quality, regional favouritism, and geographical endowments 
 
As discussed in section 1.2, there are growing concerns about the causes and consequences of 
spatial inequality in much of the world, with Africa being no exception. The dominant view is 
that geographical factors are the main cause of spatial inequality in the African context. 
However, a different strand of research highlights the impact of national governments on 
spatial inequality. Due to data limitations, most of the existing research has focussed on 
examining spatial inequality at the country level by comparing variations in wealth between 
African provinces. This, however, is a significant issue given the sheer size of African 
provinces.  
 
The average African province is approximately 37,000 square kilometres – almost 25 times the 
size of London. It should therefore not be assumed that policies which favour a particular city, 
or geographical endowments that benefit a certain area, affect entire provinces equally. Instead, 
it is likely that these policies and geographical endowments cause spatial inequality within 
provinces.   
 
This paper, co-authored with Neil Lee, therefore investigates the relationship between national 
government quality and spatial inequality within the provinces of 52 African countries. We 
create a new measure of within-province inequality using high-resolution satellite data of night-




We find that national government quality matters just as much as geographical endowments in 
explaining spatial inequality within provinces. Our results show that better national 
government quality reduces spatial inequality within African regions – a finding we confirm 
using an instrumental variable approach based on historic European settler mortality rates.  
 
3.4 Paper 4 – Bureaucratic insulation vs accountability: interventions to 
improve service delivery in Kampala 
 
While papers 1 and 2 focus on the impacts of government quality on regional economic 
development and spatial inequality respectively, and paper 3 focuses on the drivers of SNGQ; 
this paper focuses on what can be done to improve government quality – specifically service 
delivery. I do so by qualitatively examining a citizen feedback intervention conducted by an 
NGO, SEMA, in Kampala. 
 
Service delivery in places such as Kampala, Uganda, are marred by inefficiency, corruption, 
and negligence. Research has suggested that a lack of resources and capacity are primary 
factors in driving poor service delivery. However, once resource and capacity constraints have 
been addressed, there is an ongoing debate on how service delivery can be further improved.  
 
One argument suggests that bureaucratic insulation – in other words, autonomy – is 
fundamental to improving government services. This is because government officials, once 
insulated from influences of corruption (either top-down from politicians, or bottom-up from 
citizens), are enabled to act in the most effective way. The other argument, driven by principal-
agent theories, suggests that increasing accountability to political leaders and citizens ensures 
that government officials act in the most effective way.  
 
I attempt to shed light on this debate by examining whether accountability interventions can 
improve service delivery in settings which do not have bureaucratic insulation. I examine this 
qualitatively by analysing SEMA’s citizen feedback initiative in Kampala. The analysis shows 
that interventions designed to improve accountability can in fact play an important role in 
improving service delivery. It does so by establishing incentives for government officials to 
perform better, while also creating an evidence base so officials can lobby for more resources. 
However, such interventions on their own are ultimately unable to tackle systemic forms of 
corruption, which may be sewn into the fabric of government institutions and everyday life. 
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Thus, to adequately target structural issues such as corruption, accountability interventions may 




In summary, this PhD attempts to provide a holistic examination on the role of institutions and 
regional economic development within African countries. I have focussed on the impacts of 
institutional quality on regional development and spatial inequality (papers 1 and 3), the 
determinants of SNGQ – particularly the role of armed conflict and the channels through which 
it impacts government quality (paper 2), and finally interventions that can be adopted to 
improve government quality and service delivery (paper 4).  
 
It is my hope that this research will be helpful to policymakers and researchers alike – 
particularly within a context of increasing devolution, whereby sub-national governments will 
be increasingly responsible for driving the development agenda of African regions. For 
instance, I show that in the event of armed conflict an increase in transfers from central 
governments to sub-national governments can help mitigate the deterioration in local service 
delivery (paper 3). If this does not take place and SNGQ reduces, there is likely to be an 
associated decrease in regional economic activity (paper 1). This reduction in SNGQ may also 
be a barrier to sub-national governments – as they will be less able to develop effective 
redistributive policies that mitigate the regional favouritism displayed by national governments 
(paper 2). Moreover, to address some of the more structural problems around improving service 
delivery, an adequate incentive system should be introduced so that government officials are 
induced to increase their performance (paper 4).  
 
Moreover, historically, one of the main barriers to studying sub-national institutions and 
regional economic development in African regions has been the absence of official sub-
national statistics. To address this data paucity, this PhD has developed a number of tools which 
can aid policymakers in measuring, evaluating and monitoring the quality of institutions and 
their impact on regional development. For instance, we have created the first index of sub-
national government quality using large-scale survey data from Afrobarometer, we have used 
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high-resolution satellite imagery on night-time luminosity as a proxy for regional GDP,1 and 
we have also used this data to provide a novel index of within-province spatial inequality. 
 
This research opens up many further questions which should be studied in the future. For 
example, what is the impact of SNGQ on employment, inflation or innovation within African 
regions? How does SNGQ impact the returns on aid funding? Importantly, what are some of 
the other determinants of SNGQ aside from armed conflict? Can sub-national governments 
truly insulate themselves from the influence of national governments?  
 
While I have used novel data in the ensuing analyses, this is barely scratching the surface of 
what is possible. The analyses could be extended by using other proxies for regional economic 
development in Africa. For instance, new research coming out of Stanford’s AI lab, has been 
using machine vision techniques and convolutional neural networks on daytime satellite 
imagery to obtain new measures of household consumption in African countries (Jean et al., 
2016). Such measures can be a useful complement to night-light images, in the absence of 
official statistics. Moreover, new satellite providers, such as CG Satellite are providing 
luminous images that are 500 times the resolution of the VIIRS DNB images used in this 
analysis. Once the cost of such images becomes more favourable to researchers, this will open 
up avenues for improving the accuracy of satellite-derived GDP estimates. 
 
Moreover, as more sub-national governments begin digitising and publicising official 
documents – such as budget papers – researchers will be able to come up with further measures 
of sub-national government quality (Ouedraogo and Sy, 2020). For example, by comparing 
where and how fiscal resources are being spent by local governments (Ebdon, 2003). Similarly, 
given the acceleration of efforts to capture data on institutional quality in African regions (e.g. 
the expansion of Afrobarometer surveys and the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business 
indicators), it is likely that we can obtain a better understanding of the spatial dynamics of sub-
national government quality in African regions. For instance, recent research has found that 
national government quality deteriorates the further citizens are from the national capital in 
African countries (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014); and that voting patterns in 
European regions indicate that quality of institutions may vary between regions in the periphery 
 
1 This PhD has used VIIRS DNB satellite data, rather than the traditional DMSP-OLS data 
that is used in spatial economics studies. VIIRS data has twice the resolution of DMSP-OLS 
data. 
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and those in the core (Stein et al., 2020; Rodríguez–Pose, 2018). As such, future studies should 
take inspiration from these studies to examine whether sub-national government quality varies 
within a given region in Africa. For instance – is local service delivery worse in more remote 
areas? Or does sub-national government quality decay with distance from regional capitals? 
 
Thus, with technology and data collection methods rapidly improving, it is just a matter of time 
till richer datasets are produced, and further investigations into African sub-national institutions 
are made possible. It is therefore my hope that this PhD demonstrates what can be done in data 
sparse environments; and that it serves as the beginning of a long line of studies that shed light 
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Paper 1 – Quality of Sub-national Government and Regional 
Development in Africa 
 





Despite widespread interest in government quality and economic development, the role of sub-
national government has been largely overlooked. This represents an omission in Africa, given 
ongoing processes of devolution in much of the continent. In this article, we consider the impact 
of sub-national government institutions on economic development in 339 regions across 22 
African countries. We create a novel index of sub-national government quality based on large-
scale survey data and assess its impact on regional economies using satellite data on night light 
luminosity. To address causality concerns, we instrument sub-national government quality 
with data from pre-colonial societies. Our results show a positive and significant relationship 
between sub-national government quality and regional economic development, even when 
controlling for the quality of national-level institutions. Better sub-national governments are a 
powerful but often overlooked determinant of development in Africa. 
 
1. Introduction 
Quality of government (QoG) – sometimes defined as ‘the impartiality of institutions that 
exercise government authority’ (Rothstein & Teorell, 2008, p. 165) – is increasingly seen as 
important for economic development. Higher quality government implies better provision of 
public goods, improved processes of resource allocation, and more efficient democratic 
processes (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). It may improve trust in 
government, ensure the effective rule of law, and increase social capital (Rothstein, 2003). 
Based on these ideas, a series of studies have found that quality of government matters at a 
 
2 This paper was published in the Journal of Development Studies. Citation: Iddawela, Y., 
Lee, N., & Rodríguez-Pose, A. (2021) Quality of Sub-national Government and Regional 
Development in Africa, Journal of Development Studies. 
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national level (for example Acemoglu, Johnson, & Robinson, 2001; Acemoglu & 
Robinson, 2012; Easterly, 2001; Rodrik, Subramanian, & Trebbi, 2004; Rothstein, 2011), and 
policymakers have launched a host of initiatives aiming to improve governance (Langbein & 
Knack, 2010). 
The vast majority of studies on quality of government have focused on national government. 
Sub-national or regional government quality has attracted far less attention. However, in recent 
years a smaller subset of research has increasingly sought to investigate how sub-national 
governments affect geographical differences in economic output and regional economic 
performance, using new indicators to measure sub-national government quality (for example 
Charron, Dijkstra, & Lapuente, 2014). A series of studies have considered variations in quality 
of sub-national government, finding it plays an important role in explaining sub-national 
differences in economic performance in Europe (Charron et al., 2014; Crescenzi, Di Cataldo, 
& Rodríguez‐Pose, 2016; Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 2015; Rothstein, Charron, & 
Lapuente, 2013) and China (Cai & Treisman, 2005; Cole, Elliott, & Zhang, 2009; Rodríguez‐
Pose & Zhang, 2019). 
However, research on sub-national government quality has mainly focused on Europe and 
Asia.1 The rest of the world – especially the developing world – remains a black box. There 
has been a dearth of studies examining how local and regional institutions shape economic 
performance in Africa. This is a surprising omission for two reasons. First, sub-national 
government institutions have historically played an important role in African countries. The 
colonial history of many African states involved forms of ‘indirect rule’ that empowered local 
state apparatuses to govern on behalf of colonial empires (Mamdani, 1996a). This created ‘a 
dependent but autonomous system of rule, one that combined accountability to superiors with 
a flexible response to the subject population, a capacity to implement central directives with 
one to absorb local shocks’ (Mamdani, 1996a, p. 60). Given the scholarship which 
demonstrates how institutional culture persists over time, it is important to further investigate 
the role of modern-day sub-national institutions (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; La Porta et 
al., 1999; North, 1990; Tabellini, 2008; Young, 1994). Second, over the past two decades, 
many African states have been undergoing an accelerated process of devolution (see 
Bratton, 2012; Erk, 2015). While the experience of different African states has been diverse 
(for example Olowu, 2003; Snyder, 2001), sub-national governments have become 
increasingly responsible for driving the development agenda in many African countries. This 
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has raised concerns that variations in the performance of sub-national governments can create 
significant inequalities in economic outcomes (Wilfart, 2018). 
Notwithstanding this importance of sub-national government institutions in much of Africa, 
there is little quantitative evidence on their importance for economic development. This paper 
addresses this gap. It produces for the first time a sub-national government quality index for 
many regions in Africa. The index, constructed using Afrobarometer survey data, covers 339 
regions in 22 countries across Africa. This is then used to estimate the impact of sub-national 
government quality on regional GDP, as measured by satellite images of night-time luminosity 
– an increasingly used proxy for GDP, which overcomes data availability issues and avoids 
problems of data comparability between states (see Henderson et al., 2012). To overcome any 
issues of endogeneity, and to establish a causal relationship between government quality and 
economic performance, we use data on the political decentralisation of pre-colonial African 
societies as an instrument for modern-day sub-national government quality. 
Our analysis shows a positive and significant relationship between sub-national government 
quality and differences in regional wealth in African countries. The findings are robust to a 
large set of controls including geography, topography, natural resources, central government 
quality, infrastructure, FDI, and education levels. One concern is that better economic 
performance may influence sub-national quality of government. However, the relationship we 
identify seems to be causal, as the results hold in instrumental variable (IV) regressions. Given 
that these results exist independently of national government quality, we argue for a greater 
focus on the role of sub-national government institutions in economic development, 
particularly given ongoing processes of devolution. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature examining the 
relationships between government quality and economic development, with a focus on 
Africa. Section 3 provides an overview of the data, and Section 4 presents some descriptive 
analysis, while section 5 provides the results of our regression models. In Section 6 a range of 
robustness tests are undertaken, and we conclude in Section 7. 
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2. Quality of sub-national government and economic 
development in Africa 
The importance of national government institutions – particularly government quality – for 
economic development has become widely researched (for example La Porta et al., 1999; 
Rothstein, 2011; Rothstein & Teorell, 2008). In line with most of this literature, this paper’s 
conceptualisation of ‘government institutions’ refers to the official architecture of government 
agencies, bureaucratic structures and personnel. This architecture is responsible for delivering 
services and creating and enforcing the rules and incentives that shape political, social and 
economic interaction. While a number of African countries and regions may have formal non-
governmental institutions, such as ethnic tribes or kingdoms (for example Uganda’s Buganda 
Kingdom) that have some governance functions, we do not include these in our definition of 
present-day ‘sub-national government institutions’. 
Our definition of ‘quality of government’ builds on Rothstein and Teorell (2008). According 
to them, government quality involves impartiality in the exercise of public authority. 
Impartiality is understood as a procedural norm which is separate to the development and 
content of policies. A government with good quality can be thought of as possessing low levels 
of corruption, high levels of trust and accountability to its citizens, and as able to deliver 
services effectively. Therefore, while democracy is important for government quality, it is not 
a synonym for it. 
The emerging consensus is that national-level government institutions have played, and will 
continue to play, a fundamental role in explaining variations in national economic development 
(Knack & Keefer, 1995; Mauro, 1995). This is because governments are responsible for 
protecting property rights, meeting the needs of their people by providing basic public services, 
and preserving the rule of law. These three elements, when taken together, are responsible for 
creating the overall environment for economies to prosper (Acemoglu, Johnson, & 
Robinson, 2005). Thus, if formal government institutions only protect the property rights of a 
small elite, then investment and participation from other groups may be disincentivised or 
crowded out (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2005). These issues can then compound and result in 
pervasive corruption, rent-seeking, insider-outsider problems, clientelism, nepotism and, 
subsequently, culminate in an overwhelming reduction in economic activity (Rodríguez-Pose 
& Storper, 2006). 
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Some, however, have been less convinced about the role of government institutions in 
explaining variations in economic development. For example, Glaeser, La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, and Shleifer (2004) argue that human capital matters more than institutions, as 
authoritarian regimes have witnessed improvements in economic performance over time. In 
contrast, Diamond (1998) takes a much longer perspective. While acknowledging the role of 
‘idiosyncratic cultural factors’ in promoting economic development in places such as China 
(1998, p. 11), he argues that differences in development may be deeply rooted in history (even 
going back to periods before the existence of formal institutions). He makes a grand historical 
argument that the foundations of modern-day economic activity have been shaped by Neolithic 
geographical endowments (for example plant and animal species) that influenced agricultural 
productivity. Agricultural productivity, in turn, increased population density, promoted 
specialisation of labour and industry, and led to innovative activity. As a result, this endowment 
advantage led to some regions becoming more economically prosperous than others. 
So far, most research on government institutions has considered the national level. Yet, to fully 
understand the role of government institutions in spurring economic activity, we need to 
examine all parts of a country’s governmental architecture. This means studying the role of 
sub-national governments – core institutions which have been previously overlooked by the 
majority of studies that focus solely on the national level. This is a surprising omission given 
the ‘global trend to devolution’ (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003) and the so-called ‘devolution 
revolution’ which has taken place over the past three decades through decentralisation of 
policy-making and government services (Snyder, 2001). 
Devolution can be understood as the process whereby a central government formally cedes 
power to lower tiers of government – such as sub-national governments or local councils 
(Ribot, 2002). The process may be undertaken to improve democratic representation, better 
match public resources to local needs, or enhance local service delivery. Devolution is 
underpinned by the assumption that sub-national governments are better placed to understand 
the preferences of the people they represent (Rodríguez-Pose & Gill, 2003; Tiebout, 1956). As 
a result, there has been an upsurge in literature which examines the impact of decentralisation 
on the quality of governments (for example Faguet, 2014; Prud’Homme, 1995; 
Treisman, 2002, 2007). 
In addition to the global trend towards devolution, research has stressed the importance of 
examining sub-national units – particularly in the domain of comparative politics 
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(Snyder, 2001). This is because sub-national analyses allow researchers to better understand 
the spatially uneven nature of political and economic processes. This therefore improves the 
ability to understand, describe and theorise about such complex processes. 
Hence, a smaller subset of literature has emerged which uses quantitative methods to 
investigate the role of sub-national governments in promoting economic activity. While some 
studies examine Asian countries (Cai & Treisman, 2005; Cole et al., 2009; Rodríguez‐Pose & 
Zhang, 2019), most of this literature has focused on Europe. Charron et al. (2014) conducted 
the first comprehensive cross-regional examination of sub-national government quality and 
regional economic activity in Europe. They created a sub-national government quality index 
covering 172 European regions in 18 countries. To produce this index, they compiled a survey 
of 34,000 Europeans at a regional level, with parameters based on the World Governance 
Indicators. They found strong evidence that high-quality regional governments are associated 
with higher levels of GDP and better health and education outcomes. However, issues of 
endogeneity and reverse-causality may have affected their findings. Rodríguez-Pose and 
Garcilazo (2015) addressed those concerns through an IV analysis, using literacy rates in the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire from 1880 as an instrument for regional government quality. They 
found a positive, significant, and causal relationship between European sub-national 
government quality and regional innovation. Moreover, they found that sub-national 
government institutional quality in European regions trumped more traditional determinants of 
economic activity and growth, such as education, innovation, and infrastructure provision. 
In Africa, sub-national government quality may play a similar – if not enhanced – role. 
Nevertheless, similar studies to those conducted in Europe and Asia on African regions have 
largely been absent. This is a significant oversight for two reasons. First, like in other parts of 
the world, African countries have been undergoing accelerated processes of devolution since 
the 1990s. As often national governments lacked the capacity to impose effective government, 
finding it hard to levy taxes, particularly in rural areas (Herbst, 1997), decentralisation was sold 
as a solution to address existing governance problems. Many African countries have undergone 
processes of decentralisation, so sub-national governments have become increasingly 
responsible for planning and implementing regional economic development. This represents a 
shift away from the previous dominant belief that central governments should entirely drive 
the agenda (Handley, Higgins, Sharma, Bird, & Cammack, 2009). Given their growing role in 
policymaking, African regional governments deserve to be examined more closely. 
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Second, sub-national government institutions have historically played an important role in 
African societies. The colonial era in Africa frequently saw European empires exercise power 
indirectly by empowering local state apparatuses – typically Native Authorities – to rule on 
their behalf (Mamdani, 1999, p. 867). These local apparatuses were frequently organised 
around pre-existing ethnic or religious groups and communities. Locals were appointed as 
‘chiefs’ or ‘administrators’ to organise society in lieu of direct rule by permanent colonial 
settlers (Mamdani, 1996b, p. 52). According to Mamdani (1999, p. 869), this form of rule was 
expanded by the British originally from the colony of Natal to Nigeria, Uganda, and the 
territory of Tanganyika in the early 20th century, after which it was subsequently ‘emulated’ 
by the French after 1918, the Belgians in the 1930s, and the Portuguese in the 1950s. Moreover, 
according to Herbst (1997, p. 122), most colonial states did not extend the administrative 
apparatus of national governments beyond the capital city. Therefore, areas outside the capital 
city were influenced more by local governance arrangements than by national governments. 
Sub-national governments – in one form or another – have therefore played a long-spanning 
role in organising people within African societies. These patterns of devolution can still be 
picked up in patterns of decentralisation today (Ali, Fjeldstad, Jiang, & Shifa, 2019). 
It becomes even more important to evaluate sub-national African institutions once we 
understand the effect pre-colonial and colonial local administrations have on present-day sub-
national governments. A wide range of research has demonstrated that institutional culture 
persists over long periods of time (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; La Porta et al., 1999; 
North, 1990; Young, 1994). Our definition of ‘institutional culture’ builds on Tabellini (2010), 
whereby he sought to explain why some governments, which on paper share similar 
bureaucracies, laws and resources; act in very different ways. He found that variations in 
culture influenced differences in government performance. Culture is a broad and complex 
topic, involving as common factors a set of normative values and morality, which can be passed 
down between generations. Culture therefore dictates what people view as being ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’. It governs peoples’ voting decisions and how bureaucracies themselves function. For 
example, if there is a normalised culture of corruption, this may filter through to how 
governments act. 
Building on this literature on cultural persistence, Duranton, Rodríguez-Pose, and Sandall 
(2009), argue that the relationship between historical government institutions and present-day 
government institutions is based upon shared social and cultural traits, which persist over time 
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and still determine differences in development. These findings make the political centralisation 
of pre-colonial African societies a useful instrument for present-day sub-national government 
quality. Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013a) have reported that political centralisation of 
pre-colonial ethnic institutions determines present-day differences in economic development 
in Africa. We therefore hypothesise that pre-colonial African societies may have affected local 
state apparatuses during colonial rule, which, in turn, influenced modern-day sub-national 
government. As indicated by Murdock (1959) and Herbst (2000), many pre-colonial societies 
had forms of organised bureaucracies, property rights, and norms and processes for dispute 
resolution. Our identification strategy rests on the assumption that high levels of political 
centralisation (in other words a more top-down government architecture) in pre-colonial 
societies have led to higher levels of sub-national government quality in African regions. 
Despite the important role of sub-national government institutions, few studies have examined 
sub-national government quality in Africa. These studies have tended to find nuanced results 
which show the importance of local variation in sub-national government quality. For example, 
Smith’s ethnographic study (2012) investigated factors which lead to a deterioration in the 
quality of sub-national governments. He found that donor-funded development projects played 
a central role in reinforcing clientelism and patronage networks in Nigeria’s Abia State. 
Tidemand et al. (2014) demonstrated that inequality in funding provided to Tanzanian local 
government authorities led to an increase in unequal service delivery within the country. 
Meanwhile, Knutsen, Kotsadam, Olsen, and Wig (2017) found that an influx of revenue from 
opening new mines caused sub-national government officials in Sub-Saharan Africa to demand 
further bribes. 
While these studies have made important contributions to understanding the role of sub-
national governments in African settings, our paper builds on this literature in three ways. First, 
it goes beyond individual case studies and attempts to identify the economic implications of 
sub-national government institutions by examining 339 regions in 22 countries. Second, the 
use of econometric methods allows us to conduct a cross-country and cross-regional study. 




3. Measuring sub-national government quality in Africa 
To overcome this gap in existing knowledge, we build a model linking differences in sub-
national government quality with regional economic development. Given the absence of 
official sub-national data on GDP for most African countries, we exploit satellite data on night-
time luminosity as the dependent variable. To measure sub-national institutional quality, we 
create a new index using Afrobarometer data. 
3.1. Quality of sub-national government 
The explanatory variable of interest is a newly developed index of sub-national government 
quality. This is created using Rounds 5 (2013) and 6 (2015) of the Afrobarometer surveys. The 
surveys cover around 200,000 individuals in nationally representative samples across 37 
different African countries.2 Interviews are geocoded and can be traced to both their 
administrative level 1 regions (for example provinces) and administrative level 2 regions (for 
example municipalities). All respondents are randomly selected, such that every adult citizen 
has an equal chance of being surveyed (Afrobarometer, 2014). Furthermore, samples are 
distributed across urban and rural areas in proportion to their share of the national population.3 
We construct the sub-national index for a total of 22 African countries: Algeria, Benin, 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Malawi, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and 
eSwatini (Swaziland at the time of surveying). However, due to data availability issues, a 
handful of regions were omitted. Some of these are low population density or desert regions of 
Algeria (Adrar, Tindouf, Tamanghasset, and Naama) and Egypt (Al Wadi, Al Jadid, and 
Shamal Sina), alongside areas experiencing conflict (Boko Haram-ravaged states of Yobe, 
Borno, and Adamwa in northeastern Nigeria), and a small number of relatively low-population 
regions in Malawi (Nsanje), Namibia (East and West Kavango) and Guinea (Faranah). We also 
exclude countries such as Uganda and Zimbabwe which do not have second tiers of 
government. 
Perhaps the most important definition of QoG comes from Rothstein and Teorell (2008). They 
argue that QoG can be thought of both in terms of inputs, or the access to public authority, and 
outputs, or manner in which exercise of authority occurs. They suggest that impartiality is at 
the core of QoG, based on the idea that high QoG allows citizens to trust that their dealings 
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with the government will be removed from special considerations, preferences, or pre-existing 
relationships. Because of this, QoG is inversely related to corruption, which entails special 
treatment, positively connected to both trust and the extent to which local actors are willing to 
contact government agencies. While Rothstein and Teorell (2008) separate out policy 
effectiveness from quality of government, they note that both are likely to be related. Given 
that other seminal studies of QoG have also considered effectiveness (La Porta et al., 1999), 
we argue that it is important to consider these measures in any indicator of QoG. 
Building on these theoretical ideas, we select eight questions from Afrobarometer to measure 
sub-national quality of government (see Supplementary Table A2). These include the level of 
corruption of sub-national government officials (for example frequency of bribes); the trust 
respondents have in sub-national officials; the perceived performance in office of local 
government actors; and the quality of the services they are responsible for. The responses to 
these questions are pooled into a subjective sub-national regional government quality index, 
which reflects – in line with the OECD’s Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators 
(Nardo et al., 2005) – the opinions of African citizens about their regional government 
institutions. 
Although the number of surveyed individuals varies by region and survey round, there is a 
mean value of approximately 200 respondents for each (admin 1) region per round.4 By 
combining rounds 5 and 6, we end up with an average of around 400 respondents per region. 
To construct the index of sub-national government quality, some steps are taken. First, we 
standardise the scale of each question. Each question is given an equal weighting and the scores 
combined to form a sub-national government quality rating for reach respondent. These 
measures are then averaged at a regional level. The resulting index is rescaled to form a number 
between 0 (low government quality) and 100 (high government quality). 














!"#$ is the sub-national government quality index for each region +, ' is the individual-level 
sub-national government quality rating, ) is the response to each of the eight Afrobarometer 
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questions, and ( is the total number of Afrobarometer respondents in each region. The 
Appendix provides further detail on the methodology behind the index. 
 
3.2. GDP data 
The dependent variable is the log GDP levels from 2015. However, most African countries do 
not publish official sub-national GDP data. To address this shortcoming, we use satellite data 
of night-time light luminosity, following Henderson, Storeygard, and Weil (2012), who found 
that night lights are an accurate indicator of sub-national economic activity (other examples 
include Russ et al., 2018; Tanaka & Keola, 2017). We use data from the Visible Infrared 
Imaging Radiometer Suite Day/Night Band (VIIRS-DNB), which provide greater resolution 
than the Defence Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System (DMSP-
OLS) data typically used in spatial economics studies. VIIRS data are available every 15 arc 
seconds for each pixel area (approximately 0.5 km × 0.5 km). Gas flares, moonlight, and 
sunlight (potential sources of noise) have been filtered out, such that just electric lighting is 
measured. The data are highly sensitive to low levels of visible light, which is important when 
deriving economic activity indicators for more rural (and thus less-electrified) areas (Ou, Liu, 
Li, Li, & Li, 2015) in Africa. To adjust for the population of each region and to ensure that the 
night light emissions are not driven purely by a population effect, we use log population as a 
control variable (as per Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2018) using the UN’s Gridded 
Population of the World database to ensure that our night light data are not simply driven by a 
population effect. 
3.3. Geographic data 
We also use several geographic, topographic, and climate controls. The geographic controls 
are log average distance to gold mines from GOLDATA; log average distance to water from 
the GSHHG Database; log average distance to national borders, calculated using GADM 
Shapefiles; and log average distance to petroleum sites, from the Peace Research Institute Oslo. 
These controls account for any locational advantage that may affect GDP. 
Our topographic controls include log average ground slope and log average elevation data from 
the Consortium for Spatial Information. These measures are important in addressing any 
variations in terrain and ruggedness that could impact regions. 
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We also control for log average yearly temperature of each region using data the University of 
Delaware’s Climate Data Archive. This control accounts for other regional disparities that may 
affect the cultivability of a regions’ land, which in turn would affect its GDP levels. 
3.4. Further economic data 
Several economic controls are also included. These consist of employment and education 
levels, which are calculated from round 5 and 6 of the Afrobarometer surveys; infrastructure, 
proxied through a road density measure (that is the percentage of a region covered by roads) 
and calculated using raster data from OpenStreetMap; and (log) greenfield and brownfield 
Foreign Direct Investment data from Orbis (2018). These measures account for exogenous 
economic factors behind variations in regional GDP. 
3.5. Institutional data at national level 
We include a measure of national-level devolution: the World Bank’s Administrative 
Decentralisation Index (Ivanyna & Shah, 2012). This measures the regulatory control regional 
governments have over their own functions by looking at whether governments can conduct 
their own policies regarding hiring, firing, setting terms of employment. It then measures the 
resources of regional governments by looking at the ratio of regional government employment 
to national government employment (excluding health, education, and police sectors). A 
continuous composite index of between 0 and 1 is then calculated for each country. 
As a further institutional check, we control for levels of central government quality using the 
Government Effectiveness measures of the World Bank’s 2015 World Governance Indicators. 
As a robustness test, we use three alternative measures of central government quality: 
Transparency International (2015) Corruptions Perception Index, and IHS Markit 
(2015a, 2015b) Government Instability Index, and their Political Risk Index. Central 
government quality controls are used to account for variations in national-level institutions that 
would impact GDP levels. 
Institutional quality is often higher closer to the main administrative and/or commercial capital 
cities (for example Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2013a). This is because agglomeration 
effects appear to be most prominent in capital cities – they have greater resource endowments 
and larger labour pooling effects; a strong foundation for better quality institutions. Knowledge 
flows can spill over onto neighbouring areas, and these knowledge flows have been found to 
experience distance decay effects (Rodríguez-Pose & Crescenzi, 2008). Thus, regions near 
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capital cities may benefit from such spillovers. Especially in Africa, regions near capital cities 
may also benefit from the widely observed favoured treatment of capitals, which generally 
receive a preferential allocation of resources to harness political rents (for example Ades & 
Glaeser, 1995; Lee & Luca, 2019). Therefore, to address questions about whether the results 
are driven by capital cities, we include a capital city dummy variable. 
4. Sub-national government quality and regional GDP 
Mapping the 2013–2015 sub-national government quality index for the 22 African countries 
included in the analysis uncovers a high degree of variation in government quality across 
African regions. Figure 1 provides a cross-sectional illustration of this variation. The 
subjective opinions of Africans about their regional institutions point to a greater level of 
satisfaction in western Kenyan states such as Nandi, West Pokot, and Turkana; Erongo in 
western Namibia; North-West District in Botswana; Diffa in eastern Niger; El Bayadh, Saida, 
and Mascara Provinces in northwestern Algeria; as well as parts of Egypt such as Matrouh, 
Qena, and Aswan. The highest dissatisfaction is found across southern Nigeria, including Abia, 
Ogun, and Benue states; parts of northern Algeria such as Batna, Oum el Bouaghi, and Annaba; 
as well as Tana River in Eastern Kenya. There is no evidence in the government quality index 
of a polarisation between capitals and the rest of the country – for example Dakar ranks highly 
in the case of Senegal, but Rabat, Gauteng province, Maputo, Niamey, or Accra are perceived 
to have lower government qualities than the average of Morocco, South Africa, Mozambique, 
Niger, and Ghana, respectively. Nor is there a marked urban/rural pattern. Many rural areas in, 
for example, northeastern Kenya, northern Ghana, southern Egypt, and northern Mozambique 
perform better than other more densely populated areas in their countries, while this trend does 




Figure 1: Sub-National Government Quality, 2013-15 
 




Differences in sub-national government quality also do not necessarily reflect differences in 
cross-national government quality. Figure 2 provides an illustration of national government 
quality (measured through the World Bank’s 2015 World Governance Indicator, which is 
calculated from a wider range of data sources including expert surveys – see Kraay, Kaufmann, 
& Mastruzzi, 2010). This allows for a comparison between regional government quality with 
the quality of corresponding national institutions. The best levels of national government 
quality are found towards Southern Africa, with Botswana, Namibia, and South Africa topping 
the ranks. Burundi, Guinea, and Liberia have the worst government quality among the countries 
involved in the analysis. There is some divergence between regional and central government 
quality, which in part may be because many of the variables we use are specifically related to 
citizen perceptions at a local level; the measure of Central Government Quality is instead 
reliant on expert surveys. 
 
 
Figure 2: Central Government Quality, 2015 
 




Figure 3 provides a descriptive overview of regional-level measures of nightlight density – our 
proxy for GDP levels. We can see several administrative level 1 regions with high night light 
density in Northern Africa. These regions include Cairo, Alexandria, and Qalyubia in Egypt; 
Algiers and Oran in Algeria; or Casablanca in Morocco. Moreover, a number of Southern 
African regions such as Gauteng in South Africa and Gaborone in Botswana similarly emit 
high levels of night lights. In West Africa, Rivers, an oil-rich state in Southern Nigeria; and 
Dakar in Senegal have high levels of GDP. Finally, Mombasa in Kenya has the highest level 
of regional GDP in East Africa. Rural states in Nigeria, such as Taraba and Ebonyi, as well as 
Inhambane in Mozambique and Kasungu in Malawi have some of the lowest levels of regional 
GDP in our sample. This pattern reflects a familiar geography of GDP throughout African sub-
national regions. We would expect that regions with higher population levels would possess 
higher levels of nightlight density. Therefore, it is important to account for levels of population 
when conducting our analysis. 
 






Before anything can be directly inferred from these figures, we need to account for sources of 
endogeneity, such as omitted variables bias and reverse causality. To do so, we first use an 
OLS model, followed by a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) model, 
with the political centralisation of pre-colonial ethnic societies as an instrument for current day 
sub-national government quality. 
 
5. The model and the econometric analysis 
5.1 The model 
 
In the first instance, we use a reduced form OLS model that measures the impact of sub-national 
government quality on GDP. Our analysis is based on variants of the following specification: 
 
(1)                                ,(-!' = 	/ +	1!"#$!' + 2′!'φ + 5!' 	 
 
,(-!' is the level of GDP in 2015 for region r in country c as measured in satellite data on 
nighttime light density. SNGQ is our sub-national government quality index which has been 
created from rounds 5 and 6 of Afrobarometer, and 2 is a vector of numerous covariates which 
affect GDP levels. These are the various economic, geographic, topographic, climate, and 
institutional controls discussed previously. We cluster standard errors at the country level. 
Appendix Table 1 provides a further overview of the data and their sources. 
 




Overall, the OLS results displayed in Table 1 match our initial expectations: sub- national 
government quality is positively associated with GDP. We run two sets of regressions – with 
standard errors clustered at the region and country level. Columns (1 and 3) show that in the 
entire sample, there is a positive relationship between sub-national government quality and 
regional economic performance (when controlling for a range of location and topographic 
factors). Our controls include central government quality, suggesting that the effect of sub-
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national government quality is independent of this, and a range of other covariates, such as 
infrastructure, education, employment, and the stock of FDI, are considered. 
 
Table 1: OLS estimates of impact of sub-national government quality on 
GDP 
 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP 
  
Sub National Gov Qual 0.0152** 0.0208*** 0.0152**     0.0208** 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)    (0.008) 
Log Population 0.1610*** 0.1355*** 0.1610** 0.1355** 
 (0.040) (0.037) (0.059) (0.058) 
Devolution Index −1.1065*** −1.1554*** −1.1065*** −1.1554*** 
 (0.251) (0.246) (0.332) (0.302) 
Log Temperature −0.4420 −0.4632 −0.4420 −0.4632 
 (0.441) (0.420) (0.367) (0.326) 
Central Gov Qual 0.0249*** 0.0255*** 0.0249** 0.0255** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) 
Employment −0.1427 −0.1701* −0.1427 −0.1701 
 (0.091) (0.087) (0.106) (0.103) 
Education 0.9272** 0.6961* 0.9272 0.6961 
 (0.435) (0.411) (0.547) (0.553) 
Infrastructure −0.0185** −0.0248*** −0.0185 −0.0248 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.015) (0.015) 
Log FDI 0.0572*** 0.0505*** 0.0572*** 0.0505*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
Capital City Dummy  0.9099***  0.9099*** 
  (0.257)  (0.220) 
Constant 6.1393*** 5.7890*** 6.1393* 5.7890* 
 (1.916) (1.847) (3.098) (2.980) 
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Topographic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 339 339 339 339 
R2 0.5791 0.6103 0.5791 0.6103 
Adjusted R2 0.560 0.591 0.560 0.591 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates linking regional development with sub-national 
government quality. The dependent variable is log of GDP as measured in night light density. Standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. Standard errors are clustered by region in regressions 1–2 and 
country in 3–4. Location controls include log distance from national borders, log distance from water, log distance 
from petroleum deposits and log distance from gold deposits. Topographic controls include log elevation and log 
slope. 
 
In line with previous results by Rodríguez-Pose and Ezcurra (2011), greater regional autonomy 
is, however, not associated with high GDP. This may be a consequence of hasty 
decentralisation processes, lack of resources to conduct independent policies, limited capacity 
by local governments, or a combination of all three. Moreover, decentralisation processes may 
be too recent to have made an impact. 
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An important concern is that our results may be skewed by the location of capital cities. To 
address this, in columns (2 and 4) we add a capital city dummy. When we account for regions 
with capital cities, we see that sub-national government quality remains positively associated 
with regional GDP at the 1 per cent significance level.5 
In sum, a statistically significant relationship between regional government quality and GDP 
exists across Africa, even when controlling for factors such as education, infrastructure, and 
national government quality. We would expect to see a high degree of correlation between sub-
national governments and regional economic performance because more-developed areas are 
likely to have greater resources, higher reserves of human capital and, therefore, better quality 
institutions. We are more interested, however, in examining whether sub-national government 
quality drives economic performance. To do so, we need to undertake an identification strategy 
which establishes causality and addresses endogeneity resulting from omitted variables bias. 
 
5.3 Identification strategy 
To address causality concerns we use an IV model. The instrument is the level of political 
centralisation of pre-colonial African societies – that is the ‘Jurisdictional Hierarchy of Local 
Communities’. The data is obtained from anthropologist George P. Murdock’s Ethnographic 
Atlas, a database of 1167 societies that were mapped, coded, and published in the Journal of 
Ethnology. This database has been widely used in recent institutional literature focusing on 
African economic performance (for example Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007; Michalopoulos & 
Papaioannou, 2013b; Nunn, 2008; Nunn & Wantchekon, 2011; Sinding Bentzen, Hariri, & 
Robinson, 2019). The variable attributes the value of 0 to groups ‘lacking any form of 
centralized political organization’, 1 for ‘petty chiefdoms’, 2 for ‘large paramount 
chiefdoms/small states’, and 3 or 4 for ‘large states’. For our index of political centralisation, 
we combine all ‘large states’ into a single category, and therefore use four values to represent 
the four categories. 
The Ethnographic Atlas data were constructed from a team of fieldworkers as well as archival 
research (Murdock, 1967).6 For each ethnic group Murdock identified the earliest period for 
which satisfactory data existed prior to widespread European colonisation in order to describe 
their characteristics (Gennaioli & Rainer, 2007). Murdock’s dataset for Africa does not attempt 
to capture the full complexities of centuries of local community administrative organisations. 
Instead, it measures the level of local community centralisation on the eve of widespread 
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European colonisation, based on existing work which shows that that pre-colonial political 
institutions still matter for political structures now (Sinding Bentzen et al., 2019). 
We determine which pre-colonial African societies corresponds to current day administrative 
regions by overlaying them to identify the area of intersection (see Figure 4). In cases where 
more than one society fits into a region, we assigned a weighting of jurisdictional hierarchy 
levels based on the percentage of intersection (see Figure 5). We have dropped observations 
where there are missing values in Murdock’s map although this does not have a significant 
impact on the OLS estimates provided in Table 1. 





Figure 5: Levels of jurisdictional hierarchy in pre-colonial societies 
   
 
The second stage estimating equation involves variations on the following: 
(1)                        !"#$!' = 	/ +	∅7!' + 2′!'φ + 5!' 
Here we treat sub-national government quality (SNGQ) as endogenous and data on the 
centralisation of pre-colonial African societies, 7, as an exogenous variable. 
Table 2 reports a significant and causal impact of sub-national government quality on regional 
economic performance. Column (1) demonstrates that sub-national government quality exerts 
a significant impact on regional economic activity when controlling for location, climate, and 
topographic factors. Adding in central government quality in column (2) does not have a major 
impact on the significance and magnitude of this relationship. In column (3) we similarly see 
that this causal relationship holds when controlling for economic factors. Finally, in column 
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(4) we use the capital city dummy to assess whether our previous results were driven by regions 
hosting the capital cities of a country. We see that this also does not have a large impact on the 
magnitude and significance of the relationship between sub-national government quality and 
regional GDP. 
 
5.4 Instrumental variable results 
 
Table 2. IV estimates of impact of sub-national government quality on GDP 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
VARIABLES Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP 
Sub National Gov Qual 0.178*** 0.167*** 0.149*** 0.156*** 
 (0.0481) (0.0423) (0.0408) (0.0427) 
Log Population 0.209*** 0.205*** 0.155** 0.136** 
 (0.0732) (0.0707) (0.0619) (0.0614) 
Devolution Index 1.582*** −2.090*** −1.849*** −1.912*** 
 (0.579) (0.544) (0.480) (0.500) 
Log Temperature −0.622 −0.304 −0.0882        −0.175 
 (0.389) (0.204) (0.210) (0.194) 
Central Gov Qual  0.0472*** 0.0280*** 0.0275*** 
  (0.00982) (0.0105) (0.0106) 
Employment   0.0798 0.00902 
   (0.168) (0.172) 
Education   0.915          0.358 
   (0.840) (0.823) 
Infrastructure   0.0223         0.0122 
   (0.0167) (0.0155) 
Log FDI   0.0318*        0.0246 
   (0.0174) (0.0172) 
Capital City Dummy    1.257*** 
    (0.355) 
Constant −5.419 −5.222 −4.058          −4.221 
 (4.312) (3.578) (3.112) (3.082) 
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes           Yes 
Topographic Controls Yes Yes Yes           Yes 
First stage F-test 21.4
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0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 241 241 238 238 
R2 −0.243 −0.060 0.131 0.142 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS IV estimates associating regional 
development with sub-national government quality. Dependent variable is log of GDP as measured 
in night light density. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 
0.05, * p < 0.1. Location controls include log distance from national borders, log distance from 
water, log distance from petroleum deposits and log distance from gold deposits. Topographic 




Of note are the coefficient and significance of central government quality. In column (2) central 
government quality has a positive and significant relationship with regional GDP, however the 
magnitude of this relationship is much smaller than sub-national government quality. As more 
controls are added in columns (3) and (4), central government quality becomes less significant 
and the magnitude of the relationship diminishes. While this may seem unexpected given the 
long literature on the importance of central government quality, this finding aligns more with 
the work of Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013b), who used regression discontinuities in 
African regions and found that national-level institutions had close to zero effect on regional 
economic activity. It also supports the work of political scientists, such as Herbst (2000), who 
challenged the widespread assumption regarding the sole importance of present-day national-
level institutions in explaining economic performance within African contexts. 
To meet the exclusion restrictions of a valid instrument, we need to ensure that the instrument 
is relevant and exogenous. The instrument of jurisdictional hierarchy of pre-colonial societies 
is relevant, as the first stage f-tests are greater than 10 (the rule of thumb for instrument 
relevance). However, given that the f-test is less than 25 in all cases, we have employed the 
Anderson-Rubin test which is robust to weak instruments. In each case, the Anderson-Rubin 
p-value is well under 0.05, thereby indicating that our results still hold. Regarding instrument 
exogeneity, we have previously discussed the extensive literature, which suggests that 
institutional culture persists over time. We address these and other concerns in the robustness 
tests section below. As with any instrument, it is important to caveat this finding – the results 
here are consistent with a causal explanation, but they can never prove it. 
6. Robustness tests 
6.1. Instrument exogeneity in IV estimates 
In Supplementary Table A4 we examine whether our instrument acts through central 
government quality as well as sub-national government quality. This would render our 
instrument endogenous. To test this theory, we run the instrument through central government 
quality and find that the f-test is less than 2, thereby indicating that it is not a valid instrument 
for national-level institutions. This finding upholds our initial assumption that pre-colonial 
societies influenced the make-up of local-level institutions during colonialism, which in turn 
affected sub-national institutions following independence. 
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Another potential concern is that colonisation and the creation of colonial borders were 
influenced by the quality of pre-colonial institutions. In other words, colonial powers decided 
to settle in areas which had higher quality proto-local governments. If this were the case, then 
pre-colonial institutional quality may be endogenous. However, a range of literature has 
disputed this, arguing that colonial borders were created exogenously (in the late 19th century, 
culminating in the 1884–1885 Berlin Conference) at a time when Europeans had limited 
knowledge of local conditions (Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2016). 
However, it is possible that Europeans may have known more about coastal regions – 
especially in Western Africa – prior to 1884. To address this concern, in Supplementary Table 
A5, we drop all coastal regions from our analysis and re-run our IV estimates. Again, we find 
no major changes in the magnitude or significance of sub-national government quality’s impact 
on GDP. 
6.2. Alternative measures of central government quality 
Given the existence of several central government quality indicators, we repeat our IV analysis 
using different measures. This is to ensure that we do not rely on a single measure of central 
government quality that biases the results. In addition to the World Governance Indicators, we 
use Transparency International’s Corruptions Perceptions Index, IHS Markit’s Government 
Instability Index, and IHS Markit’s Political Risk Index. The results of these analyses are 
presented in Supplementary Table A6. No significant discrepancies with our original findings 
are in evidence. Sub-national government quality still has a positive, significant, and causal 
impact on regional economic performance, while the instrument again satisfies the exclusion 
restriction with all first-stage F-tests larger than 10. 
6.3. Estimations with alternative time period 
In Supplementary Table A7, we repeat the analysis using data from 2016 instead of 2015. This 
is to ensure our results remain consistent over different cross-sections. Given that the sub-
national government quality index is constructed using data from 2013 to 2015, we can only 
repeat the analysis with data after 2015. The latest available year of VIIRS night lights data 
comes from 2016, which therefore restricts us to analysing 2015 and 2016 cross-sections. 
While we see some variances in the OLS results – with Sub-National Government Quality 
becoming insignificant in column (1), once controlling for capital cities the significance 
returns. Nonetheless, the IV results remain unchanged across all permutations which indicates 
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a positive, significant, and causal relationship between sub-national government quality and 
regional GDP in 2016. 
6.4. Estimations without low-sample regions 
Our final check addresses the concern that the results may be driven by regions with a low 
number of observations in Afrobarometer. We repeat the basic regression (given in Table 1, 
Column 2) using alternative samples of the data. The full regression table appears in 
Supplementary Table A8. We run the model excluding regions with <50 observation and then 
those with <100 observations. The coefficient is close in both cases to that in the full model 
(0.021): 0.018 and statistically significant at the 5 per cent level, when excluding those with 
<50 observations; and 0.016 and significant at the 10 per cent level, when excluding those with 
<100). Given that the coefficient remains similar in magnitude, the reduction in statistical 
significance may result from the smaller sample size and imprecision added in the weighting 
process. We cautiously conclude that our results are not likely to be biased in a major way by 
low-observation regions. 
7. Conclusion 
This paper has addressed a significant gap in the literature regarding the role of sub-national 
governments in influencing the economic performance of African regions. Despite near-
consensus that government institutions matter for economic performance, few studies have 
considered sub-national government institutions – especially outside of Europe and Asia. 
While African states have a varied history of sub-national government institutions and 
apparatuses (Olowu, 2003), sub-national governments have tended to be relatively and 
increasingly important, given the more recent trends towards devolution. Given this, the lack 
of evidence on the relationship between sub-national government quality and economic 
development represents an important gap. To properly understand the role of institutions in 
promoting economic activity, research should go beyond the traditional analyses of national-
level government institutions to fully account for variations in sub-national government quality 
in Africa. 
In this paper, we have addressed this gap by creating a new index of sub-national government 
quality for 339 African regions. The index was then used to investigate the relationship 
between quality of sub-national government and regional GDP, as proxied by night light 
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density. We employ data on the level of jurisdictional hierarchy of pre-colonial societies as an 
instrument for sub-national government quality. This instrument was found to be relevant and 
exogenous, thereby meeting the criteria for the exclusion restriction. 
The principal finding is that sub-national government quality has a positive, statistically 
significant, and robust relationship with regional economic development in Africa. These 
results hold when controlling for a wide range of other factors that may be correlated with GDP 
(for example education levels, infrastructure endowments, and FDI). The instrumental variable 
analysis suggests that this effect is causal, rather than due to more developed localities having 
better government. Moreover, we find that sub-national government quality has an effect, 
independent of national government quality. This finding may be somewhat controversial, as 
it goes against some of the more prominent theories explaining economic activity that see 
national government institutions as fundamental to economic performance (for example 
Acemoglu et al., 2005). However, it is consistent with more recent research by Michalopoulos 
and Papaioannou (2013b), who established through regression discontinuity designs that 
national-level government institutions did not have as large an impact on regional economic 
activity than was previously believed. 
The results have implications for both academic work and policy. Outside the European and 
Asian cases, academic work on government institutions – and, therefore, most development 
policies – has tended to focus on the national-level context. However, in Africa like elsewhere 
in the world, sub-national government institutions fulfil a range of important functions that are 
at the heart of differences in development. Hence, sub-national government quality shapes past 
and future development prospects, even in a context where decentralisation and regional 
autonomy have not yielded the expected economic returns. For policy, these results highlight 
the importance of building capacity, increasing voice, transparency, and accountability, and 
stemming corruption at a sub-national level. Focusing on these issues at national level does not 
suffice. If the sub-national government dimension continues to be overlooked, it is likely that 
most governmental improvements at the national level will end up diluted and the benefits will 
not reach ordinary citizen. 
Our research opens up several potential avenues for examination. One question is the extent to 
which sub-national government quality influences economic performance in the context of 
better (or worse) national government quality (particularly if sub-national governments may in 
some cases be a substitute for national governments). A second would be to identify the exact 
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mechanisms that impact sub-national government quality or decomposing the index and 
determining the channels through which sub-national government quality affects GDP. 
Moreover, if sub-national government quality matters for regional economic performance, then 
what are its effects on other important economic factors such as spatial inequalities, 
productivity, innovation, or employment? In order to fully grasp how institutions impact 
important economic indicators, we must extend our understanding of the impacts of sub-
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Appendix Table A1 
Variable Definition Source 
Sub-National 
Government Quality 
Index of sub-national government quality 
(author's calculation) 
Afrobarometer Rounds 5 and 6 
Night time light 
emissions (GDP) 
Log of night light density measured using the 
Visible Infrared Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
Distance to gold 
mines 
Log average distance to gold mines (kms) GOLDATA (Balestri, 2013) 
Distance to water Log average distance to water (kms) GSHHG Database 
Distance to national 
borders 
log average distance to national borders (kms) GADM 
Distance to 
petroleum 
log average distance to petroleum sites (kms) PRIO 
Slope log average ground slope (degrees) from 
Shuttle Radar Topography Mission dataset at 
500m resolution 
Consortium for Spatial Information 
Elevation log average elevation (metres) from Shuttle 
Radar Topography Mission dataset at 500m 
resolution 
Consortium for Spatial Information 
Temperature Monthly average of daily mean temperature 
(2015 and 2016) 
University of Delaware’s Climate 
Data Archive 
Employment Afrobarometer Question: "Employment 
status?" Responses: 0=No (not looking), 1=No 
(looking), 2=Yes, part time, 3= Yes, full time, 
9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing. 
Afrobarometer Rounds 5 and 6 
Education Afrobarometer Question: "What is your 
highest level of education?" Responses: 0=No 
formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only 
(including Koranic schooling), 2=Some 
primary schooling, 3=Primary school 
completed, 4=Intermediate school or Some 
secondary school / high school, 5=Secondary 
school / high school completed , 6=Post-
secondary qualifications, other than university 
e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or 
college, 7=Some university, 8=University 
completed, 9=Post-graduate, 99=Don’t know 
[Do not read], 98=Refused to answer, -
1=Missing 
Afrobarometer Rounds 5 and 6 
Infrastructure Index of road density (percentage of total area) 




$ millions Orbis 
Population Log population levels UN’s Gridded Population of the 




Government Effectiveness Score (0-100) World Governance Indicators  
Corruptions 
Perception Index 
Central government corruption levels (0=very 
corrupt, 100= not corrupt) 
Transparency International 
Government 
Instability Index  
Government instability of central governments 
(0 = stable, 10= unstable) 
IHS Markit (2015a) 
Political Risk Index Political risk rating of central government (0 = 
low risk, 10= high risk) 
IHS Markit (2015b) 
Devolution Index Administrative decentralization index (0 = not 
decentralized, 1=completely autonomous sub-
national governments) 




APPENDIX TABLE A2 







How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard 
enough about them to say: Your Metropolitan, Municipal or District 
Assembly? 
1 4 
During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following 
persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A 




How many of the following people do you think are involved in 
corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Local 
government councillors? 
1 4 
How many of the following people do you think are involved in 
corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Tax 





Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have 
performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard 




How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen 
to what people like you have to say: Local government councillors? 
1 4 
What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I 
mean your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly. How well or 
badly would you say your local government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Maintaining 
local roads? 
1 4 
What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I 
mean your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly. How well or 
badly would you say your local government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Maintaining 





APPENDIX TABLE A3: First-Stage IV Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Sub Nat Gov 
Qual 
Sub Nat Gov 
Qual 
Sub Nat Gov 
Qual 
Sub Nat Gov 
Qual 
          
Pol_centralisation 2.161*** 2.211*** 2.167*** 2.122*** 
 (0.466) (0.473) (0.463) (0.465) 
Devolution Index 10.81*** 12.05*** 10.54*** 10.49*** 
 (2.168) (2.249) (2.306) (2.300) 
Log Population -0.965*** -0.979*** -0.853** -0.782** 
 (0.331) (0.337) (0.337) (0.338) 
Log Temperature 0.875 0.273 0.254 0.493 
 (0.882) (0.837) (0.889) (0.894) 
Central Gov Qual  -0.0924* -0.0585 -0.0557 
  (0.0543) (0.0650) (0.0650) 
Infrastructure   -0.220*** -0.187** 
   (0.0748) (0.0752) 
Log FDI   0.148 0.165 
   (0.102) (0.101) 
Employment   -1.917** -1.676* 
   (0.944) (0.965) 
Education   -0.349 1.230 
   (4.571) (4.580) 
Capital City 
Dummy    -3.552*** 
    (1.275) 
Constant 56.83*** 57.74*** 53.45*** 52.78*** 
 (10.86) (10.79) (10.56) (10.50) 
Location 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Topographic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 




Appendix Table A4 – IV Estimates (instrumenting through central government quality) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP 
        
Central Gov Qual 0.456 0.399 0.399 
 (0.385) (0.298) (0.300) 
Devolution Index -6.489 -5.156 -5.195 
 (5.409) (3.571) (3.600) 
Log Population 0.169 0.255 0.245 
 (0.215) (0.204) (0.203) 
Log Temperature 2.445 0.787 0.743 
 (4.016) (1.696) (1.708) 
Sub National Gov 
Qual 0.0656 0.0344 0.0381 
 (0.0419) (0.0245) (0.0249) 
Infrastructure  -0.122 -0.128 
  (0.0973) (0.0982) 
Log FDI  -0.118 -0.122 
  (0.136) (0.137) 
Employment  -1.407 -1.446 
  (1.014) (1.025) 
Education  1.461 1.170 
  (1.668) (1.647) 
Capital City 
Dummy   0.660 
   (0.788) 
Constant -3.522 -1.654 -1.735 
 (13.41) (8.952) (8.952) 
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Topographic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-test 1.10 1.54 1.54 
Observations 241 238 238 
R-squared -5.566 -2.983 -2.972 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS IV 
estimates associating regional development with sub 
national government quality. Dependent variable is log of 
GDP as measured in night light density. Standard errors 
clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. Location controls include log distance from 
national borders, log distance from water, log distance from 
petroleum deposits and log distance from gold deposits. 
Topographic controls include log elevation and log slope 
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Appendix Table A5 – IV Estimates (excluding coastal regions) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP 
        
Sub National Gov 
Qual 0.116*** 0.0859** 0.0840*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0341) (0.0324) 
Devolution Index -1.565*** -1.181*** -1.179*** 
 (0.584) (0.444) (0.399) 
Log Population 0.119* 0.0751 0.0586 
 (0.0663) (0.0549) (0.0522) 
Log Temperature -1.575*** -1.359*** -1.398*** 
 (0.521) (0.496) (0.452) 
Central Gov 
Quality 0.0476*** 0.0258** 0.0271** 
 (0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0109) 
Infrastructure  0.0140 0.00330 
  (0.0153) (0.0135) 
Log FDI  0.0447*** 0.0348*** 
  (0.0156) (0.0133) 
Employment  -0.156 -0.221* 
  (0.125) (0.119) 
Education  1.083 0.692 
  (0.756) (0.687) 
Capital City 
Dummy   1.312*** 
   (0.364) 
Constant 4.341 6.484* 7.383** 
 (4.170) (3.365) (3.057) 
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Topographic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-Test 14.49 18.65 18.63 
Observations 185 182 182 
R-squared 0.220 0.428 0.502 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS 
IV estimates associating regional development with 
sub national government quality. Dependent variable is 
log of GDP as measured in night light density. 
Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Location controls 
include log distance from national borders, log distance 
from water, log distance from petroleum deposits and 
log distance from gold deposits. Topographic controls 




Appendix Table A6 – Alternate Measures of Central Government Quality 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Log GDP Log GDP Log GDP 
        
Sub National Gov Qual 0.155*** 0.152*** 0.149*** 
 (0.0416) (0.0452) (0.0424) 





 (0.484) (0.476) (0.460) 
Log Population 0.268*** 0.168*** 0.186*** 
 (0.0779) (0.0634) (0.0629) 
Log Temperature -0.0595 -0.169 -0.174 
 (0.178) (0.275) (0.249) 
Infrastructure 0.00743 0.0336** 0.0335** 
 (0.0180) (0.0166) (0.0165) 
Log FDI 0.0258 0.0392** 0.0379** 
 (0.0177) (0.0182) (0.0171) 
Employment 0.0318 0.166 0.141 
 (0.160) (0.187) (0.178) 
Education 0.747 0.860 0.849 
 (0.859) (0.858) (0.841) 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index 0.0492***   
 (0.0131)   
Government Instability 
Index  -0.0860  
  (0.127)  
Political Risk Index   -0.167 
   (0.121) 
Constant -6.628* -3.880 -3.474 
 (3.446) (3.522) (3.364) 
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Topographic Controls Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-test 20.75 18.39 20.00 
Observations 234 238 238 
R-squared 0.116 0.088 0.122 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS IV 
estimates associating regional development with sub 
national government quality. Dependent variable is log of 
GDP as measured in night light density. Standard errors 
clustered by country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1. Location controls include log distance 
from national borders, log distance from water, log 
distance from petroleum deposits and log distance from 
gold deposits. Topographic controls include log elevation 
and log slope. Individual fixed effects for living 




Appendix Table A7 – Alternative Cross-Section 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES lnviirs lnviirs lnviirs lnviirs lnviirs 
            
Sub National Gov 
Qual 0.0101 0.0157*** 0.134*** 0.108*** 0.113*** 
 (0.00615) (0.00590) (0.0350) (0.0306) (0.0320) 
Central Gov Qual 0.0186*** 0.0195*** 0.0360*** 0.0227*** 0.0228*** 
 (0.00675) (0.00640) (0.00749) (0.00809) (0.00799) 
Devolution Index -0.817*** -0.861*** -1.551*** -1.333*** -1.364*** 
 (0.248) (0.242) (0.461) (0.386) (0.395) 
Log Population 0.271*** 0.245*** 0.315*** 0.253*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0391) (0.0368) (0.0609) (0.0513) (0.0505) 
Employment -0.118 -0.150*  0.0254 -0.0432 
 (0.0932) (0.0897)  (0.139) (0.142) 
Education 1.244*** 1.091***  1.556*** 1.225** 





0.0308***  0.00458 -0.00399 
 (0.00926) (0.00922)  (0.0139) (0.0133) 
Log FDI 0.0525*** 0.0447***  0.0286* 0.0208 
 (0.0118) (0.0108)  (0.0153) (0.0145) 
Log Temperature -0.216 -0.234 -0.133 0.131 0.0568 
 (0.339) (0.316) (0.156) (0.162) (0.144) 
Capital City 
Dummy  0.929***   1.095*** 
  (0.265)   (0.301) 
Constant 4.551*** 4.198*** -4.761 -3.706 -3.703 
 (1.579) (1.492) (3.115) (2.588) (2.532) 
Location Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Topographic 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-Test - - 21.92 22.78 21.8 
Observations 339 339 241 238 238 
R-squared 0.647 0.675 0.306 0.482 0.505 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS (1)-(2) and 2SLS IV (3)-(6) estimates 
associating regional development with sub national government quality. Dependent 
variable is log of GDP as measured in night light density. Standard errors clustered by 
country in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Location controls include log 
distance from national borders, log distance from water, log distance from petroleum 
deposits and log distance from gold deposits. Topographic controls include log elevation 




Appendix Table A7 – Results excluding low-observation regions 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES lnGDP lnGDP 
 
Specification 
Excluding regions with 
< 50 observations 
Excluding regions with 
< 100 observations 
 





 (0.00785) (0.00946) 
Central Gov Qual 0.0180** 0.0132 
 (0.00736) (0.00878) 
Employment -0.201** -0.0938 
 (0.0926) (0.103) 
Education 1.044** 2.018*** 
 (0.480) (0.694) 
Log FDI 0.0441*** 0.0311** 
 (0.0107) (0.0121) 
Capital City Dummy 0.836*** 0.782*** 
 (0.255) (0.267) 
Devolution Index -0.885*** -0.636** 
 (0.252) (0.273) 
Log Population 0.174*** 0.223*** 
 (0.0443) (0.0609) 
Log Temperature -1.614*** -1.214*** 
 (0.416) (0.464) 
Constant 9.417*** 6.925*** 
 (1.952) (2.358) 
Topographic Controls   
Observations 291 211 






Paper 2 - Examining the Drivers of Sub-National 





Paper 1 suggests that variations of sub-national government quality (SNGQ) impacts economic 
activity in African regions. However, given data availability constraints, little has been done to 
understand what drives deteriorations in SNGQ. This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature 
by examining the impact of armed conflict on SNGQ in 460 regions across 27 African countries 
between 2013-2018. Despite Africa experiencing more armed conflict than any other continent 
over the past 20 years, little is known about how and to what extent this has impacted 
institutional quality. I use conflict data from the Upsala Conflict Data Program and assess its 
impact on SNGQ using data from Afrobarometer. To address causality concerns, I instrument 
armed conflict with exogenous changes in world agricultural prices as reductions in agricultural 
revenue lowers the opportunity cost of farmers engaging in armed conflict. The results 
demonstrate that armed conflict has a negative, significant and causal impact on SNGQ in 
African regions. I also find that this reduction in SNGQ is caused by a deterioration in the 
quality of services that sub-national governments provide, rather than an upsurge in corruption. 
This is because sub-national governments need to direct resources towards crisis response, and 
away from its usual services. Finally, contrary to the existing literature, I find that an upsurge 
in armed conflict does not impact national government quality. This may be because national 
governments are better resourced than sub-national governments. Therefore, when violent 
conflicts occur, the cost of crisis response is proportionally lower for national governments 






In paper 1, we found that lower levels of sub-national government quality (SNGQ) negatively 
impacts economic development in African regions (Iddawela et al., 2021). As such, SNGQ – 
defined here as impartiality, respect for private property rights, freedom from official 
corruption, and the ability to provide high quality services to citizens (Rothstein and Teorell, 
2008; Fan et al., 2009) – is an important part of a country’s overall institutional architecture 
that directly impacts regional economic activity (Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2014; Meyer 
and Revilla Diez, 2015). Given these new insights, policymakers need to better understand 
what factors influence a region’s SNGQ. The lack of research on such factors is particularly 
surprising in light of recent studies that investigate the determinants of SNGQ in Europe (e.g. 
Charron and Lapuente, 2013; Sundström & Wängnerud, 2016), and in South America (e.g. 
Niedzwiecki, 2016). This paper aims to address this gap in the literature by examining one 
particular driver of SNGQ in African regions – armed conflict. 
 
A clearer understanding of how armed conflict affects SNGQ is warranted for two reasons. 
First, SNGQ plays a central role in determining sub-national economic development and 
wealth levels in African regions. This is because many African countries have experienced 
ongoing devolution over the past two decades, which has seen sub-national governments 
becoming more responsible for driving development agendas (see Bratton, 2012; Erk, 2015). 
Furthermore, sub-national government institutions have historically played an important role 
in African countries. For instance, the colonial history of many African states involved a form 
of ‘indirect rule’, whereby sub-national institutions (e.g. tribes and chieftaincies) would rule 
on behalf of colonial powers (Mamdani, 1996: 60). Given the important and historical role of 
sub-national government institutions, academics and policymakers alike need to better 
understand the factors that drive variations in SNGQ.  
 
Second, armed conflict is sadly pervasive in many African countries. The Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program’s Georeferenced Events Database (UCDP GED) shows that Africa has 
experienced more armed conflict-related deaths since 1989 than any other continent. Given this 
prevalence of armed conflict, we have seen a number of studies examining the relationship 
between armed conflict and economic outcomes. For example, see Alesina et al. (2016) and 
Kyriacou (2013) who found that conflict has led to ethnic fragmentation in African countries. 
Yet despite this set of research, little has been done to (1) study the (causal) relationship 
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between armed conflict and SNGQ in African regions, and (2) understand the channels through 
which conflict impacts SNGQ. Extending this research to the sub-national level will help 
develop a better understanding of African government institutions – specifically what affects 
SNGQ and what policymakers can subsequently do to improve it. 
 
I address this gap in the literature by first creating an index of SNGQ for 460 African 
administrative level-1 (admin 1) regions across 27 countries. I use newly available data from 
Afrobarometer Round 7 and follow the approach outlined in Iddawela et al. (2021) to create 
this index. As such, I create SNGQ measures for each region in 2013, 2016 and 2018. Using 
this SNGQ measure, I assess the impact on armed conflict (measured in terms of the number 
of conflict-related fatalities using the UCDP GED dataset) for each admin 1 region (e.g. 
provinces). 
 
While conflict may make it more difficult to govern, endogeneity through reverse causality is 
a primary concern. This is because regions with poor government quality may be unable to 
address structural issues that lead to armed conflict (e.g. famine, or an absence of rule of law). 
To determine the causal impact of armed conflict on SNGQ, the identification strategy uses 
exogenous changes in world agricultural prices as an instrument for armed conflict. Following 
the method outlined by McGuirk and Burke (2020), I calculate a producer price index (PPI) 
that measures a basket of world food prices for goods that are produced in African regions. The 
logic behind this instrument is that a reduction in PPI (i.e. a drop in global agricultural 
commodity prices) will raise the incidence of civil conflict by reducing the opportunity cost of 
fighting for agricultural producers. In other words, if the price of agricultural products drops 
and potential revenue from farmers reduces, then the opportunity cost for farmers to engage in 
civil conflict is lower. Given that African economies are predominantly agricultural (and that 
agricultural products represent a higher average share of household production in Africa than 
in any other continent), I propose that changes in world agricultural prices should affect levels 
of conflict (and thereby SNGQ) throughout each country in the sample.  
 
The analysis yields three main results. First, as expected, armed conflict has a negative, 
significant and causal impact on SNGQ in African regions. Second, in examining the specific 
channels, we see that the reduction in SNGQ is caused by a reduction in the quality of services 
that sub-national governments provide. This is because sub-national governments need to 
direct resources towards crisis response, and away from its usual services. Moreover, it appears 
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that an increase in armed conflict does not impact either the level of corruption in sub-national 
governments, or the level of trust citizens have in their sub-national government officials. Thus, 
contrary to the existing literature (see Bratton and Chang, 2006; and Brinkerhoff et al., 2012), 
armed conflict does not seem to impact the legitimacy of (sub-national) governments. Finally, 
an upsurge in conflict does not appear to affect NGQ. This is likely because national 
governments have significantly more resources than sub-national governments. Therefore, 
when violent conflicts occur, the cost of crisis response is proportionally higher for sub-
national governments than for national governments. As a result, the service delivery of 
national governments is not affected as much as it is for sub-national governments. 
 
In carrying out the analysis, this paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides an overview 
of the existing literature and situates the study within this, section 3 elaborates the theoretical 
model underpinning the relationship between conflict and SNGQ, section 4 describes the data 
sources and provides some descriptive analyses, section 5 provides the results, section 6 
discusses the identification strategy of using PPI as an instrument for conflict and provides the 
results of our 2SLS estimation, section 7 discusses robustness tests, while section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Existing Literature 
 
This paper is situated at the intersection of two areas of academic literature on economic 
development in Africa – that which examines the relationship between armed conflict and 
government quality, and that which examines the drivers of government quality. 
 
2.1  Literature on the relationship between armed conflict and government quality 
 
The World Bank’s 2011 World Development Report background paper focuses on institutions 
and service delivery within conflict affected states (Baird, 2011). It argues that “much of the 
basic infrastructure to deliver services is often damaged or destroyed, with severe shortages of 
trained personnel and supplies” (Baird, 2011:6). Improved service delivery therefore helps 
raise living standards but, through providing basic infrastructure, also improves the legitimacy 
of governments. Moreover, the report suggests that armed conflict upends social order, and this 
typically leads to the systematic exclusion of certain groups along ethnic, religious, political 
and gender lines (ibid).  
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Conflict’s impact on ethnic fragmentation is upheld by Alesina et al. (2016), who explore the 
causes and impacts of ethnic inequality across 173 countries using ethnic fragmentation data 
from ethno-linguistic maps. As part of their results, they find that ethnic polarisation is 
significantly related to conflict – as ethnic-based conflict leads to lasting ethnic divisions within 
a society. Ethnic inequality, in turn, affects institutional development as it becomes challenging 
for states to implement policies and deliver services in areas characterised by ethnic tensions. 
Moreover, ethnic minorities that hold power in governments may delegitimise the state, and 
thus lead to a reduction in the government’s ability to provide services. This aligns with 
Kyriacou (2013), who also suggests that violent conflict and ethnic inequality are inherently 
related. Kyriacou examines the impact of ethnic inequality on institutional equality by 
examining a panel of 29 developing countries using Demographic and Health Surveys data to 
measure ethnic group inequalities. He finds that greater inequalities between ethnic groups 
undermines institutions in two ways. First, because institutions are seen as legitimising 
corruption in the eyes of disadvantaged ethnic groups, and second because the advantaged 
groups attempt to maintain their privileges. As a result, ethnic group inequalities, which in part 
stem from armed conflict, are seen to reduce government quality.  
 
By focusing specifically on the African context, Bratton and Chang (2006), build on these 
findings by arguing that conflict does not just lead ethnic minorities to lose confidence in 
governments, but instead most citizens lose confidence. As a result, state legitimacy (and 
therefore the government’s ability to effectively deliver services), will only be restored if 
governments can regulate conflict within its borders, protect citizens from criminals, and 
mitigate illegal challenges to electoral rule. In other words, following the outbreak of conflict, 
citizens lose trust in their government. Trust will only be regained once law and order and the 
rule of law are established. These findings align with Brinkerhoff et al. (2012), who study the 
impact of conflict on service delivery and state legitimacy in Iraq. They find that armed conflict 
impacts the government’s ability to fulfil three main functions: provide security, deliver basic 
public goods and services, and manage political participation. With limited capacity following 
armed conflict, governments struggle to effectively provide public goods and services that are 
at a level satisfactory to most citizens. This poor service delivery, combined with the inability 
to provide security, results in citizens not accepting or supporting the government – in other 
words the government loses legitimacy. Once governments lose legitimacy, they often use 
repression and coercion to maintain power. This further entrenches the loss of legitimacy and 
deterioration in government quality.  
 73 
 
To summarise, the literature which examines the relationship between armed conflict and 
institutions has mainly focussed on the national level. The research suggests that armed conflict 
leads to a reduction in national government quality in three ways: by losing legitimacy and the 
trust of citizens, deteriorating the quality of services provided, and governments turning to 
corruption and coercion to maintain power following the loss of legitimacy.  
 
2.2  Literature on the drivers of government quality 
 
National government quality (NGQ) is broadly understood as involving impartiality, the 
respect for private property rights, freedom from official corruption, and the ability to provide 
high quality services to citizens (Rothstein and Teorell, 2008; Fan et al., 2009). 
 
The literature on institutions broadly analyses the drivers of NGQ in two distinct ways. First, 
many studies have sought to understand the drivers of government quality through the lens of 
historical factors such as colonial settler patterns (Acemoglu et al., 2001), protestant traditions 
(La Porta et al., 1999), long-run exposure to democratic systems (Treisman, 2000), and 
historical literacy rates (Tabellini, 2010). The central argument of this strand of literature is 
that historical factors have influenced ‘institutional culture’, and this culture has in turn 
persisted over time – thereby affecting present-day government quality levels. ‘Institutional 
culture’, as defined by Tabellini (2010), involves a common set of normative values and 
morality, which can be passed down from generation to generation. In this way, institutional 
culture is an important factor that influences behaviours and what society views as ‘right’ or 
‘wrong’. It therefore plays a role in governing people’s voting decisions and how government 
agencies function. Thus, as Acemoglu et al. (2001) find, countries which had been colonised 
by European settlers, obtained European-style institutions that protected property rights and 
promoted the rule of law. As a result, this institutional culture has been passed down along the 
years to impact the quality of governments in the present day. This finding has been confirmed 
by studies such as Michalopoulos and Papaioannou (2013), who use measures of pre-colonial 
institutional quality in African countries from the work of George Murdock, and assess the 
impact of early institutions on modern-day economic activity using nightlight satellite imagery 
as a proxy for economic development. Similarly, Treisman (2000), examines a large panel of 
countries and examines measures of perceived corruption compiled from business risk surveys 
from the 1980s and 1990s. He finds that countries that had historical exposure to British rule 
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and the common law legal system were “less corrupt” than other countries. He attributes this 
to the ‘legal culture’ that was passed on from British institutions onto other countries. 
 
The second group of literature examines the impact of different political regimes on 
government quality. Bäck and Hednius (2008), analyse democracy levels for 193 countries 
from 1970 to 2003, using data from Freedom House and Polity. They find that NGQ is higher 
in strongly authoritarian states than in states that are partially democratised, and that 
government quality is highest in fully democratic systems. They argue that these results may 
be driven by the monarchies of the Middle East, that have vast and profitable natural resources. 
These states are authoritarian, but have managed to introduce well-functioning bureaucratic 
systems. However, partially democratic systems (i.e. countries that are transitioning to 
bureaucracy) are caught in between. Similarly, Charron and Lapuente (2010), in analysing 125 
countries using data on records of corruption as well as citizens’ perceptions of corruption, find 
that government quality improves when there are political leaders who have the power to make 
reforms and a citizenry that demands longer-term structural changes over short-term gains. In 
addition, once certain wealth thresholds are reached, they argue that there is a greater demand 
from citizens for better quality government institutions. Poorer countries, however, are argued 
to have less of an incentive for longer-term improvements in government institutions as they 
are more concerned with short-terms factors (e.g. immediate improvements in service 
delivery).  
 
Keefer (2007), on the other hand, uses rule of law data from the International Country Risk 
Guide, for 113 countries from 1975-2000. He finds that the age of democracy is an important 
factor in determining NGQ. He argues that younger democracies are more corrupt, have less 
rule of law, and have worse quality bureaucracies than older democracies. As a result, they 
lack the political credibility of more established democratic systems.  
 
Despite the number of studies focussed on the drivers of NGQ, the number of studies doing so 
for SNGQ are far more limited. Like the NGQ studies preceding it, Charron and Lapuente 
(2013) investigate why SNGQ varies across European regions. They find similarities with the 
NGQ research – namely that regional path dependencies are a primary driver of SNGQ. They 
argue that regions which belonged to historical regimes (from the 17th to 19th centuries) that 
had limited checks and balances, created an environment for clientelism to emerge. This has 
subsequently affected present-day SNGQ levels. Corrado and Rossetti (2018), build on this 
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analysis by focussing specifically on the drivers of SNGQ in Italy. They employ panel data on 
crimes perpetrated by public officials against the public administration from 2000 to 2011. 
Like Charron and Lapuente, they find that cultural conditions impact instances of corruption. 
In other words, regions in which people appear to be more honest appear to have lower 
incidences of corruption.   
 
Ward and John (2013), on the other hand look at factors aside from culture and history. They 
adopt spatial regression analyses in looking at local government quality in the UK and find that 
SNGQ spills over from localities. This is because policymakers appear to both learn from 
neighbours, and compete with them – as neighbouring regions vie to obtain more resources 
from national governments. Bubbico et al. (2017) extend this analysis to Europe-wide sub-
national governments using data on competitive pressures. They similarly find that SNGQ 
spills over from region to region due to a competition effect. In other words, ‘good policies’ 
and good-quality service delivery can be influenced by that of neighbouring governments – 
particularly when performance is incentivised by having to compete for limited resources from 
national governments. Moreover, Di Berardino et al. (2018), examine the drivers of SNGQ in 
Italian provinces and find that high skilled internal migration can boost SNGQ. This is because 
provincial governments are able to draw on a larger pool of human capital, which in turn 
improves the delivery of local services. 
 
While these studies focus purely on European sub-national governments, the literature focused 
on the determinants of African SNGQ is far more nascent. Knutsen et al. (2017) analyse over 
90,000 Afrobarometer survey responses to questions on local corruption, along with spatial 
data on 496 industrial mines in African regions. They find that mining activity causes local 
corruption to increase. This may be because revenue from mining activity in Africa is generally 
opaque – it therefore lays the seeds for corruption to take place with a smaller likelihood of 
being discovered. Moreover, it is well known that mining is a high-profit industry, and thus 
individuals who are part of the ‘bribery market’ (e.g. corrupt officials), may flock to these areas 
to extract rents. These findings are validated by Konte and Vincent (2019), who similarly 
analyse over 100,000 respondents from Afrobarometer between 2005 and 2015. They argue 
that mining activity leads to a reduction in the quality of local government services that are 
provided to citizens in African regions. They find that mines that were established in areas with 
poor SNGQ, experienced a further deterioration in both corruption and the trust that citizens 
have in their local government officials. Isaksson and Kotsadam (2018), on the other hand, 
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focus on aid inflows. They analyse almost 100,000 Afrobarometer responses on local 
government corruption and geolocated Chinese aid projects in Africa. They find that Chinese 
aid investment leads to an increase in local government corruption in African regions. They 
hypothesise that aid funding increases the number of resources that are “up for grabs”, which 
subsequently stimulates corrupt activity among local actors. 
 
In summary, this paper is situated at the intersection of two areas of academic literature on 
economic development in Africa – studies which examine the relationship between armed 
conflict and government quality, and studies which examine the drivers of government quality. 
This paper adds to this literature in two ways. First, by examining whether armed conflict 
impacts sub-national government quality in African regions in ways that are similar to how 
conflict impacts national government quality (e.g. through reducing trust in the government, 
deteriorating service delivery, or increasing corruption). Second, it adds to the literature on the 
drivers of SNGQ in African regions (which have so far focused on the impacts of mining and 
aid on local corruption). 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
Given the prevalence of armed conflict in Africa, it is important to study its impact on the 
quality of institutions – specifically SNGQ. In this section, I outline a theoretical framework 
that attempts to capture how an increase in conflict can lead to a reduction in SNGQ. 
 
Each sub-national government 8 has a finite amount of resources y. For each region +, 9 is 
obtained according to: 
9! = '! +	:! +	;! 
Where	' is resources obtained by direct transfers from national governments3, : is taxation, 
and ; is aid received from donors.  
 
Each 8 attempts to maximise their chances of being reappointed for another term in office. 
Appointment can either involve being appointed directly by the national government or by 
 
3 Most sub-national governments in Africa receive the vast majority of their funding through 
direct transfers from central governments (Fjeldstadt et al., 2014). 
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being democratically elected in local government elections. The probability of being 
reappointed is highest when there is the least amount of civil unrest or civil conflict within a 
jurisdiction (see Lynch et al., 2019; and Salehyan and Linebarger, 2015)4. Low levels of civil 
unrest are relevant to citizen-satisfaction. If there is civil unrest, this leads to a lower likelihood 
of voters not re-electing governments, or for national governments to forgo re-appointing sub-
national government officials in the fear that sub-national unrest can spread to nation-wide 
unrest. 
 
Throughout 8’s term in office, it is faced with four main decisions < ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} about how 
to allocate their limited budget. The optimal allocation of budget is the one which maximises 
chances of re-appointment. As such, 8 can: (1) spend resources on crisis response, (2) spend 
resources on institution building (e.g. improving accountability or transparency in 
government), (3) spend resources on delivering services to citizens, and (4) embezzling funds 
for private gain (i.e. corruption).  
 
Based on existing research on embezzlement in the African context (see Lierl, 2016), I view 
(4) as being relatively inelastic (this assumption is tested in the empirical analysis below). 
Furthermore, the size of a sub-national government’s budget is influenced by the size of its 
economy, and the size of its population. These two factors should therefore be accounted for 
in order to avoid biasing results.  
 
From this, we can arrive at two main propositions. 
 
Proposition 1: In the event of conflict, sub-national governments are likely to divert money 
away from service delivery and institution building towards crisis response. This will result in 
a reduction in the quality of services that are provided to citizens.  
 
4 These papers argue that civil unrest leads to popular discontent in governments and this in 
turn leads to a lower probability of re-election, as has been evidenced in the case of Kenya, 
Ghana and Uganda. However, while the probability of re-election is lower, re-election can 
take place particularly in more authoritarian regimes where the opposition is supressed by the 
ruling party (e.g. Uganda). 
 
 78 
Proposition 2: National governments have much larger pools of resources than sub-national 
governments.5 Therefore, in the event of conflict, the reduction in the quality of services 
provided by national governments will be much less than the reduction in the quality of services 




4.1 Sub-National Government Quality 
 
The dependent variable is an index of sub-national government quality. This index is created 
using data from Rounds 5 (2013), 6 (2015) and 7 (2018) of the Afrobarometer surveys in a 
panel, that follows the approach outlined in Iddawela et al. (2021).  
 
Afrobarometer involves surveying a clustered, stratified, multi-stage area probability sample 
of 1,200 or 2,400 individuals in each country. Sampling is conducted with probability 
proportionate to population to ensure that respondents in larger regions have a higher 
probability of being included in a sample. 
 
Given the availability of data, I have constructed the sub-national index for a total of 27 African 
countries: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nigeria, Niger, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, E-Swatini, 
Tanzania, Togo and Zambia. 
 
Eight of the questions in each survey relate to sub-national government quality. Specifically, 
these topics include the level of corruption of sub-national government officials (e.g. frequency 
of bribes paid); the level of trust respondents have in their sub-national government officials; 
the perceived performance in office of local government officials; and the quality of the 
services they are responsible for delivering. The responses to these questions are pooled 
together into a subjective sub-national regional government quality index, which reflects – in 
 
5 By ‘larger pools of resources’, I mean both access to taxation/aid revenue and access to 
borrowing. Moreover, it is worth noting that sub-national governments cannot draw on a 
wider tax base from other regions. National governments on the other hand can offset tax 
losses by drawing on tax revenue from regions that do not experience conflict. In other 
words, national governments are able to mitigate risk through its wider tax base.  
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line with the OECD’s Handbook on Constructing Composite Indicators (Nardo et al., 2005) – 
the opinions of African citizens about their regional government institutions. I provide a list of 
these questions in Appendix Table A2. 
 
While perceptions measures are not perfect – as a decrease in government quality (e.g. through 
embezzlement or increased corruption) may occur without the public knowing, it is currently 
the best possible method of measuring government quality. Moreover, it is the most widely 
accepted measure of sub-national government quality in the institutional literature (e.g. see 
Charron et al., 2014; Rodríguez-Pose & Di Cataldo, 2014; and Rodríguez-Pose & Garcilazo, 
2015). 
 
To construct the index of sub-national government quality, a number of steps have been taken. 
First, I standardised the scale of each question. Each question was subsequently given an equal 
weighting, after which I combined the scores to form a sub-national government quality rating 
for reach respondent. These measures were then aggregated up to the regional level to form the 
average level of sub-national government quality. The index was then rescaled to read in terms 
of standard deviations from the mean.  
 














!"#$ is the sub-national government quality index for each region +, ' is the individual-level 
sub-national government quality rating, ) is the response to each of the eight Afrobarometer 
questions, and ( is the total number of Afrobarometer respondents in each region. The 
Appendix provides further detail on the methodology behind the index. 
 
4.2 Administrative Units 
 
The main explanatory variable is the number of conflict related deaths in an administrative-
level 1 area (e.g. provinces). All admin-1 governments in the sample are responsible for 
providing services to citizens. Countries where admin-1 regions are just an administrative layer 
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without any governance functions, such as Uganda and Libya, are not excluded. The mean 
square area of each admin-level 1 area in the sample is 33,955 square kilometres, while the 
mean population is approximately 1.5 million. Summary statistics are provided in Appendix 
Table A4. I use polygons for each admin 1 unit from the Database of Global Administrative 
Areas (GADM). 
 
4.3 Conflict Data 
 
Conflict data is obtained from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program’s Georeferenced Events 
Database (UCDP GED). For an event to be recorded in UCDP GED, it must involve “the use 
of armed forced by organised actors against another organised actor, or against civilians, 
resulting in at least 1 direct death…at a specific location and for a specific temporal duration” 
(Sundberg and Melander, 2013)6. I therefore exclude smaller-scale homicides or some 
incidents of non-organised crime from the definition of ‘conflicts’. 
 
UCDP GED obtains conflict data from online media reports. They utilise at least one global 
newswire source (e.g. AFP, Reuters or Xinhua) and supplement with BBC Monitoring (which 
provides local news reports). In areas which may not have a lot of international media coverage, 
they supplement using other mediums such as radio reports. Analysts then verify the accuracy 
of the reports and remove duplicate reports to arrive at the figures presented in the UCDP GED 
database. This results in an average of 12,000 new events added to the database every year 
(UCDP, 2019). 
 
4.4 Other Data 
 
A range of other data is used as control variables in the analysis. Given lower levels of 
economic development could lead to civil unrest, I use satellite imagery of night light 
luminosity as a proxy for sub-national GDP levels. The data is from the Visible Infrared 
Imaging Radiometer Suite Day/Night Band (VIIRS-DNB). VIIRS data is available every 15 
arc seconds for each pixel area (approximately 0.5km × 0.5km). The likelihood of civil unrest 
could be lower in regions that have smaller populations. I therefore use population data from 
the UN’s Gridded Population of the World as a control. Furthermore, agricultural areas that 
lack adequate precipitation and droughts could lead farmers to armed conflict (McGuirk and 
 
6 This definition is to ensure that one-off homicides are not conflated with ‘armed conflict’. 
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Burke, 2020). I therefore control for precipitation and temperature using mean precipitation 
data and mean temperature data from the University of Delaware’s Climate Data Archive. 
Finally, to measure the impact of armed conflict on NGQ, I use the World Governance 
Indicator’s Government Effectiveness scores. Further detail on control variables is provided in 
Appendix Table A1. 
4.5 Overview of SNGQ and Conflict 
 
Figure 1: Average SNGQ (2013-2018) 
 
Figure 1 above shows quantiles of SNGQ on a scale of 0 (poor SNGQ) to 100 (high SNGQ). 
The highest SNGQ rating is 67.4/100. The SNGQ measures have been averaged across the 
three years of Afrobarometer data in our sample (i.e. 2013, 2015 and 2018). We can see higher 
levels of SNGQ in Southern African states such as South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and 
Malawi, as well as in Tanzanian regions in East Africa. Further, parts of West Africa such 
Niger and Burkina Faso have higher levels of SNGQ. There appears to be some clustering at 
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the country level7. Lower levels of SNGQ, on the other hand, are found in southern Nigeria, 
central Kenya and northern Guinea. 
 
 




Figure 2 (same sample as Figure 1)8 and Figure 3 (full UCDP sample) show the admin 1 regions 
throughout Africa which have experienced conflict-related deaths between 2013-2018, as 
reported by the UCDP GED dataset. We can see that high levels of conflict deaths are found 
in east Africa – in Somalia (e.g. through Al-Shabaab), Ethiopia (e.g. Tigray Liberation Front) 
and South Sudan (from the civil war with Sudan); in Central Africa (Central African Republic 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo, which are being driven by the ongoing Central African 
Republic Civil War, and the ongoing Kivu conflict in DRC), as well as in parts of West Africa 
(Mali, Niger and Nigeria, which experience armed conflict due to the ongoing Malian civil 
war, and from the likes of Boko Haram in Nigeria and Niger). 
 
5. Model specification and results 
 
5.1 Econometric specification 
 
 
7 I address this country-level clustering in the regressions using country-year fixed effects. 
8 Figure 2 shows aggregated conflict data for the same sample of countries as in Figure 1 (i.e. 
those that are restricted to being covered by Afrobarometer). Figure 3 shows the full sample 
of conflict deaths for all African countries. 
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I first use a reduced form OLS model to measure the relationship between armed conflict and 
SNGQ. The analysis is based on the following specification: 
 
(1) !"#$!'( = 	/ +	1,(EF;:ℎH!'( + 2′!'(φ	 + I'( + 5!'( 
 
Where !"#$!'( is the index of sub-national government quality for region + in country J in 
time :, measured in standard deviations from the mean. ,(EF;:ℎH!'( is the log number of 
armed conflict related deaths in each region for the time period. I'( is country × year fixed 
effects, 2′!'(φ	is a vector of covariates discussed previously (and elaborated in Appendix Table 
1), while 5!'( is the error term. The analysis is a panel from 2013, 2015 and 2018 (the rounds 




5.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares Estimation 
Table 1: OLS Estimates of the relationship between conflict and SNGQ 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SNGQ SNGQ SNGQ 
        
lnFatalities -0.010** -0.009** -0.009** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
lnGDP  -0.102*** -0.103*** 
  (0.027) (0.0276) 
lnPopulation   0.0167 
   (0.0339) 
Constant 1.230 0.803 0.696 
 (1.230) (1.152) (1.304) 
Climate controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country × Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,225 1,225 1,225 
R-squared 0.603 0.609 0.609 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating conflict deaths 
with sub national government quality. Dependent variable is an index of SNGQ using 
Afrobarometer data from round 5, 6 and 7. Standard errors clustered at country level. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Climate controls include mean precipitation and mean 
temperature.  
 
The OLS results reported in Table 1 indicates that, as expected, conflict related fatalities are 
lower in regions with higher SNGQ. In other words, there is a negative and significant 
relationship between conflict deaths and SNGQ for the African regions in the sample. A one 
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unit increase in log fatalities is associated with a slight (0.01) decrease in SNGQ (measured in 
standard deviations) across all permutations in columns (1) to (3).  
 
However, in order to assess the channels through which this relationship takes place, in Table 
2, the SNGQ index is disaggregated into three constituent parts: (1) the quality of services 
provided by sub-national governments, (2) the level of corruption in sub-national governments, 
and (3) the level of trust citizens have in their sub-national government officials.9 
 
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the relationship between Conflict and the decomposed 
SNGQ index 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES Service Corruption Trust 
        
lnFatalities -0.218*** 0.032 -0.050 
 (0.0587) (0.038) (0.0838) 
lnGDP 0.748 0.793** -1.539*** 
 (0.506) (0.305) (0.424) 
lnPopulation 0.712 -0.106 0.126 
 (0.547) (0.264) (0.435) 
Constant 41.950*** 42.720*** 64.450*** 
 (14.130) (10.590) (15.510) 
Climate controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country X Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,225 1,225 1,225 
R-squared 0.473 0.544 0.600 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating conflict deaths 
with the quality of service delivery (column 1), the level of sub-national corruption (column 
2), and the level of trust citizens have in sub-national government officials (column 3). 
Standard errors clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Climate controls 
include mean precipitation and mean temperature.  
 
In column (1), we see that service delivery is worse in places that experience conflict fatalities. 
In other words, fatalities are negatively and significantly associated with a reduction in the 
quality of services that are provided by sub-national governments. However, an increase in 
conflict fatalities does not appear to be associated with an increase in corruption (column 2), 
or a reduction in the level of trust citizens have in their sub-national government officials. This 
finding appears to align with the theoretical framework outlined previously - namely, that an 
 
9 Afrobarometer survey questions used to produce these indexes are contained in Appendix 
Table A2. 
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increase in conflict may result in governments diverting resources away from services towards 
crisis management (to reduce the impact of conflict). However, contrary to the literature (see 
Bratton and Chang, 2006; and Brinkerhoff et al., 2012), it appears that an increase in armed 
conflict does not impact government legitimacy – i.e. trust citizens have in their sub-national 
governments. It also appears that the level of corruption is relatively inelastic – hence the level 
of trust in sub-national government officials does not appear to be associated with an upsurge 
in conflict. 
 
Table 3 provides an overview of the relationship between conflict and NGQ across African 
states. 
 
Table 3: OLS Estimates of the relationship between Conflict and NGQ 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES NGQ NGQ NGQ 
        
lnFatalities 0.00273 0.00224 0.00288 
 (0.00983) (0.00987) (0.00978) 
lnGDP  0.0323 0.0362 
  (0.0341) (0.0343) 
lnPopulation   -0.0166 
   (0.0397) 
Constant 3.020 3.071* 3.284* 
 (1.829) (1.814) (1.942) 
Climate controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,828 3,828 3,828 
R-squared 0.378 0.380 0.382 
 The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating conflict 
deaths with national government quality (measured using the World Governance 
Indicators’ Government Effectiveness Index). Standard errors clustered at country 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Climate controls include mean precipitation and 
mean temperature. Region x Year fixed effects refer to macro-regions in Africa (e.g. 
North, South, East, West, Central and Islands). 
 
This analysis uses a full sample of 51 African countries that are contained in the World 
Governance Indicators (WGI). Given the frequency of the WGI data, the analysis has been 
expanded to include every year between 2012 and 2018. From this, we can see that there does 
not appear to be any significant relationship between NGQ and conflict fatalities across all 
permutations in columns (1) to (3). To ensure that the results are not biased by the larger 
sample, I use the same sample of countries and the same time period that were used in Tables 
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1 and 2. The results, reported in Appendix Table A10, show that the results remain unchanged 
– that there does not appear to be a significant relationship between NGQ and conflict deaths. 
 
The lack of relationship between NGQ and armed conflict may occur because, as outlined in 
the theoretical framework, national governments have a much larger budget with which to 
respond to crises. As a result, the quality of services is not impacted as heavily as it is for sub-
national governments. In other words, the proportion of funds sub-national governments 
reallocate for crisis response is higher than for national governments. 
 
5.3 Identification Strategy 
 
5.3.1 Balance tests 
In determining the impact of armed conflict on SNGQ, endogeneity through reverse causality 
needs to be addressed. In other words, there is the possibility that low levels of SNGQ leads to 
armed conflict. This is because better quality governance protects property rights (Maves and 
Braithwaite, 2013), can mitigate ethnic fragmentation (Easterly, 2001), and can mediate the 
impacts of events like water shortages on armed conflict (Gizelis and Wooden, 2010). 
In order to test this idea of whether SNGQ has led to armed conflict, I first conduct balance 
testing to determine whether there are significant differences in SNGQ for sub-national regions 
that experience armed conflict and regions that do not experience armed conflict. I also look at 
differences in GDP, population, precipitation and temperature. 
The balance tests (presented in Appendix Table A4) examine SNGQ levels in 2013 (the earliest 
period in the sample), and regions that experienced armed conflict in 2018 (the last year in the 
sample). If there is reverse causality, we would expect to see regions with low levels of SNGQ 
in 2013 go on to experience high levels of armed conflict in 2018. 
All countries in the sample except Kenya do not have a statistically significant difference in 
SNGQ for regions that experienced conflict in 2018 and regions that did not experience 
conflict. This appears to suggest that SNGQ does not cause armed conflict to take place. 
Nonetheless, given the descriptive evidence of reverse causality in Kenya, I adopt an 
instrumental variables approach to obtain the causal impact of armed conflict on SNGQ. 
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5.3.2 2SLS IV Model 
The instrument used is a producer price index (PPI) which, following the methodology of 
McGuirk and Burke (2020), captures exogenous shocks to world agriculture commodity prices. 
It follows that an increase in the PPI would lead to higher income levels for farmers (as the 
price of their crops is higher). As a result, the opportunity cost of participating in armed conflict 
becomes higher for farmers. Conversely, a reduction in the PPI would lead to more incidents 
of conflict given the lower opportunity cost to farmers. 
 
It is important to note that most sub-national governments in Africa receive the vast majority 
of their funding through direct transfers from central governments (Fjeldstadt et al., 2014).10 
These transfers are set through the national government budget process the previous fiscal year. 
Therefore, a reduction in agricultural revenue does not result in an immediate reduction in sub-
national governments’ resources.  
 
5.3.3 Constructing the instrument 
The PPI is created by combining temporal variation in world agriculture prices with high-
resolution spatial-variation in crop-specific agricultural land. The spatial data is obtained from 
the M3-Cropland Project (Ramankutty et al., 2008). The M3 Project involves combining two 
different satellite data sources (the MODIS landcover product and the GLC2000 dataset), to 
create a high-resolution (at a resolution of 5-minutes) global dataset on land used for crop 
production. I aggregate this data to the admin-1 level to determine the percentage of land used 
for crop production in each region. The PPI is then calculated by combining this crop coverage 
with a vector of 11 different crop prices as follows: 
 
(2) LLM!'( =	∑ (L)( ×#)$% ")!') 
 
Where crops P…( is the set of 11 major agricultural crops that feature in the M3-Cropland 
dataset. L is the price of each crop, and " is the crop share of the land in each region +. Global 
crop prices are taken from the IMF International Financial Statistics series and the World 
Bank’s Global Economic Monitor. Further details are provided in Appendix Table 3. 
 
10 E.g. Local governments in Liberia receive 100% of resources from the national 
government, 92% of sub-national governments funding in Botswana comes from national 
governments, 88% in Uganda, 78% in Nigeria, etc. 
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For the PPI to satisfy the exclusion restriction, we need to be certain that world agriculture 
prices are truly exogenous to local conflicts in African regions. African production of most 
commodities in the basket of PPI is significantly lower compared to the rest of the world. 
According to the FAO, the African continent is responsible for producing just 16% of global 
food supply (FAO, 2013). Furthermore, the entire African continent accounted for just 3.9% 
of global wheat production, and 5.3% of global sugar cane production in 2017 (FAO Stat, 
2020). As a result, it appears unlikely that any shocks or events in an African admin 1 region 
will produce a noticeable effect on world agriculture prices. Moreover, the World Bank (2015) 
provides a number of reasons for spikes in global agricultural prices. For example, changes to 
global wheat prices are attributed to weather shocks in the Pacific that have been driven by El 
Nino, while rice prices were increasing given drier weather conditions in supplier countries 
such as Thailand and the Philippines. It is therefore unlikely that weather patterns in Thailand 
could affect levels of conflict in an African region aside from through an effect on world 
agriculture prices.  
 
The specification also involves controlling for sub-national GDP levels (to ensure that PPI does 
not affect conflict through GDP), population, and climate controls. As such, the first stage 
estimating equation is as follows: 
 
(3) ,(EF;:ℎH!'( = 	/ +	1LLM!'( + 2′!'(φ	 + I'( + 5!'( 
 
Where ,(EF;:ℎH!'( is the log number of armed conflict related deaths in each region + in 
country J in time :. 1LLM is the producer price index, calculated for each region in each time 
period. I'( is country × year fixed effects, 2′!'(φ	is a vector of covariates including log GDP, 
log population, and climate controls, while 5!'( is the error term. 
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5.4 2SLS Results 
 
Table 4: IV Estimates of the relationship between Conflict and SNGQ 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SNGQ SNGQ SNGQ 
        
lnDeaths -0.285** -0.282** -0.286** 
 (0.143) (0.142) (0.142) 
lnPopulation  0.00580 0.0121 
  (0.0334) (0.0334) 
lnGDP   -0.0587 
   (0.0508) 
Climate controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
F-test 5.59 5.56 5.63 
Anderson-Rubin P-Value 0.0007 0.0007 0.0005 
Observations 1,225 1,225 1,225 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country IV estimates measuring the impact of 
conflict deaths on sub-national government quality (measured in standard deviations). 
Standard errors clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Climate 
controls include mean precipitation and mean temperature. 
 
Table 4 appears to suggest that there is a negative and causal relationship between conflict 
deaths and sub-national government quality across the sample. Column (1) demonstrates that 
conflict exerts a significant impact on sub-national government quality when controlling for 
climate factors and using country-year fixed effects. Adding in log population (to control for 
higher incidents of conflict being reported in more populated areas) does not have a meaningful 
impact on the significance and magnitude of this relationship. Finally, in column (3) we 
similarly see that this causal relationship holds when controlling for log GDP levels (measured 
in night-time luminosity) for each region. The first stage results are reported in Appendix Table 
A6. 
 
To meet the exclusion restrictions of a valid instrument, the instrument must be relevant and 
exogenous. PPI appears to be a weak instrument as the first stage f-tests are less than 10 (the 
rule of thumb for strong instruments). However, in order to address this, I use the Anderson-
Rubin test which is robust to weak instruments (Andres and Stock, 2005). In each case, the 
Anderson-Rubin p-value is well under 0.05, which indicates that the results are relevant and 
therefore hold. Regarding instrument exogeneity, as discussed above, it is unlikely that food 
production in African regions affects global agriculture prices. It is therefore likely that the 
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only way changes in global agriculture prices can affect SNGQ is through armed conflict. To 
address any concerns that global agriculture prices can affect SNGQ through GDP levels, I 
control for this in column (3) above and find that the results do not change in any meaningful 
way.  
 
Table 5: IV Estimates of Relationship between Conflict and NGQ 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES NGQ NGQ NGQ 
        
lnDeaths 0.376 4.603 -4.133 
 (0.744) (75.09) (22.56) 
lnPopulation  -1.506 1.247 
  (24.05) (6.896) 
lnGDP   0.666 
   (3.414) 
Climate controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
First Stage F-test 0.29 0.00 0.03 
Anderson-Rubin P-Value 0.173 0.135 0.142 
Observations 3,828 3,828 3,828 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS estimates associating conflict 
deaths with national government quality (measured using the World Governance 
Indicators’ Government Effectiveness Index). Standard errors clustered at country 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Climate controls include mean precipitation and 
mean temperature. Region x Year fixed effects refer to macro-regions in Africa (e.g. 
North, South, East, West, Central and Islands). 
 
In Table 5 I examine whether there is a causal relationship between conflict deaths and national 
government quality. It appears that, as in the OLS specification, there is no significant 
relationship. Moreover, the first stage F-test for all three specifications in Columns (1) – (3) 
are less than 1, and all Anderson-Rubin P-values are greater than 0.05. This suggests that the 
instrument does not meet the exclusion restriction for NGQ. First stage results are reported in 
Appendix Table A7. 
 
5.5 Robustness Tests 
 
In order to test the sensitivity of the results, I conduct two further robustness tests, the results 
of which are located in the appendix. One concern is that I include more countries in the NGQ 
analysis (Tables 3 and 5) than I do in the SNGQ analysis (Tables 1 and 4). This is because the 
World Governance Indicators database contains more countries than the Afrobarometer 
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dataset. To address any concerns that the larger sample size biases the result, I restrict the 
sample to the same countries I use in the SNGQ analyses. The results, provided in Appendix 
Tables A8 (OLS) and A9 (IV), demonstrates that the results hold. In other words, armed 
conflict does not appear to impact NGQ. 
 
Second, to ensure that I have not added in any biases in the creation of the SNGQ index, I use 
principal component analysis to combine the de-composed measures of trust, corruption and 
service delivery into a new SNGQ index. This technique is used to address issues of collinearity 
between the three de-composed measures.  The results, contained in Appendix Table A10, 
shows that, across all permutations, the results hold and conflict deaths appear to have a causal, 




In this paper I have sought to examine one of the determinants of varying SNGQ across African 
regions – armed conflict. Despite emerging studies that establish the relationship between sub-
national government quality and regional economic performance across African countries, 
given previous data limitations, little work has been done to understand the drivers of SNGQ. 
Given this upsurge in studies examining the impact of SNGQ, as well as the ongoing 
prevalence of armed conflict in African countries, it is important to try and understand whether 
armed conflict has any significant impact on the institutional architecture across African 
countries. 
To examine the impact of armed conflict on SNGQ, I employ newly released data from 
Afrobarometer round 7 to create a panel of SNGQ measures across 460 African admin 1 
regions in 30 countries for 2013, 2015 and 2018. I measure conflict related deaths through the 
UCDP GED dataset. To establish the direction of causality, I subsequently use a PPI measure 
to capture global agricultural prices as an instrument for conflict deaths. It appears that an 
increase in PPI leads to a reduction in conflicts as the opportunity cost for farmers to participate 
in conflict becomes higher. This instrument appears to be relevant, exogenous and satisfies the 
exclusion restriction. 
The main finding of this research is that conflict does appear to deteriorate SNGQ. In other 
words, there is a negative, significant and causal relationship between armed conflict and 
SNGQ. These results hold when controlling for a range of factors such as GDP, population, 
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temperature and precipitation within an admin-1 region. Additionally, contrary to the literature 
which suggests that armed conflict affects the legitimacy of governments (by reducing the level 
of trust citizens have in governments); I find that the channel through which conflict affects 
SNGQ is through a reduction in the quality of services provided by sub-national governments. 
This appears to be because sub-national governments are required to re-direct limited resources 
away from service delivery towards crisis response. This explains why there does not appear 
to be a relationship between NGQ and conflict. In other words, given that national governments 
have more resources at their disposal, re-directing funds towards crisis response has a much 
more limited effect on national governments’ service delivery. This finding similarly diverges 
from the existing literature which have argued that armed conflict reduces the quality of 
national governments through a reduction in legitimacy (Bratton and Chang, 2006; and 
Brinkerhoff et al., 2012). 
The main takeaway for policymakers from this research is that when armed conflict arises, 
national governments could increase transfers to relevant sub-national governments in order to 
help them maintain the quality of the services they provide. This will help mitigate the effect 
of sub-national governments having to strip funding away from local services to fund crisis 
response efforts.  
This analysis on the drivers and determinants of SNGQ within African countries can be seen 
as opening up further avenues for examination. More work is required to fully understand what 
drives variations in SNGQ. For example, further research can examine the impact of ethnic 
fragmentation on sub-national governments, or how the role of tribal institutions affects SNGQ. 
Given the impact SNGQ has on regional economic performance in Africa, such studies can 
inform how best to improve institutional quality and thereby improve economic development 
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Appendix Table A1 
 
Variable Definition Source 
Sub-National 
Government Quality 
Index of sub-national government quality 
(author's calculation) 




Log of night light density measured using the 
Visible Infrared Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) 




Monthly average of daily mean temperature 
(2012 - 2018) 
University of Delaware’s Climate 
Data Archive  
Precipitation Monthly average of daily mean precipitation 
(2012 - 2018) 
University of Delaware’s Climate 
Data Archive 
Population Log population levels (2012-2018) UN’s Gridded Population of the 
World database (NASA, 2017) 
Central Government 
Quality 




Appendix Table A2 
 







How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard 
enough about them to say: Your Metropolitan, Municipal or District 
Assembly? 
1 4 
During the past year, how often have you contacted any of the following 
persons about some important problem or to give them your views: A 




How many of the following people do you think are involved in 
corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Local 
government councillors? 
1 4 
How many of the following people do you think are involved in 
corruption, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Tax Officials 




Do you approve or disapprove of the way the following people have 
performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard 




How much of the time do you think the following try their best to listen 
to what people like you have to say: Local government councillors? 
1 4 
What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I 
mean your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly. How well or 
badly would you say your local government is handling the following 
matters, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: Maintaining local 
roads? 
1 4 
What about local government? I do not mean the national government. I 
mean your Metropolitan, Municipal or District Assembly. How well or 
badly would you say your local government is handling the following 






Appendix Table A3 
 
Price variables used in calculation of the Producer Price Index 
Crop Description Source 
Cocoa  International Cocoa Organization cash price, CIFUS and 
European ports, US$ per metric ton  
IMF 
Coffee 1  Robusta, International Coffee Organization New York cash price, 
ex-dock New York, US cents per pound  
IMF 
Coffee 2  Other Mild Arabicas, International Coffee Organization New 
York cash price, ex-dock New York, US cents per pound  
 
Maize  U.S. No.2 Yellow, FOB Gulf of Mexico, U.S. price, US$ per 
metric ton  
IMF 
Oil palm  Malaysia Palm Oil Futures (first contract forward) 4-5 percent 
FFA, US$ per metric ton  
IMF 
Rice  5 percent broken milled white rice, Thailand nominal price quote, 
US$ per metric ton  
 
Sorghum  Sorghum (US), no. 2 milo yellow, f.o.b. Gulf ports, US$ per metric 
ton  
World Bank 
Soybean  Chicago Soybean futures contract (first contract forward) No. 2 
yellow and par, US$ per metric ton  
 
Sugar 1 Free Market, Coffee Sugar and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) contract 
no.11 nearest future position, US cents per pound  
IMF 
Sugar 2 U.S. import price, contract no.14 nearest futures position, US cents 
per pound (Footnote: No. 14revised to No. 16)  
IMF 
Tea  Mombasa, Kenya, Auction Price, From July 1998, Kenya 
auctions, Best Pekoe Fannings. Prior, Lon-don auctions, c.i.f. U.K. 
warehouses, US cents per kilogram  
IMF 
Tobacco Any origin, unmanufactured, general import, cif, US$ per metric 
ton 
World Bank 
Wheat No.1 Hard Red Winter, ordinary protein, FOB Gulf of Mexico, 












Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Population 1380 
    
1,553,409  
  
2,522,760.00  20 
    
14,044,555  
Sq. Area 1380 
         
33,955  
            
69,487  4 
         
536,790  
Fatalities 1380 
                  
8                 63  0 
             
1,805  











These tables examine differences between regions (within the same country) that experience 




Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -0.04 0.15 0.11 0.28 
GDP 4.82 3.37 1.44 0.71 
Population 974532.23 608387.23 366145 0.12 
Precip 46.75 47.45 -0.69 0.95 
Temp 17.42 18.75 -1.32 0.27 
     
Kenya 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ 0.47 0.39 0.08 0.01 
GDP 0..57 1.08 -0.51 0.4 
Population 849942.76 1112152.34 -265209.58 0.15 
Precip 101.93 83.22 18.71 0.09 
Temp 20.42 22.62 -2.2 0.05 
     
Burundi 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -1.36 -1.34 -0.02 0.87 
GDP 0.67 0.62 0.06 0.87 
Population 585189.5 628086.17 -42896.67 0.69 
Precip 89.14 77.53 11.6 0.05 
Temp 19.57 20.39 -0.82 0.43 
     
Nigeria 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -0.47 -0.42 -0.06 0.42 
GDP 1.57 1.4 0.16 0.85 
Population 4957342.13 4350628.71 606713.42 0.39 
Precip 105.76 103.01 2.75 0.86 
Temp 27.44 27.05 0.39 0.09 
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Sudan 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -1.74 -1.85 0.11 0.75 
GDP 0.21 0.39 -0.18 0.21 
Population 1896319.3 2468546.5 -572227.2 0.39 
Precip 27.77 31.2 -3.44 0.8 
Temp 28.64 28.63 0.06 0.92 
     
Tunisia 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ 1.21 1.2 0.01 0.14 
GDP 3.47 0.78 2.69 0.54 
Population 454862.37 441281.3 13481.07 0.93 
Precip 34.76 17.95 16.81 0.24 
Temp 19.64 19.96 -0.32 0.76 
     
Tanzania 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -0.35 -0.3 -0.06 0.5 
GDP 0.42 1.99 -1.57 0 
Population 1563496.78 3190069.84 -1626573.1 0.03 
Precip 80.16 80.62 -0.46 0.98 
Temp 23.49 26.03 -2.54 0.12 
     
Mali 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -0.38 -0.68 0.3 0.02 
GDP 6.43 0.64 5.79 0.19 
Population 2547301.48 2511187.04 36114.44 0.93 
Precip 110.06 69.43 40.63 0.05 
Temp 27.67 28.84 -1.17 0.01 
     
Burkina Faso 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -0.43 -0.35 -0.08 0.37 
GDP 0.44 0.77 -0.33 0.2 
Population 1136878.77 1719270.08 -582391.3 0.07 
Precip 77.97 65.67 12.3 0.11 
Temp 28.56 29.19 -0.63 0.09 
     
Niger 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -0.45 -0.45 0.01 0.98 
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GDP 0.89 0.21 0.68 0.61 
Population 1962297.1 3341692.83 -1379395.7 0.27 
Precip 32.54 33.91 -1.37 0.92 
Temp 29.14 30.07 -0.92 0.11 
     
Cameroon 
Variable No-Conflict Conflict Difference p-value 
SNGQ -0.35 -0.34 -0.01 0.94 
GDP 0.39 0.35 0.04 0.76 
Population 2094317.14 2515054.24 -420737.1 0.64 
Precip 151.35 148.62 2.73 0.95 





Appendix Table A6 
 
First-Stage IV Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES lnDeaths lnDeaths lnDeaths 
        
PPI .-0.0000104** .-0.0000105** .-0.0000106** 
 (0.0000044) (0.0000045) (0.0000045) 
lnPopulation  0.0349277 0.017741 
  (0.0955215) (0.0928803) 
lnGDP   0.16452 
   (0.1492086) 
Climate controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
First Stage F-test 5.59 5.56 5.63 
Observations 1,225 1,225 1,225 
        
The table reports first-stage results of the cross-regional, cross-country IV estimates measuring the 
impact of conflict deaths on sub-national government quality (measured in standard deviations). 
Standard errors clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Climate controls include 




Appendix Table A7  
 
First-Stage IV Results 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES lnDeaths lnDeaths lnDeaths 
        
PPI 4.16e-06 3.93e-07 -4.01e-07 
 (7.73e-06)  6.44e-06 (2.18e-06)   
lnPopulation  0.3226489* 0.3073727*** 
  (0.1942499)   (0.0404705)    
lnGDP   0.1539778** 
   (0.0661191) 
Climate controls Yes Yes Yes 
Region x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
First Stage F-test 0.29 0.00 0.03 
Observations 3,828 3,828 3,828 
        
The table reports first-stage results of the cross-regional, cross-country IV estimates 
measuring the impact of conflict deaths on national government quality (measured in standard 
deviations). Standard errors clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 





Appendix Table A8 
 
Restricted sample for NGQ (OLS) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES NGQ NGQ NGQ 
        
lnDeaths -0.00755 -0.00775 -0.00587 
 (0.00554) (0.00571) (0.00520) 
lnGDP  0.0159 0.0308 
  (0.0405) (0.0305) 
lnPopulation   -0.0736* 
   (0.0417) 
Constant 0.880 0.899 1.867 
 (1.642) (1.636) (1.796) 
Climate Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,215 1,215 1,215 
R-squared 0.365 0.366 0.407 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating conflict 
deaths with national government quality (measured using the World Governance 
Indicators’ Government Effectiveness Index). Standard errors clustered at country 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Climate controls include mean precipitation and 
mean temperature. Region x Year fixed effects refer to macro-regions in Africa (e.g. 





Appendix Table A9  
 
Restricted sample for NGQ (2SLS) 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES NGQ NGQ NGQ 
        
lnDeaths -0.150 -0.0939 -0.146 
 (0.507) (0.251) (0.101) 
lnGDP  0.0394 0.0602* 
  (0.101) (0.0308) 
lnPopulation   -0.0321 
   (0.0342) 
Climate Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
First stage F-test 0.11 0.25 2.38 
Observations 1,215 1,215 1,215 
R-squared -2.664 -0.950 -2.484 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS estimates associating conflict 
deaths with national government quality (measured using the World Governance 
Indicators’ Government Effectiveness Index). Standard errors clustered at country 
level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Climate controls include mean precipitation and 
mean temperature. Region x Year fixed effects refer to macro-regions in Africa (e.g. 




Appendix Table A10 
 
Alternative SNGQ Index (2SLS result) 
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SNGQ SNGQ SNGQ 
        
lndeath -0.302** -0.296** -0.299** 
 (0.141) (0.137) (0.136) 
lnpop  0.0139 0.0184 
  (0.0373) (0.0367) 
lnviirs   -0.0423 
   (0.0536) 
Climate Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Country x Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
First-stage F-test 7.46 7.69 7.77 
Anderson-Rubin P-Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 1,208 1,208 1,208 
R-squared -2.375 -2.289 -2.334 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country IV estimates measuring the impact of 
conflict deaths on an alternative measure of sub-national government quality (created 
using principal component analysis). Standard errors clustered at country level. *** 




Paper 3 – Spatial Inequality within African Provinces: A 
Story of National Government Quality, Regional 
Favouritism, and Geographical Endowments 
 




There is growing concern about the causes and consequences of spatial inequality in much of 
the world, with Africa being no exception. The dominant view is that geographical factors are 
the main cause of spatial inequality in the African context. However, a different strand of 
research highlights the impact of national governments on spatial inequality. Due to data 
limitations, most of the existing research has focussed on examining spatial inequality at the 
country level by comparing variations in wealth between African provinces. This, however, is 
a significant issue given the sheer size of African provinces. The average African province is 
approximately 37,000 square kilometres – almost the size of the Netherlands. Therefore, it 
should not be assumed that policies which favour a particular city, or geographical endowments 
that benefit a certain area, affect entire provinces equally. Instead, it is likely that these policies 
and geographical endowments cause spatial inequality within provinces.  This paper therefore 
investigates the relationship between national government quality and spatial inequality within 
the provinces of 52 African countries. We create a new measure of within-province inequality 
using high-resolution satellite data of night-light luminosity, and measure government quality 
using data from the World Governance Indicators. We find that national government quality 
matters just as much as geographical endowments in explaining spatial inequality within 
provinces. Our results show that better national government quality reduces spatial inequality 
within African regions – a finding we confirm using an instrumental variable approach based 





There is growing concern about inter and intra-regional inequalities in much of the world. 
Studies have found that spatial inequality has led to conflict and crime (Østby et al., 2009), an 
entrenched divide between urban and rural areas (Galor and Moav, 2004), uneven reduction in 
poverty across countries (Te Velde and Morrissey, 2005), and lower economic growth (Achten 
and Lessmann, 2020). High levels of inter- and intra-regional inequality have been linked to 
growing political cleavages, particularly where local income differences map onto ethnic or 
nationalist groups (Kanbur and Venables, 2005). Based on this, a wide range of literature 
interrogates patterns of spatial inequality, its causes, and its consequences (see Guo et al., 2020; 
Lee and Luca, 2019; Rodríguez‐Pose & Tselios, 2009; Glaeser et al., 2009). While there is 
some disagreement about whether spatial inequality is a temporary phenomenon which 
declines in ensuing stages of development (e.g. Williamson, 1965; and Kuznet, 1955), there is 
broad agreement that inequality poses significant problems for countries and regions alike.  
 
Africa is no exception to these concerns. Average regional income inequality within African 
countries (measured through the Gini coefficient) has increased from 0.32 to 0.38 between 
1992 and 2013 (Mveyange, 2018). Moreover, income inequality in Africa has increased each 
year since 2009 (ibid). The academic literature examining the drivers of spatial inequality is 
split into two schools of thought. One school of thought suggests this income inequality is 
primarily driven by variations in geographical factors such as the quality of land and climate 
(e.g. Moradi and Baten, 2005; and Frankema, 2010). In contrast, a different strand of research 
suggests inequality is primarily spurred by the quality of national institutions (e.g. Trotter, 
2016; Adeleye et al., 2017). This school of thought has been influenced by the upsurge in 
literature that has found the importance of national government institutions in explaining levels 
of economic development in the broader global context (e.g. Acemoglu et al. 2001; Easterly, 
2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Rothstein, 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). 
 
Much of the existing research on Africa has focussed on inequality at the country-level by 
comparing variations in economic activity between sub-national regions (e.g. see Lessman and 
Seidel, 2017; Alesina et al., 2016). This however overlooks the drivers of spatial inequality at 
the sub-national level – in other words spatial inequality within African provinces. These prior 
studies assume that if certain cities or municipalities within a province benefit from either 
regional favouritism or natural endowments, then the entire province benefits. This, however, 
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is an assumption that needs to be reconsidered given the sheer size of African provinces. The 
average province is 37,000 square kilometres – 25 times the size of London. Thus, if certain 
cities or municipalities within a province benefit from regional favouritism or natural 
endowments, it is likely that this would cause inequality within provinces. 
 
In fact, in the African context, the history of poor national government quality has involved 
regional favouritism that benefits particular cities rather than entire provinces. For instance, in 
Zaire (now Democratic Republic of Congo), former president, Mobutu Sese Soko, transformed 
his former hometown, Gbadolite, (which had 1,500 residents during the 1970s) into a lavish 
city with five-star hotels, three palaces and a 3.2km runway for a Concorde jet (Wrong, 2000). 
Similarly, in 1983, former Ivory Coast president, Félix Houphouët‐Boigny, declared his 
hometown, Yamoussoukro, as the nation’s capital. He built palaces, an airport that could also 
land a Concorde, and the world’s largest church at a cost of $300 million USD (Ahlerup and 
Isaksson, 2015). While in Burundi, the country’s fifth five-year plan involved funnelling 98% 
of government funding to the capital city and the area surrounding former President Pierre 
Buyoya’s homeland of Rutovu (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza, 2000). Although this area was 
initially one of the poorest in Burundi, it has now become one of the best endowed in terms of 
education infrastructure and hospitals (Nkurunziza  and Ngaruko, 2004). 
Given the city-specific favouritism displayed by certain African governments, this 
paper goes beyond the existing studies by examining whether government quality impacts 
inequality within provinces. We do so by measuring variations in economic activity between 
administrative level 2 regions (i.e. municipalities). Furthermore, to address the existing 
academic debate on the drivers of spatial inequality, we compare the impact of national 
institutions to that of geographical factors. 
 
Understanding these within-province spatial dynamics are important for both policy and 
research. As discussed in Paper 1, most African countries have provincial-level governments, 
which are responsible for driving significant changes to regional economic development 
(Iddawela et al., 2021). Thus, if local policymakers have (1) a robust measure of within-
province spatial inequality in the absence of official statistics, and (2) an understanding of what 
drives these inequalities; they will be better equipped to implement adequate redistributive 
policies that ensure city or town-level endowments spill over and benefit the wider province.  
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We subsequently make three main contributions to the literature. First, we create a new 
measure of spatial inequality within African provinces using high-resolution satellite data. 
Examining spatial inequality within the African context has historically been challenging due 
to data limitations as official sub-national economic indicators are largely absent. To address 
this limitation, the likes of Alesina et al. (2016), Mveyange (2015), and Lessman and Seidel 
(2017), have used night-time luminosity (measured through the DMSP-OLS satellite data from 
NOAA) as the basis for spatial inequality measures. Our study diverges from this work by, for 
the first time, providing a measure of spatial inequality within provinces by using high-
resolution satellite images of night light luminosity (measured through VIIRS-DNB satellite 
data)11.  
 
Second, we look at the impact of national government institutions on spatial inequality within 
African provinces. Countries with poor government quality have been found to engage in 
regional favouritism, clientelism, and to inefficiently allocate resources (Ezcurra & Rodríguez-
Pose, 2014). However, despite this, little work has been done to quantify the impact of 
government quality on spatial inequality within African provinces. We determine the causal 
relationship between national government quality and spatial inequality through a 2SLS 
instrumental variables model. We use European settler mortality rates, as used by Acemoglu 
et al. (2001), as an instrument for national government quality.  
 
Third, we compare the role of national government quality to geographical factors in explaining 
spatial inequality within African provinces. Research suggests that variations in geographical 
endowments may play an important role in driving and entrenching spatial inequality within 
Africa (Moradi and Baten, 2005; and Frankema, 2010). We therefore create a range of 
measures to capture variations in geographical endowments across African sub-national 
regions. We subsequently look at whether levels of spatial inequality are associated more with 
national government quality than with variations in geographical endowments. 
 
We find three main results. First, we find that an increase in national government quality is 
associated with a reduction in spatial inequality within African provinces. Second, using our 
 
11 VIIRS satellite data is approximately double the resolution of the DMSP-OLS satellite data 
which is traditionally used in spatial economics research. Given the number of remote and 
regional areas in Africa, higher-resolution satellite images are more appropriate as they are 
highly sensitive to lower levels of visible light (Ou et al., 2015). 
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2SLS instrumental variables model, we see that the relationship between national government 
quality and spatial inequality appears to be causal. Finally, our results suggests that national 
government quality matters just as much as variations in geographical endowments when 
explaining spatial inequality within African regions. We obtain this result by creating an index 
of geographical variation using principal component analysis. We find the relationship between 
our index of geographical variation and spatial inequality is significant, as is the relationship 
between national government quality and spatial inequality.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature examining spatial 
inequality and its drivers. Section 3 provides an overview of the data and presents some 
descriptive analysis. Section 4 provides the results of our regression models. In Section 5 a 
range of robustness tests are undertaken, and finally we conclude with Section 6.  
 
2. Spatial inequality in African regions 
 
We draw on Kanbur and Venables (2005, p.8) by defining spatial inequality as variations in 
income-related inequality between smaller units within larger spatial units (Kanbur and 
Venables, 2005, p.8). In other words, spatial inequality involves aggregating a collection of 
individuals into spatial units (such as municipalities) and measuring variation between these 
units. Spatial inequality, defined as such, has been rising over the past two decades within 
African regions (Mveyange, 2018). 
 The academic literature on the drivers of inequality within Africa mainly focusses on 
country-level spatial inequality, rather than within-province inequality. Nonetheless, the 
majority of this existing literature predominantly bifurcates into two groups which debate the 
main causes of spatial inequality. On the one hand are those who argue that variations in 
institutional quality is one of the primary drivers (Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose, 2014; 
Henderson, 2010; Holder and Raschky, 2014). On the other hand are those arguing that 
variations in geographical factors are the primary driver (Maddison, 1995;  Easterly, 2007; 
Naudé and Krugell 2006). This paper aims to add to this literature by examining the within-
province spatial dynamic, and understanding whether national institutional quality matters as 




2.1 Institutions and Spatial Inequality 
 
In analysing a cross-country sample of 46 countries (including South Africa but no other 
African countries) over a ten-year period, Ezcurra and Rodríguez-Pose (2014) provide 
evidence that countries with better national government quality experience lower levels of 
spatial inequality. They condition their findings on GDP per capita to account for the Kuznets 
curve (whereby inequality increases with initial growth in economic activity but reduces over 
time). The channels by which institutional quality affects spatial inequality have been explored 
in subsequent papers.  
 
It appears that regional favouritism of poor-quality institutions is likely to play a major role in 
driving spatial inequality. Regional favouritism takes place when leaders or elected officials 
favour certain cities over others. Henderson (2010) argues that national governments may 
implement policies that favour certain regions or cities within a country. In other words, they 
direct place-based policies that benefit one or more cities over the rest. The status of being a 
‘favoured’ city incentivise firms to relocate there and absorb economic activity from 
neighbouring regions. As a result, these cities have more economic activity than non-favoured 
cities; thereby contributing to spatial inequality. While favouritism in developed countries may 
take place primarily due to economic reasons such as better access to capital markets and better 
fiscal conditions (ibid), favouritism in countries with poor institutional quality typically takes 
place due to nepotism and patronage (i.e. in the form of ethnic or family connections to the 
leader). Holder and Raschky (2014), for instance, examine a panel of 38,426 subnational 
regions from 126 countries between 1992 to 2009. They find that areas which are the birthplace 
of current political leaders experience higher degrees of economic activity. Moreover, they find 
that regional favouritism is heightened in a context of low institutional quality. Dreher et al. 
(2017) build on this by examining the African context specifically. They analyse data of 117 
African leaders’ birthplaces and ethnic groups and compare this to Chinese funded aid projects 
across 3,097 regions between 2000-2012. They find that, in countries where leaders have more 
autocratic control, their birthplaces receive significantly more aid funding than other 
(subnational) regions. Moreover, given Chinese aid plays an important role in spurring local 
economic development, spatial inequality between birthplaces and other regions becomes 
further entrenched. Similarly, Burgess et al. (2015) study data on road construction in Kenyan 
districts from 1963-2011 (a period of fluctuating transitions in and out of democracy). They 
find strong evidence of regional favouritism as areas that share the ethnicity of the president 
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obtain double the amount of funding for road construction than other regions. However, they 
argue that as institutional quality strengthens and the government transitions into democracy, 
regional favouritism disappears. These findings are consistent with Kramon and Posner (2016), 
who study educational data on over 50,000 Kenyans, as well as ethnic information of Kenya’s 
presidents, cabinet ministers and bureaucrats dating back to the period of colonisation. They 
find that sharing an ethnicity with the president or the minister of education leads to greater 
educational outcomes. This is because more resources are directed to these areas by the key 
decision makers. 
 
Similar findings take place with regards to corruption within national governments. Candau 
(2008) creates a structural model demonstrating that, in countries which lack democracy, 
‘urban giants’ – i.e. large concentrations of wealth in urban areas – are more likely to emerge. 
This is because of the limited redistributive role of the state. Democracy, however, acts as a 
redistributive force and reduces spatial inequality. Moreover, corrupt officials, who embezzle 
money prevent resources from being used for redistributive purposes, and instead channel that 
into personal expenditure in regions where they live – typically the capital. This then intensifies 
spatial inequality between the capital and the periphery. Gupta et al. (2001), provides evidence 
of this. They find that a one standard deviation increase in corruption heightens income 
inequality (measured through the Gini coefficient) by 11 points. They argue that corruption 
works by government officials using public funding for private gain. This subsequently 
interferes with the allocation of resources and redistribution of income – thereby creating 
spatial inequality. 
 
However, aside from corruption and ethnic favouritism, institutions also play a fundamental 
role in developing place-based policies to address existing spatial inequalities. Trotter (2016), 
for instance, uses panel data from 46 sub-Saharan African countries between 1990 and 2010, 
and finds that higher quality national institutions (that are characterised by democratic forms 
of government), have more equitable roll out of electricity infrastructure throughout the 
country. Moreover, Todes and Turok (2018) study place-based policies in South Africa post-
Apartheid. They find that poor quality national institutions that lack a clear overarching vision 
and policy framework, are ultimately unable to efficiently address spatial inequality. Thus, in 
order to implement policies that successfully address spatial inequality, high quality 




Thus, in summary, this school of thought finds that institutional quality is fundamental to 
addressing spatial inequality. This is because better quality institutions do not participate in 
regional favouritism driven by ethnic or familial ties to a region; they also reduce corruption 
which impedes upon the redistributive function of the state; and finally better quality 
institutions are able to introduce policies that address regional imbalances in economic 
opportunities.  
 
2.2 Geography and Spatial Inequality 
 
The other strand of literature argues that variations in geography are the main driver of spatial 
inequality. Diamond (1998) for instance argues that differences in development predate the 
existence of formal institutions. Instead, he argues they have been shaped by historical 
geographical endowments – for example plant and animal species, that in turn influenced 
agricultural productivity. As agricultural productivity boomed, a growing population could be 
maintained. Through this, agglomerations formed, which subsequently led to some regions 
experiencing economic activity while other regions with less favourable geographical 
endowments did not.  
 
With regards to Africa specifically, Maddison (1995) examined five major periods in African 
history – ranging from the precolonial era, the onset of colonial rule to WWI, the world wars 
and the great depression, late colonial rule to independence, and post-independence. He argues 
that institutional quality of African countries varies significantly throughout all periods of 
analysis. However, despite this temporal variation of institutional quality, African regions have 
performed worse (in terms of economic activity) than other regions. As a result, he suggests 
this reflects geographic and environmental differences between African countries and the rest 
of the world. Bloom and Sachs (1998) build on this by arguing that variations in climate, soils, 
topography, disease ecology, temperature and precipitation are fundamental in driving the 
economic performance of African regions – particularly because African economies are 
predominantly agricultural. Temperature and precipitation in agricultural economies are 
fundamental because it regulates photosynthetic potential of crops. They also argue that the 
most fertile areas in Africa are found at high altitudes because of lower temperatures, higher 
rainfall and volcanic soils that are nutrient rich. Thus these areas have an economic advantage 
over areas with worse geographical and environmental endowments.  
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These findings are confirmed by Easterly (2007), who uses cross-country data from 114 
countries to show that variations in agricultural endowments predict inequality. He argues that 
the agricultural endowments which are particularly predictive of inequality are the abundance 
of land suitable for growing wheat and sugarcane. Over time, as variations in agricultural 
output translated into variations in agglomerations, studies are finding that other geographical 
factors, such as distance to ports and distance to natural resources is also predictive of spatial 
inequality in African countries. For instance, Naudé and Krugell (2006) investigate sub-
national variations in economic growth for 354 magisterial districts in South Africa from 1998-
2002. They find geographic factors such as distance from internal markets, and distance from 
international harbours play a significant role in explaining disparities in economic activity, 
thereby contributing to spatial inequality. Similar findings have been established by Mudiriza 
and Edwards (2021), who find that regional wage disparities across 354 regions in South Africa 
from 1996-2011 are driven by geographic factors such as transport costs (reflecting 
connectivity and distance to urban centres), mineral resource endowments, quality of 
agricultural land and climate conditions. In other words, economic performance of a region in 
South Africa depends on the natural endowments that permit agricultural activity (i.e. soil and 
climate factors) or the availability of natural resources, coupled with the ability to trade or 
export these products (e.g. distance to urban city centres).  
 
A number of studies are also starting to emerge which examines the determinants of spatial 
inequality using satellite imagery of night-time luminosity (DMSP-OLS data), as luminosity is 
seen to be a reliable proxy for economic activity (Henderson et al., 2012). The use of this data 
has the advantage of extending previous studies by providing a full worldwide sample of 
regional economic activity that are measured in a consistent way. For instance, Lessman and 
Seidel examine regional inequality throughout the world and find that natural resources, 
transportation costs, and share of arable land in a region is correlated with regional inequality. 
Similarly, Mveyange (2018), builds on this approach by focussing his analysis on African 
regions. His study also upholds the previous literature in finding that fluctuations in 
temperature and precipitation have the potential to increase regional inequalities in the medium 
and long-run. He finds these results are heightened in low income and agriculture-intensive 
countries. The present paper extends this work by creating a measure of spatial inequality using 
higher resolution satellite imagery (VIIRS) as opposed to lower resolution satellite imagery 
(DMSP-OLS). We also focus on within-province inequality, rather than within-country 
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inequality. Furthermore, we explicitly examine the role of institutions and geography in driving 
spatial inequality. 
 
To summarise, this school of thought argues that geographical and environmental endowments 
play the fundamental role in driving spatial inequality. This is particularly important in 
predominantly agricultural economies like those found in African regions. As a result, 
variations in the quality of soil, temperature, precipitation, as well as access to other markets 
are important factors that explain spatial inequality between regions.  
 
Thus, these two schools of thoughts both provide evidence for the relevance of institutions and 
geography for spatial inequality. They are thus fiercely opposed to each other in arguing over 
the primacy of institutions vs the primacy of geographical endowments. Yet, despite this, the 
existing literature has focused their analysis on inequality at the national level. Given the sheer 
size of African provinces, understanding the spatial inequality dimension at the province-level 
is warranted. Especially given that many provinces possess governments that can implement 
policies to improve economic development (Iddawela et al., 2021) and offset imbalances in 
geographical endowments and regional favouritism of national governments.  
 
This paper therefore aims to build on this existing literature by examining the dynamics of 
within-province spatial inequality, and by investigating the role of national institutional quality 




3.1  Measuring Spatial Inequality 
 
Our focus is on inequality within provinces (admin 1 regions). Previous studies, for example 
Lessman and Seidel (2017), calculate mean income levels for each province (see Figure 1), and 
subsequently create country-level spatial inequality measures (such as a Gini Coefficient) 




Figure 1: Average income in each province Figure 2: Country-level inequality 
                                
Figure 1 shows average income for each province in South Africa. Variations between 
provincial income levels are used to calculate a country-level inequality measure in Figure 2. 
 
Provinces in Africa, however, are large spatial units. The average size of a province is 37,000 
square kilometres – larger than countries like Belgium (see Appendix Table 2 for summary 
statistics). Therefore, we should not assume that acts of regional favouritism which benefit just 
one town within a large province, ultimately benefits the entire province. Similarly, given the 
sheer size of provinces, there are significant variations in geographical endowments between 
municipalities within a province (Naude and Gries, 2009; Lessman and Steinkraus, 2019). As 
a result, we examine whether government quality and geographical endowments create and 
exacerbate spatial inequality within provinces. 
 
Given the lack of official sub-national data in African countries, we use satellite data of night 
light luminosity. This approach was popularised by Henderson et al. (2012), who found that 
night lights are an accurate indicator of economic activity. We however diverge with the vast 
majority of spatial inequality studies by using higher-resolution satellite images from the 
Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite Day/Night Band (VIIRS-DNB), rather than the 
lower-resolution Defence Meteorological Satellite Program’s Operational Linescan System 
(DMSP-OLS). VIIRS data is available every 15 arc seconds for each pixel area (approximately 
0.5km × 0.5km). We use the first available year of VIIRS data (2015) for the analysis.  
 
To calculate a measure of spatial inequality for each province (admin 1 regions) in Africa, we 
first calculate luminosity per capita measures for each municipality (admin 2 region). We use 
population data from the United Nations’ Gridded Population of the World (GPW) dataset, 
which provides pixel-level population estimates for 2015. We subsequently create a province-
level Gini coefficient that measures variation between municipalities. 
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Whereby we capture levels of development in municipalities, T, with log luminosity per capita 
9". We then construct a Gini coefficient for each province that reflects inequality across 
(	number municipalities. 
 
A primary concern when calculating spatial inequality measures is the modifiable areal unit 
problem (MAUP). This takes place when the same data, aggregated differently, yields different 
results. It is therefore important to aggregate luminosity per capita in a non-arbitrary way. 
Arbitrary methods of aggregation could involve dividing provinces into ‘grids’ (through 
‘fishnetting’), subsequently calculating luminosity per capita for each grid, and then finally 
determining a Gini coefficient based on variations between grids. The size of the grids will 
significantly affect the degree to which spatial inequality is observed. The smaller the grid, the 
higher the levels of observed inequality as a city is likely to fit within a single grid, while rural 
areas would not. Municipalities are more likely to have a non-arbitrary mix of agglomerations 
and rural areas as cities, in addition to their green belts. Furthermore, there is a risk that spatial 
inequality measures are simply reflecting the size of regions and the distribution of population. 
To address this, we control for area size of regions and distribution of population in our 
regression specifications. Therefore, to address the MAUP, we calculate luminosity per capita 
for non-arbitrary units – municipalities. Each province has, on average, nine municipalities 
nested within it. 
 
We obtain data on the boundaries of provinces and municipalities from the database of Global 
Administrative areas (GADM). Since Libya does not have any recognised municipalities, we 
have excluded it from our analysis. Similarly, given the disputed status of Western Sahara, we 
have also excluded it. 
 
Figure 3 provides an overview of the distribution of luminosity per capita measures for each 
municipality (categorised by quintiles). We can see that the highest level of luminosity per 
capita is observed in Southern Africa (South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe), as 
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well as parts of Northern Africa (e.g. natural resource rich areas in Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, 
and Tunisia). The areas with the lowest level of luminosity per capita are found in Central 
Africa (Central African Republic, Chad and the Democratic Republic of the Congo), as well 
as in the Horn of Africa (Somalia, eastern Ethiopia and South Sudan). 
 
Figure 3: Luminosity Per Capita (Municipalities) 
 
 
Figure 4 illustrates spatial inequality (based on the variations of municipal-level luminosity per 
capita levels seen in Figure 1 and categorised by quintiles). We see that the most spatially equal 
regions are in Southern Africa (South Africa and Namibia), parts of Western Africa (Ghana 
and Côte D’Ivoire) as well as parts of Northern Africa (regions in Morocco, Egypt, and 
Algeria). The areas with the lowest level of luminosity per capita are found in Central Africa 
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(Central African Republic and Chad), Somalia in Eastern Africa as well as Angola in Southern 
Africa. 
 
Figure 4: Spatial Inequality (Provinces) 
 
3.2 Other data  
 
To determine whether variations in geographical features (e.g. natural resource endowments 
and climate) drives spatial inequality, we use a number of geographic, topographic, and climate 
controls. The geographic controls include the number of gold mines in a region, which is taken 
from GOLDATA; the number of gem mines, from GEMDATA; a crop suitability index from 
Galor and Özak (2016), and the number of petroleum sites, from the Peace Research Institute 
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Oslo. These control for variations in natural resource endowments, which may lead to spatial 
inequality.  
 
The main topographic control is an index of terrain ruggedness from Nunn and Puga (2012). 
This helps us account for localised variation in terrain which Bloom and Sachs (1998) argue 
impacts patterns of economic development and therefore spatial inequality. We use two climate 
controls: mean precipitation data and mean temperature data from the University of Delaware’s 
Climate Data Archive. This is to account for environmental variations which, as discussed in 
section 2, are argued to have impacted spatial inequality in African regions (Mveyange, 2018). 
 
Furthermore, we measure national and sub-national government quality. For national 
government quality, we use the World Governance Indicators’ Government Effectiveness 
Index. Variations in sub-national government quality may also exacerbate spatial inequality 
(Iddawela et al., 2021). To account for this, we use measures of the perceptions of local 
government corruption and trust in local government officials. These measures are taken from 
responses to the Afrobarometer survey (round 5). We aggregate and average the responses to 
these questions such that we have measures for corruption and trust at the provincial level. 
 
In order to adequately capture the relationship between NGQ and spatial inequality, we control 
for variations in these factors between municipalities by creating Gini indexes for precipitation, 
ruggedness, temperature, area size and population following the same approach outlined in 
section 3.1. This ensures that our measure of spatial inequality is not biased by variations in 
climate, terrain, population and size of municipalities. 
 
4. Model specification and results 
 
4.1 Econometric specification 
 
We first use a reduced form OLS model to measure the relationship between spatial inequality 
and NGQ. The analysis is based on the following specification: 
 
(4) M(U)5;,T:9!' = 	/ +	1"#$' + 2′!'(φ	 + I* + 5!' 
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Where M(U)5;,T:9!' is the spatial inequality within each province + (measured using Gini 
coefficients) in country J in 2015. "#$' is national government quality (measured through the 
World Governance Indicators’ Government Effectiveness Index), 2′!'(φ	is a vector of 
covariates discussed previously which includes Gini coefficients for precipitation, ruggedness, 
temperature, region size and population (further detail is provided in Appendix Table 1), I* are 
region fixed effects (for Northern, Southern, Eastern, Western, and Central Africa, in addition 
to Islands) to account for any time-variant spatial heterogeneities, and 5!'( is the error term. 






4.2.1 Impact of National Government Quality on Spatial Inequality 
Table 1: Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq 
          
NGQ -0.00449*** -0.00423*** -0.00476*** -0.00443*** 
 (0.000837) (0.00114) (0.000784) (0.00112) 
Precipitation 1.127* 1.002 0.881 0.886 
(Gini coefficient) (0.594) (0.646) (0.596) (0.677) 
Ruggedness 0.349*** 0.327*** 0.282*** 0.271** 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0995) (0.108) (0.0938) (0.108) 
Temperature -0.0536 0.0827 -0.0245 0.0574 
(Gini coefficient) (0.170) (0.194) (0.160) (0.193) 
lnArea 0.00930 0.00438   
 (0.0102) (0.0114)   
Population 0.297*** 0.313*** 0.252*** 0.268*** 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0594) (0.0742) (0.0537) (0.0659) 
Petrol Sites -0.0168 0.00595 -0.0179 -0.00495 
 (0.0203) (0.0215) (0.0174) (0.0198) 
Gem Mines 0.00335 0.00369 0.00255 0.00241 
 (0.00813) (0.00799) (0.00723) (0.00688) 
Gold Sites -0.0128*** -0.0138*** -0.0107*** -0.0118*** 
 (0.00254) (0.00288) (0.00237) (0.00267) 
lnCrop Suitability -0.00882 -0.00946 -0.00578 -0.00566 
 (0.00959) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0142) 
Local corruption  0.000213  0.000250 
  (0.00218)  (0.00203) 
Local trust  0.000278  0.000651 
  (0.00175)  (0.00161) 
Area   0.230*** 0.243*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0616) (0.0725) 
Constant 0.387*** 0.385 0.425*** 0.339 
 (0.130) (0.243) (0.0972) (0.232) 
     
Region FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 615 474 615 474 
R-squared 0.467 0.430 0.484 0.452 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ with 
spatial inequalities. Dependent variable is Gini coefficient of admin 1 spatial 
inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per capita. Standard errors clustered 
at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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The OLS results reported in Table 1 indicates that there is a negative and highly significant 
relationship between NGQ and spatial inequality for the African regions in our sample. A one 
unit increase in NGQ is associated with a slight (0.04%) decrease in spatial inequality across 
all permutations in columns (1) to (4). In short, better quality of national government is 
associated with reduced spatial inequality.  
 
In columns (1) and (2) we control for log area size of each province to account for any concerns 
that the size of regions biases the results. In columns (3) and (4) we control for variations in 
the area of municipalities that are nested within each province. We do this by calculating a gini 
coefficient to capture variations in municipality sizes. This is done to address the idea that 
smaller units have higher levels of inequalities (due to the modifiable areal unit problem 
discussed previously), and thus provinces with significant variations in the size of nested 
municipalities experience higher levels of overall spatial inequality. In columns (2) and (4) we 
control for measures of local government corruption and trust. We see that they do not have a 
significant relationship with spatial inequality.  
 
Across all permutations, we also find that spatial inequality is significantly associated with 
variations in terrain ruggedness municipality area size, and population distribution.  
 
4.2.2 Government quality vs. Natural Endowments 
 
A number of studies have argued that variations in economic development are driven by 
geographical endowments (e.g. Diamond, 1998; Bloom et al., 2003; Dell et al., 2012). In light 
of this research, we wanted to examine the degree to which variations in geography drive 
spatial inequality within African provinces. Given that the results we see in Table 1 are 
somewhat contradictory to the literature (i.e. precipitation and temperature do not appear to be 
significant), we need to address concerns of collinearity and over-controlling when using these 
geographical variables. One method of addressing these concerns is to use principal component 
analysis to transform the original set of variables into a new set of uncorrelated components 
(Chatfield and Collins, 1980). Thus, following the approach outlined in Alesina et al. (2016) 
who looked at the relationship between geographic variation and contemporary development, 
we create a composite index of geographical variation using PCA. In doing so, we capture 
variations in geographical factors by creating components based on seven geographical 
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variables – two related to topography (ruggedness and elevation), two related to climate 
(temperature and precipitation) and three related to natural resource endowments – gem mines, 
petroleum sites and gold mines, elevation. 
 
Table 2 provides the results of the principal component analysis. The first two components 
explains approximately 30% of the common variance of our seven measures of geographical 
variation, while the second component explains approximately 25% (therefore cumulatively 
explaining 63% of variation). Six measures load positively onto the first component. The first 
component has an eigenvalue of 1.69, while the second component has an eigenvalue of 1.17. 
We therefore include these components in our model (the rule of thumb for including 
components is above 1) (Chatfield and Collins, 1980). All other components have eigenvalues 




Table 2: Principal Component Analysis 
Principal 















1 1.6961 0.1429 Precipitation Gini 0.3384 0.4971 0.038 -0.4791 -0.3487 0.4237 0.326 
2 1.1714 0.2857 Elevation Gini 0.5298 -0.1945 -0.123 0.133 -0.2057 0.3372 -0.7019 
3 0.97974 0.4286 Ruggedness Gini 0.4446 -0.2436 -0.2953 0.4652 -0.325 -0.201 0.5416 
4 0.909227 0.5714 Temperature Gini 0.4743 0.1177 0.2458 -0.335 0.058 -0.7485 -0.1578 
5 0.824608 0.7143 Gem Mines 0.2312 0.4986 -0.5051 0.1909 0.6368 0.0257 -0.0132 
6 0.75252 0.8571 Gold Sites -0.0243 0.5388 0.5281 0.6213 -0.1814 -0.0278 -0.1027 







Table 3: OLS Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq 
          
NGQ -0.00581*** -0.00586*** -0.00553*** -0.00556*** 
 (0.000841) (0.000844) (0.000808) (0.000811) 
Geog (PC 1) 0.0509*** 0.0496*** 0.0278** 0.0273** 
 (0.0116) (0.0110) (0.0112) (0.0109) 
Geog (PC 2)  0.0110  0.00607 
  (0.00891)  (0.00838) 
Area   0.274*** 0.270*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0556) (0.0552) 
Population   0.241*** 0.240*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0586) (0.0589) 
Constant 0.636*** 0.637*** 0.457*** 0.459*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0296) (0.0369) (0.0374) 
Region FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 708 708 708 708 
R-squared 0.360 0.362 0.437 0.438 
 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ and 
the first two geography components with spatial inequalities. Dependent variable is 
Gini coefficient of admin 1 spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity 
per capita. Standard errors clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
In Table 3 we assess the relationship between geography (measured using the first two 
components), NGQ and spatial inequality. Column (1) examines the simple relationship with 
dummies for the six broad African regions, while column (2) also controls for variation in area 
of nested municipalities and variation in population within each province. We see that for both 
columns NGQ is highly significant and negatively associated with inequality. A one unit 
increase in NGQ is associated with a slight (.06%) reduction in spatial inequality across African 
provinces in our sample. Similarly, geography (through the first component) appears to be 
significantly associated with spatial inequality, while the second component does not appear to 
have an association. Nonetheless, we can conclude that NGQ appears to matter just as much as 




4.3 Instrumental Variable Analysis 
 
While the OLS results indicate a significant and negative relationship between NGQ and spatial 
inequality, the results could be endogenous through reverse causality. In other words, spatial 
inequality could lower NGQ. For example, some forms of spatial inequality are driven by 
ethnic divisions in African regions (Alesina et al., 2016). Ethnic groups that perceive 
themselves as marginalised are likely to challenge the legitimacy of governments – thereby 
leading to a deterioration in the government’s ability to exercise rule of law Kyriacou (2013). 
Thus, in order to establish the causal impact of NGQ on spatial inequality, we use a 2SLS 
instrumental variables model. 
 
The instrument used is log European settler mortality rates, as popularised by Acemoglu et al. 
(2001) in their study on the role of institutions on economic performance. Historically in 
Africa, there were two primary forms of colonisation – colonisation through ‘indirect rule’ 
whereby so-called ‘extractive states’ were set up. This involved empowering local state 
apparatuses to govern on behalf of colonial empires to form “a dependent but autonomous 
system of rule, one that combined accountability to superiors with a flexible response to the 
subject population, a capacity to implement central directives with one to absorb local shocks” 
(Mamdani, 1996: 60). These systems were set up by colonial powers to ‘extract’ value from 
colonies, without many resources being allocated to developing institutions that protected 
property rights or preserved rule of law. The second form of colonisation, according to 
Acemoglu et al. (2001), involved European settlements – whereby Europeans would settle and 
set up European-style institutions, which placed a heavier emphasis on rule of law and private 
property protections. These states included South Africa, Rhodesia and British Kenya.  
 
A number of studies argue that ‘institutional culture’ persists over long periods of time (e.g. 
North, 1990, Young, 1994; La Porta et al., 1998). We can understand ‘institutional culture’ as 
a set of beliefs and social behaviours that are bound up in institutions. This includes certain 
values or conceptions of morality. Thus, if an institution has normalised behaviours over time 
such as clientelism or bribery, these norms affect how government officials currently act.  
 
As such, Iddawela et al. (2021), argue that the relationship between historical government 
institutions and present-day government institutions is based upon shared social and cultural 
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traits, which persist over time and still determine differences in development across regions 
and cities. Following this logic, an instrument that can capture historical levels of government 
quality should meet the exclusion restriction of being unrelated to present-day government 
quality.  
 
European settler mortality rates therefore qualify as a meaningful instrument for present-day 
NGQ. European regimes decided where to settle based on the mortality rates of sailors, soldiers 
and bishops situated in colonies between the 17th and 19th centuries. Areas that had high settler 
mortality rates saw the creation of ‘extractive states’ without significant protection of property 
rights, while areas that had lower settler mortality rates saw the creation of settler-colonies with 
European-style institutions. As such, the institutional culture developed in early institutions 
may filter through to present-day institutions. Meanwhile, present-day institutions, in turn, 
affect levels of spatial inequality as countries with poor government quality may engage in 
regional favouritism, self-serving behaviour and clientelism (Ezcurra, & Rodríguez-Pose, 
2014).  
 
Following this logic, we arrive at the following first stage estimating equation: 
(5)         !"#$%&&!%'("'&)!*&+! = 	. +	012%34)!*&*%5"! + 6#"!$φ	 + 8% + 4"! 
 
Where !"#$%&&!%'("'&)!*&+! is the log settler mortality level for each country from Acemoglu 
et al. (2001). This data was compiled from the work of historian Philip D. Curtin (1964).12 
  
 
12 Acemoglu et al. (2001) use data on European settler mortality from the work of Philip Curtin. Curtin 
compiled this data from military records which were dated from 1815 (for British soldiers). French records 
began being collected during the 1830s, while by the 1870s most European countries were publishing 
records on soldier health. Curtin triangulated these datasets with numerous sources and found them to be 
reliable (Curtin, 1989).  
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Table 4: Instrumental Variables Results 










          
NGQ -0.0165*** -0.0180*** -0.0162*** -0.0186*** 
 (0.00272) (0.00535) (0.00319) (0.00599) 
Precipitation 0.975 0.919 0.816 0.823 
(Gini coefficient) (0.619) (0.755) (0.615) (0.769) 
Ruggedness 0.217** 0.232* 0.164 0.165 
(Gini coefficient) (0.103) (0.129) (0.105) (0.139) 
Temperature -0.224 -0.302 -0.255 -0.445 
(Gini coefficient) (0.239) (0.327) (0.260) (0.440) 
lnArea 0.00287 0.00123   
 (0.0128) (0.0179)   
Population 0.101 0.145* 0.0763 0.112 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0637) (0.0826) (0.0625) (0.0806) 
Petrol Sites -0.0286 -0.00544 -0.0318 -0.0211 
 (0.0301) (0.0410) (0.0279) (0.0412) 
Gem Mines 0.0156** 0.0143** 0.0131** 0.00972 
 (0.00629) (0.00703) (0.00599) (0.00669) 
Gold Sites 0.00963 0.00296 0.00964 0.00386 
 (0.00619) (0.00551) (0.00658) (0.00565) 
lnCrop Calories 0.0132 0.0187 0.0152 0.0237 
 (0.0185) (0.0218) (0.0188) (0.0241) 
Local Corruption  0.00177  0.00209 
  (0.00245)  (0.00246) 
Local Trust  0.00192  0.00276 
  (0.00250)  (0.00251) 
Area   0.188** 0.280*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0749) (0.0886) 
First-Stage F-Test 33.84 12.89 21.78 9.52 
Anderson-Rubin P-
Value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Observations 403 343 403 343 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ with spatial inequalities. Dependent 
variable is Gini coefficient of provincial spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per capita. Standard 
errors clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. First-stage results reported in Appendix Table 5. 
 
The 2SLS IV results reported in Table 4 indicate that our OLS results hold. We can see that a 
one unit increase in NGQ is associated with a 1.6% - 1.8% decrease in spatial inequality across 
all permutations in columns (1) to (4). In other words, there appears to be a causal, negative 
and significant relationship between NGQ and spatial inequality for African provinces. 
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In columns (1) and (2) we control for log area size of each province to ensure that the size of 
provinces does not affect our results. In columns (3) and (4) we control for variations in the 
area size of municipalities that are nested within each province. In columns (2) and (4) we 
again control for measures of local government corruption and trust.  
 
The first stage f-test in columns (1)-(3) are greater than 10 (the rule of thumb for a strong 
instrument), however it is just below 10 in column (4). Nonetheless, the Anderson-Rubin 
confidence interval, which is robust to weak instruments (Mikusheva, 2010), is less than 0.01. 
With this caveat in mind, we argue that our instrument is likely to be valid with NQG having 
a significant causal impact on spatial inequality 
 
Table 5: Instrumental Variables Results: Geography vs NGQ 






      
NGQ -0.0161*** -0.0161*** 
 (0.00243) (0.00238) 
Geog (PC1) 0.0263*** 0.0220*** 
 (0.00717) (0.00685) 
Geog (PC2) 0.0291*** 0.0168 
 (0.0106) (0.0110) 
Area  0.135** 
(Gini Coefficient)  (0.0683) 
Population  0.134** 
(Gini Coefficient)  (0.0571) 
   
Observations 469 469 
First Stage F-Test 35.11 36.79 
 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS IV estimates examining the 
impact of NGQ on spatial inequalities. Dependent variable is Gini coefficient of 
provincial spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per capita. Standard 
errors clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. First-stage results 
reported in Appendix Table 6. 
 
In Table 5 we subsequently examine the causal relationship between NGQ and spatial 
inequality while controlling for geography (measured using the first two components of our 
PCA). We see that for both permutations NGQ appears to have a causal, significant and 
negative relationship with spatial inequality. A one unit increase in NGQ is associated with a 
slight (1.6%) reduction in spatial inequality across African provinces in our sample. It appears 
 134 
that both components of geography are significant in column (1), however after controlling for 
variations in area and population in column (2), just the first component of geography remains 
significant. Nonetheless, our results suggest that good quality institutions reduce spatial 
inequality just as much as variations in geographical endowments.  
 
5. Robustness Tests 
 
We conduct a number of robustness tests to ensure the validity of our results. One of the 
primary sources of concern in constructing spatial inequality indices relates to the measure of 
population used. We have chosen to calculate luminosity per capita for each municipality using 
the UN’s Gridded Population of the World on the denominator. This is the most widely used 
measure in night light studies. However, to test the sensitivity of our results to population 
measures we re-run our analyses using an alternative measure of pixel-level population 
estimates by Worldpop. Using this alternate population measure, we see that a one unit increase 
in NGQ is associated with roughly a 0.04% - 0.05% decrease in spatial inequality. In other 
words – our OLS results (presented in Appendix Table 7) still hold as there is a negative and 
highly significant relationship between NGQ and spatial inequality.  
 
Similarly, our 2SLS instrumental variable estimations likewise suggest that a one unit increase 
in NGQ leads to a 1.6% - 1.8% decrease in spatial inequality (Appendix Table 8). As before, 
we see that there is a causal, significant and negative relationship between NGQ and spatial 
inequality. The first stage f-test remains above 10 in columns (1) to (3), however it is slightly 
below 10 in column (4). Despite this, the Anderson-Rubin test, which is robust to weak 
instruments, has a p-value well below 0.05 across all columns, which indicates that our results 
hold.  
 
Another potential source of bias in our results is the inclusion of large cities. It could be argued 
that our spatial inequality measure is driven by capital cities or commercial capitals, whereby 
large cities are surrounded by more rural areas. Therefore, provinces which have large cities 
experience higher levels of inequality as surrounding areas are significantly less developed by 
comparison. To address this concern, we drop all regions which have a capital city or 
commercial capital from our analysis. We subsequently re-run our analyses and find that, 
despite the exclusion of capital cities and commercial capitals, the results hold (Appendix Table 
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9). We see that a one unit increase in NGQ is associated with roughly a .05% decrease in spatial 
inequality across all permutations 
 
The 2SLS IV results likewise hold withstanding the exclusion of capital cities and commercial 
capitals. We can observe a causal, negative and highly significant relationship between NGQ 
and spatial inequality (Appendix Table 10). A one unit increase in NGQ causes roughly a 1.7% 
reduction in spatial inequality in columns (1) to (4). The first stage f-test is above 10 in columns 
(1) – (3) and is slightly below 10 in column (4). However, as previously, the Anderson-Rubin 
test’s p-value is well below 0.05, thereby indicating our results in column (4) holds. 
 
Finally, given the high degree of inequality in DRC (see Figure 4), there may be a concern that 
our results are being biased by the inclusion of DRC. Therefore, to address this concern, we re-
run the analysis excluding DRC. We see that the OLS (Appendix Table 11) and IV (Appendix 





Despite the growing concern about the drivers and consequences of spatial inequality within 
the African context, the vast majority of prior studies have, due to the absence of official sub-
national data, focussed on spatial inequality at the country-level (e.g. see Lessman and Seidel, 
2017; Alesina et al., 2016). Such studies have measured inequality by comparing variations in 
provincial economic performance. The implicit assumption of this work is that city-specific 
favouritism displayed by governments, or favourable geographical endowments, spills over to 
equally benefit an entire province. This assumption, however, needs to be further scrutinised 
in the African context given the sheer size of provinces. As a result, we examine whether city-
specific favouritism and geographical endowments leads to spatial inequality within provinces.  
 
Understanding these within-province spatial dynamics are fundamental for policy makers 
given that most African countries have provincial-level governments that play an important 
role in driving development outcomes of each province (Iddawela et al., 2021). Therefore, if 
local policymakers are equipped with both a robust measure of within-province spatial 
inequality (in the absence of official data) as well as an understanding of what drives spatial 
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inequality; they will be able to implement redistributive policies that can address inequality 
derived from either national government quality or variations in geographical endowments. 
 
This study creates a novel index of within-province spatial inequality by using high-resolution 
satellite imagery of night-time luminosity to calculate the economic performance of 
municipalities that are nested within a province. We subsequently create Gini coefficients 
reflecting the variation of economic activity between municipalities within provinces of 52 
African countries, and then measure the extent to which both national government quality 
(measured through the World Governance Indicators) and geographical factors shape spatial 
inequality. 
 
We subsequently find that national government quality matters just as much as geographical 
endowments in explaining spatial inequality within provinces. In using a 2SLS instrumental 
variables approach (which employs European settler mortality rates as an instrument for 
present-day government quality), we see that the relationship between NGQ and spatial 
inequality is causal. This appears to suggest that city-specific favouritism of national 
governments causes inequality within these provinces, rather than benefitting the provinces 
equally. 
 
Thus, to summarise, there are numerous policy implications of this study. First, our insights on 
within-provincial spatial inequality can encourage future redistributive policies at both the 
national and sub-national level. Second, by showing the importance of NGQ we can encourage 
local policymakers, donors and citizens alike to improve national government quality given the 
implications for inequality. Finally, our novel measure of within-province inequality can be 
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Appendix Table 1 
 
Variable Definition Source 
National 
Government Quality 
Government Effectiveness Score (0-100) World Governance Indicators  
Nighttime light 
emissions (GDP) 
Log of night light density measured using the 
Visible Infrared Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration 
Number of gold 
mines 
Number of gold mines GOLDATA (Balestri, 2013) 
Number of 
petroleum sites 
Number of petroleum sites  PRIO 
Number of gem 
mines 
Number of gem mines GEMDATA (Balestri, 2013) 
Ruggedness Terrain ruggedness Nunn, N., & Puga, D. (2012). 
Elevation log average elevation (metres) from Shuttle 
Radar Topography Mission dataset at 500m 
resolution 
Consortium for Spatial Information 
Temperature Monthly average of daily mean temperature 
(2015 and 2016) 
University of Delaware’s Climate 
Data Archive 
Local Corruption Afrobarometer Round 5 Afrobarometer Round 5  









  Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Area 720 36870.94 62458.48 1.558356 623514.8 
Population 720 253102.5 381833.1 1048.248 5640702 
VIIRS 720 623.2273 1780.953 0 22342.28 
Precipitation 720 436307.4 784280.5 237.4 8299267 





Appendix Table 3 
 
OLS Results using alternative population measures 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Spatial Inequality Spatial Inequality Spatial Inequality Spatial Inequality 
      
NGQ -0.00485*** -0.00497*** -0.00511*** -0.00517*** 
 (0.000781) (0.00105) (0.000683) (0.000957) 
Precipitation 1.214** 1.020* 0.948* 0.881 
(Gini coefficient) (0.547) (0.564) (0.555) (0.593) 
Ruggedness 0.352*** 0.326*** 0.279*** 0.264*** 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0851) (0.0922) (0.0815) (0.0941) 
Temperature 0.0545 0.181 0.0695 0.151 
(Gini coefficient) (0.158) (0.178) (0.146) (0.168) 
lnArea 0.00802 0.00445   
 (0.00880) (0.0101)   
Population 0.307*** 0.339*** 0.264*** 0.290*** 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0601) (0.0739) (0.0561) (0.0692) 
Petrol sites -0.0134 0.00730 -0.0145 -0.00505 
 (0.0207) (0.0250) (0.0175) (0.0235) 
Gem Mines 0.00268 0.00293 0.00131 0.00117 
 (0.00669) (0.00683) (0.00598) (0.00579) 
Gold Sites -0.0133*** -0.0140*** -0.0114*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.00252) (0.00291) (0.00230) (0.00262) 
lnCrop Calories 0.00316 0.00485 0.00675 0.00938 
 (0.00815) (0.00979) (0.00949) (0.0116) 
Local 
Corruption  -0.000523  -0.000452 
  (0.00193)  (0.00179) 
Local Trust  7.58e-05  0.000520 
  (0.00152)  (0.00134) 
Area   0.242*** 0.268*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0631) (0.0742) 
Constant 0.297** 0.326 0.318*** 0.265 
 (0.112) (0.197) (0.0826) (0.187) 
     
Observations 615 474 615 474 
R-squared 0.459 0.432 0.480 0.459 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ with spatial inequalities. 
Dependent variable is Gini coefficient of admin 1 spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity 




Appendix Table 4 
 
IV First Stage Results 
 










     
Settler Mortality  -5.524*** -4.201*** -4.612*** -3.909*** 
 0.949 1.17 0.988 1.267 
Precipitation 51.08* 48.328* 53.572* 50.918* 
(Gini coefficient) 30.56 31.763 30.12 30.143 
Ruggedness -6.537 -6.031 -7.168 -7.411 
(Gini coefficient) 4.513 5.033 4.856 5.372 
Temperature -17.029 -24.405 -41.57*** -45.807*** 
(Gini coefficient) 13.752 15.185 13.278 15.524 
lnArea -2.751*** -1.973***   
 0.591 0.678   
Population -4.727 -1.389 -4.057 -0.734 
(Gini coefficient) 3.648 3.991 3.691 3.948 
Petrol Sites -1.533 -1.053 -0.793 -1.036 
 1.518 1.72 1.469 1.654 
Gem Mines 0.536* 0.271 0.152 -1.109 
 0.306 0.314 0.249 0.263 
Gold Sites 1.229*** 0.503*** 1.213*** 0.479*** 
 0.292 0.35 0.274 0.347 
lnCrop Calories -0.309 -0.543 0.338 1.012 
 -0.0185 1.142 0.998 1.092 
Local Corruption 1.102 0.188*  0.194 
  0.114  0.118 
Local Trust  0.186**  0.177* 
  0.938  0.0982 
Area   -3.67 2.661 
(Gini coefficient)   3.361 4.203 
Observations 403 343 403 343 
The table reports first stage of cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS IV estimates 
examining the impact of NGQ on spatial inequalities. Dependent variable is Gini 
coefficient of provincial spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per 





Appendix Table 5 
 
Instrumental Variables Results using alternative population measures 
 










          
NGQ -0.0158*** -0.0177*** -0.0151*** -0.0181*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00513) (0.00314) (0.00572) 
Precipitation 1.349** 1.419* 1.166* 1.292 
(Gini coefficient) (0.635) (0.775) (0.626) (0.786) 
Ruggedness 0.230** 0.226* 0.181* 0.159 
(Gini coefficient) (0.106) (0.136) (0.107) (0.144) 
Temperature -0.120 -0.207 -0.0983 -0.308 
(Gini coefficient) (0.220) (0.309) (0.245) (0.424) 
lnArea 0.00716 0.00467   
 (0.0131) (0.0179)   
Population 0.103 0.162** 0.0783 0.128* 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0638) (0.0784) (0.0613) (0.0760) 
Petrol Sites -0.0186 -0.00443 -0.0227 -0.0207 
 (0.0282) (0.0412) (0.0261) (0.0408) 
Gem Mines 0.0115* 0.0103 0.00954 0.00611 
 (0.00607) (0.00681) (0.00581) (0.00655) 
Gold Sites 0.00776 0.00307 0.00728 0.00387 
 (0.00579) (0.00524) (0.00613) (0.00536) 
lnCrop Calories 0.0263* 0.0302* 0.0273* 0.0347* 
 (0.0149) (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0199) 
Local Corruption  0.000406  0.000694 
  (0.00240)  (0.00240) 
Local Trust  0.00133  0.00217 
  (0.00241)  (0.00239) 
Area   0.191** 0.289*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0737) (0.0865) 
First-Stage F-Test 34.82 13.40 22.36 9.77 
Anderson-Rubin P-Value    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 403 343 403 343 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ with spatial inequalities. Dependent variable 
is Gini coefficient of admin 1 spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per capita. Standard errors clustered at 
country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 6 
 
Instrumental Variables Results: Geography vs NGQ First Stage Results 
 






      
Settler Mortality -6.074*** -5.934*** 
 0.815 0.826 
Geography -3.357 -2.94 
(Gini coefficient) 0.624 0.643 
Area  -9.343*** 
(Gini coefficient)  3.014 
Population  1.355 
(Gini coefficient)  3.403 
Observations 469 469 
The table reports first stage cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS IV estimates 
examining the impact of NGQ on spatial inequalities. Dependent variable is Gini 
coefficient of provincial spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per 




Appendix Table 7 
 
OLS Results using alternative population measures 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Spatial Inequality Spatial Inequality Spatial Inequality Spatial Inequality 
          
NGQ -0.00485*** -0.00497*** -0.00511*** -0.00517*** 
 (0.000781) (0.00105) (0.000683) (0.000957) 
Precipitation 1.214** 1.020* 0.948* 0.881 
(gini coefficient) (0.547) (0.564) (0.555) (0.593) 
Ruggedness 0.352*** 0.326*** 0.279*** 0.264*** 
(gini coefficient) (0.0851) (0.0922) (0.0815) (0.0941) 
Temperature 0.0545 0.181 0.0695 0.151 
(gini coefficient) (0.158) (0.178) (0.146) (0.168) 
lnArea 0.00802 0.00445   
 (0.00880) (0.0101)   
Population 0.307*** 0.339*** 0.264*** 0.290*** 
(gini coefficient) (0.0601) (0.0739) (0.0561) (0.0692) 
Petrol sites -0.0134 0.00730 -0.0145 -0.00505 
 (0.0207) (0.0250) (0.0175) (0.0235) 
Gem Mines 0.00268 0.00293 0.00131 0.00117 
 (0.00669) (0.00683) (0.00598) (0.00579) 
Gold Sites -0.0133*** -0.0140*** -0.0114*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.00252) (0.00291) (0.00230) (0.00262) 
lnCrop Calories 0.00316 0.00485 0.00675 0.00938 
 (0.00815) (0.00979) (0.00949) (0.0116) 
Local 
Corruption  -0.000523  -0.000452 
  (0.00193)  (0.00179) 
Local Trust  7.58e-05  0.000520 
  (0.00152)  (0.00134) 
Area   0.242*** 0.268*** 
(gini coefficient)   (0.0631) (0.0742) 
Constant 0.297** 0.326 0.318*** 0.265 
 (0.112) (0.197) (0.0826) (0.187) 
     
Observations 615 474 615 474 
R-squared 0.459 0.432 0.480 0.459 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ with spatial inequalities. 
Dependent variable is gini coefficient of admin 1 spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity 





Appendix Table 8 
 
Instrumental Variables Results using alternative population measures 










          
NGQ -0.0158*** -0.0177*** -0.0151*** -0.0181*** 
 (0.00266) (0.00513) (0.00314) (0.00572) 
Precipitation 1.349** 1.419* 1.166* 1.292 
(Gini coefficient) (0.635) (0.775) (0.626) (0.786) 
Ruggedness 0.230** 0.226* 0.181* 0.159 
(Gini coefficient) (0.106) (0.136) (0.107) (0.144) 
Temperature -0.120 -0.207 -0.0983 -0.308 
(Gini coefficient) (0.220) (0.309) (0.245) (0.424) 
lnArea 0.00716 0.00467   
 (0.0131) (0.0179)   
Population 0.103 0.162** 0.0783 0.128* 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0638) (0.0784) (0.0613) (0.0760) 
Petrol Sites -0.0186 -0.00443 -0.0227 -0.0207 
 (0.0282) (0.0412) (0.0261) (0.0408) 
Gem Mines 0.0115* 0.0103 0.00954 0.00611 
 (0.00607) (0.00681) (0.00581) (0.00655) 
Gold Sites 0.00776 0.00307 0.00728 0.00387 
 (0.00579) (0.00524) (0.00613) (0.00536) 
lnCrop Calories 0.0263* 0.0302* 0.0273* 0.0347* 
 (0.0149) (0.0179) (0.0147) (0.0199) 
Local Corruption  0.000406  0.000694 
  (0.00240)  (0.00240) 
Local Trust  0.00133  0.00217 
  (0.00241)  (0.00239) 
Area   0.191** 0.289*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0737) (0.0865) 
First-Stage F-Test 34.82 13.40 22.36 9.77 
Anderson-Rubin P-Value    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 403 343 403 343 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ with spatial inequalities. Dependent variable 
is gini coefficient of admin 1 spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per capita. Standard errors clustered at 
country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix Table 9 
 
OLS Results excluding capital cities 
 










          
NGQ -0.00485*** -0.00497*** -0.00511*** -0.00517*** 
 (0.000781) (0.00105) (0.000683) (0.000957) 
Precipitation 1.214** 1.020* 0.948* 0.881 
(Gini coefficient) (0.547) (0.564) (0.555) (0.593) 
Ruggedness 0.352*** 0.326*** 0.279*** 0.264*** 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0851) (0.0922) (0.0815) (0.0941) 
Temperature 0.0545 0.181 0.0695 0.151 
(Gini coefficient) (0.158) (0.178) (0.146) (0.168) 
lnArea 0.00802 0.00445   
 (0.00880) (0.0101)   
Population 0.307*** 0.339*** 0.264*** 0.290*** 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0601) (0.0739) (0.0561) (0.0692) 
Petro Sites -0.0134 0.00730 -0.0145 -0.00505 
 (0.0207) (0.0250) (0.0175) (0.0235) 
Gem Mines 0.00268 0.00293 0.00131 0.00117 
 (0.00669) (0.00683) (0.00598) (0.00579) 
Gold Sites -0.0133*** -0.0140*** -0.0114*** -0.0119*** 
 (0.00252) (0.00291) (0.00230) (0.00262) 
lnCrop Calories 0.00316 0.00485 0.00675 0.00938 
 (0.00815) (0.00979) (0.00949) (0.0116) 
Local Corruption  -0.000523  -0.000452 
  (0.00193)  (0.00179) 
Local Trust  7.58e-05  0.000520 
  (0.00152)  (0.00134) 
Area   0.242*** 0.268*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0631) (0.0742) 
Constant 0.297** 0.326 0.318*** 0.265 
 (0.112) (0.197) (0.0826) (0.187) 
     
Observations 615 474 615 474 
R-squared 0.459 0.432 0.480 0.459 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ with spatial inequalities. Dependent 
variable is Gini coefficient of admin 1 spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per capita. Standard errors 
clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
 150 
Appendix Table 10 
 
IV Results excluding capital cities 
 










          
NGQ -0.0169*** -0.0172*** -0.0166*** -0.0179*** 
 (0.00290) (0.00502) (0.00351) (0.00576) 
Precipitation 0.715 0.583 0.540 0.453 
(Gini coefficient) (0.631) (0.736) (0.629) (0.752) 
Ruggedness 0.221* 0.238* 0.171 0.174 
(Gini coefficient) (0.114) (0.140) (0.115) (0.149) 
Temperature -0.199 -0.201 -0.233 -0.338 
(Gini coefficient) (0.251) (0.309) (0.269) (0.405) 
lnArea 0.00171 0.000811   
 (0.0131) (0.0178)   
Population 0.124* 0.169** 0.100 0.137* 
(Gini coefficient) (0.0665) (0.0846) (0.0651) (0.0823) 
Petrol Sites -0.0235 0.00573 -0.0254 -0.00761 
 (0.0316) (0.0424) (0.0294) (0.0430) 
Gem Mines 0.0162** 0.0153** 0.0133** 0.00995 
 (0.00685) (0.00732) (0.00655) (0.00727) 
Gold Sites 0.0109 0.00513 0.0108 0.00579 
 (0.00665) (0.00582) (0.00725) (0.00620) 
lnCrop Calories 0.0164 0.0226 0.0199 0.0300 
 (0.0203) (0.0228) (0.0207) (0.0257) 
Local Corruption  0.00213  0.00250 
  (0.00243)  (0.00246) 
Local Trust  0.00215  0.00303 
  (0.00246)  (0.00249) 
Area   0.192** 0.289*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0778) (0.0882) 
First-Stage F-Test 28.64 14.02 17.15 9.78 
Anderson-Rubin P-
Value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Observations 382 326 382 326 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS IV estimates examining the impact of NGQ on spatial 
inequalities. Dependent variable is Gini coefficient of provincial spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light 





Appendix Table 11 
 
OLS Results excluding DRC 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq 
          
NGQ -0.00442*** -0.00423*** -0.00464*** -0.00443*** 
 (0.000782) (0.00114) (0.000779) (0.00112) 
Precipitation 1.023* 1.002 0.895 0.886 
(Gini coefficient) (0.588) (0.646) (0.604) (0.677) 
Ruggedness 0.336*** 0.327*** 0.278*** 0.271** 
(Gini coefficient) (0.103) (0.108) (0.101) (0.108) 
Temperature 0.0382 0.0827 -0.00676 0.0574 
(Gini coefficient) (0.156) (0.194) (0.155) (0.193) 
lnArea  0.00438   
  (0.0114)   
Population 0.269*** 0.313*** 0.244*** 0.268*** 
 (0.0631) (0.0742) (0.0588) (0.0659) 
Petrol Sites -0.00922 0.00595 -0.0126 -0.00495 
 (0.0208) (0.0215) (0.0175) (0.0198) 
Gem Mines 0.00485 0.00369 0.00286 0.00241 
 (0.00758) (0.00799) (0.00723) (0.00688) 
Gold Sites -0.0123*** -0.0138*** -0.0111*** -0.0118*** 
 (0.00230) (0.00288) (0.00232) (0.00267) 
lnCrop 
Suitability -0.0108 -0.00946 -0.00645 -0.00566 
 (0.00976) (0.0121) (0.0112) (0.0142) 
Local 
corruption  0.000213  0.000250 
  (0.00218)  (0.00203) 
Local trust  0.000278  0.000651 
  (0.00175)  (0.00161) 
Area   0.202*** 0.243*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0655) (0.0725) 
Constant 0.492*** 0.385 0.433*** 0.339 
 (0.0833) (0.243) (0.0991) (0.232) 
Observations 591 474 591 474 
Country x 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.424 0.430 0.439 0.452 
 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country OLS estimates associating NGQ with spatial inequalities. Dependent 
variable is Gini coefficient of admin 1 spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light luminosity per capita. Standard errors 
clustered at country level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Appendix Table 12 
 
IV Results excluding DRC 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq Spatial Ineq 
          
NGQ -0.0163*** -0.0180*** -0.0160*** -0.0186*** 
 (0.00270) (0.00535) (0.00302) (0.00599) 
Precipitation 1.006 0.919 0.852 0.823 
(Gini coefficient) (0.638) (0.755) (0.621) (0.769) 
Ruggedness 0.225** 0.232* 0.168 0.165 
(Gini coefficient) (0.111) (0.129) (0.112) (0.139) 
Temperature -0.210 -0.302 -0.244 -0.445 
(Gini coefficient) (0.245) (0.327) (0.261) (0.440) 
lnarea 0.00262 0.00123   
 (0.0128) (0.0179)   
Population 0.122* 0.145* 0.103 0.112 
 (0.0696) (0.0826) (0.0666) (0.0806) 
Petrol Sites -0.0299 -0.00544 -0.0349 -0.0211 
 (0.0302) (0.0410) (0.0280) (0.0412) 
Gem Mines 0.0155** 0.0143** 0.0121** 0.00972 
 (0.00638) (0.00703) (0.00611) (0.00669) 
Gold Sites 0.00939 0.00296 0.00933 0.00386 
 (0.00612) (0.00551) (0.00636) (0.00565) 
lnCrop Suitability 0.0132 0.0187 0.0163 0.0237 
 (0.0187) (0.0218) (0.0192) (0.0241) 
Local corruption  0.00177  0.00209 
  (0.00245)  (0.00246) 
Local trust  0.00192  0.00276 
  (0.00250)  (0.00251) 
Area   0.222*** 0.280*** 
(Gini coefficient)   (0.0826) (0.0886) 
Observations 379 343 379 343 
Country x Year 
FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
F-test (first stage) 34.04 12.89 23.79 9.52 
R-squared -0.130 -0.334 -0.079 -0.347 
The table reports cross-regional, cross-country 2SLS IV estimates examining the impact of NGQ on spatial 
inequalities. Dependent variable is Gini coefficient of provincial spatial inequalities using VIIRS night light 




Paper 4 – Bureaucratic insulation vs accountability: 





Service delivery in places such as Kampala, Uganda, are marred by inefficiency, corruption, 
and negligence. Research suggests that a lack of resources and capacity are primary factors in 
driving poor service delivery. However, once resource and capacity constraints have been 
addressed, there is an ongoing debate on how service delivery can be further improved. One 
argument suggests that bureaucratic insulation – in other words, autonomy – is fundamental to 
improving government services. This is because government officials, once insulated from 
influences of corruption (either top-down from politicians, or bottom-up from citizens), are 
enabled to act in the most effective way. The other argument, driven by principal-agent 
theories, suggests that increasing accountability to political leaders and citizens ensures that 
government officials act in the most effective way. This paper sheds light on this debate by 
examining whether accountability interventions can improve service delivery in settings which 
do not have bureaucratic insulation. I examine this qualitatively by analysing a citizen feedback 
initiative conducted by an NGO, SEMA, in Kampala. The analysis shows that interventions 
designed to improve accountability can in fact play an important role in improving service 
delivery. It does so by establishing incentives for government officials to perform better, while 
also creating an evidence base so officials can lobby for more resources. However, such 
interventions on their own are ultimately unable to tackle systemic forms of corruption, which 






Previous essays in this thesis have examined the impacts of government quality on economic 
development in African regions (paper 1), spatial inequality (paper 3), as well as some of the 
drivers of sub-national government quality (paper 2). This essay therefore builds on these 
pieces of work by qualitatively evaluating an intervention designed to improve government 
quality and local service delivery in one African region - Kampala.  
 
According to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), “the delivery 
of government services throughout Uganda has long been imperilled by a lack of 
accountability, cumbersome systems, and corruption. In short: governments are not providing 
their communities with the basic services they need” (USAID, 2016). The three most prominent 
causes of poor service delivery are: weak capacity of staff (Nannyonjo and Okot, 2013), under-
resourcing of government offices (Muriisa, 2008), and inefficient allocation of existing 
resources (Mitchinson, 2003). However, once resource and capacity constraints have been 
addressed, an ongoing academic debate emerges on how service delivery can be further 
improved. 
 
On the one hand, it is argued that bureaucratic insulation – in other words, the autonomy of 
government officials – is fundamental to improving government performance (Jimenez, 2020; 
Mueller, 2015; Hearn, 2001). This is because insulation from top-down donor pressure, 
political influence, and short-term, populist demands of voters, allows government officials to 
rely on expert knowledge and professional norms to deliver the highest quality services to 
citizens. On the other hand, it is argued that greater accountability is needed because, without 
accountability to citizens, government officials will resort to self-interest (Dewatripont et al., 
1999; Kluvers and Tippett, 2010; Ananyev, 2020).  
 
This paper aims to shed light on this debate by qualitatively addressing the research question: 
can accountability interventions improve service delivery in places that do not have an 
insulated bureaucracy? I do so by examining a citizen feedback intervention in Kampala, 
Uganda that is being conducted by an NGO, SEMA. SEMA promotes accountability of 
government offices to citizens by surveying citizens on their experiences of service delivery. 
This information is then anonymised, aggregated, and presented back to government offices in 
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the form of a monthly report. Through this, the accountability of government officials is 
improved, while the level of bureaucratic insulation remains constant. 
 
The paper draws on three rounds of semi-structured interviews over five years. Using three sets 
of interviews in this way enables me to both triangulate across different sets of informants and 
investigate the impact of the programme over time. It has also allowed me to conduct research 
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. I interviewed 42 citizens in 2016 about their 
experiences with service delivery in Kampala, then, following the establishment of SEMA’s 
intervention in 2018, I analyse survey responses of citizens, government officials, and SEMA 
volunteers (responsible for collecting feedback) in 202013. Finally, I conducted virtual key 
informant interviews with core SEMA staff members in 2021. This paper is, to the best of the 
author’s knowledge, the first attempt to explore the impact of accountability mechanisms in 
Kampala. 
 
The case of Kampala is particularly interesting. Kampala, and Uganda more broadly, has 
witnessed a decline in the quality of service delivery over the past two decades (Nangoli et al., 
2015). This has taken place in a context where government offices, both national and local, 
lack bureaucratic insulation. For example, the Kampala Capital City Authority’s executive 
director is appointed by the Ugandan President. This lack of insulation has led to a culture of 
corruption being normalised in government offices (Bainomugisha, 2015). As a result, 
SEMA’s work in Kampala is a case study on whether accountability interventions can promote 
service delivery in a setting that lacks bureaucratic insulation. 
 
The results demonstrate that increasing accountability is a promising way of improving service 
delivery in places with limited bureaucratic insulation. This intervention works because it is a 
tool that motivates officials to provide better services, while also acting as a mechanism to 
quantify performance and track improvements to it. However, I find that citizen feedback is 
best suited to addressing certain barriers to service delivery that stem from the absence of an 
incentive structure. The most prominent of these is the lack of motivation of Kampala’s 
government officials. It can also indirectly empower certain government offices to lobby for 
 
13 Given the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020, surveys of citizens and SEMA feedback 
collectors were conducted in Kampala by a third party, Busara. Additionally, interviews in 
2021 were remotely conducted by the author. 
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more resources and training for staff. However, larger structural problems (e.g. a culture of 
corruption) must be addressed together with other means – such as bureaucratic insulation. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature debating the importance of 
accountability measures versus bureaucratic insulation measures in improving service delivery. 
Section 3 discusses the context of service delivery in Kampala and provides an overview of 
this paper’s method, section 4 presents the results of the qualitative analysis, while section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Improving service delivery: accountability vs bureaucratic 
insulation  
 
Well-functioning government agencies are fundamental to improving service delivery, and in 
promoting development, economic growth and well-being (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012; 
Chanda and Putterman, 2005; Evans et al., 2017). There is broad consensus that two of the 
most powerful ways of improving service delivery are by addressing resource constraints 
(Oates, 1972; Bovaird and Loffler, 2002; Khemani, 2001) and capacity constraints (Watson 
and Yohannes, 2005; Grindle and Hilderbrand, 1995) – particularly in the case of developing 
countries. These take the form of increasing funding to government offices, as well as 
improving education and training for government officials.  
 
However, once resource and technical capacity constraints have been addressed, a debate opens 
up over the best methods of further improving service delivery. One school of thought argues 
that government offices need to be further insulated from sources of corruption (either top 
down from politicians, or bottom-up from citizens). On the other hand, a different school of 
thought argues that increasing accountability to political leaders and citizens is the best way of 
ensuring that government officials provide services in the most effective way.  
 
Countries, such as Uganda, have entrenched elements of clientelism and patronage (Green, 
2010). This culture of clientelism and patronage is driven by authoritarian rulers - Yoweri 
Museveni in the case of Uganda – who systematically ensure that all arms of government and 
power are firmly within the control of the president, the president’s ethnic group, as well as the 
ruling party (Tripp, 2010). Clientelism and patronage has therefore permeated ethnic groups. 
And as a result, voting patterns in these contexts are influenced by ethnic group associations 
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(Kramon, 2019), while there is an expectation that jobs will be handed out to members of the 
same tribe or family connections rather than on merit or technical capacity (Findley et al., 
2017).  
 
One school of thought believes that the solution to protecting government offices from this 
type of clientelism and patronage is through increasing its insulation from top-down political 
pressures, and bottom-up influences from citizens. The main argument is that bureaucratic 
insulation allows officials to pursue preferences and formulate the most effective way of 
delivering services completely independently (Schneider, 1993). In other words, with 
insulation, government officials are free to choose the best methods of service delivery without 
pressure from short-term political interests, special interest groups, or citizens who may attempt 
to bribe officials for preferential treatment. Jimenez (2020), in analysing financial reports from 
local governments in the United States, finds that a lack of bureaucratic insulation incentivises 
governments to adopt policies solely because they are popular with voters (e.g. tax cuts and 
higher government spending). This subsequently leads to budgetary imbalances and long-run 
fiscal issues. However, when there is adequate bureaucratic insulation, experts are able to draw 
on their expertise to choose policies that result in the best outcomes for citizens. Similarly, 
Nistotskaya and Cingolani (2016), undertake a cross-country analysis of 135 countries using 
the University of Gothenburg’s Quality of Government survey. They find that countries which 
have more bureaucratic insulation from day-to-day oversight of politicians, tend to implement 
more effective regulation, as well as experience higher levels of entrepreneurship. These 
studies, however, do not pay enough attention to the African context where capacity levels of 
government staff may be lower than those in more developed countries. In other words, if 
bureaucratic insulation takes place in contexts with lower technical capacity, this could 
negatively impact service delivery. However, to address these concerns, Rasul and Rogger 
(2016), analyse 4,700 engineering projects in Kenya – a country which has less technical 
capacity amongst government officials than in the United States. Despite having lower 
technical capacity, the findings appear consistent. They determine that increasing the autonomy 
of bureaucrats is positively associated with project completion rates. Meanwhile both 
monitoring practices and interventions designed to incentivise the performance of bureaucrats 
were both negatively associated with project completion rates. As a result, this school of 
thought’s argument is that bureaucratic insulation leads to better quality service delivery both 
in developed and less-developed contexts. 
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Conversely, another school of thought has emerged which states that, in order to improve 
service delivery, accountability mechanisms14 need to be introduced so bureaucrats act in the 
most effective way possible. In other words, greater access to citizens and political masters 
would improve service delivery. This thinking stems from the work of Tullock (1965:32), who 
argues that every government official “will only carry out assigned tasks if this proves the best 
way of attaining his [sic] own ends, and will make every effort to change the tasks so as to 
make them more in keeping with these objectives”. Similarly, Downs (1967), builds on this by 
arguing that “every official is significantly motivated by his [sic] own self-interest even when 
acting in a purely official capacity”. Finally, Niskanen (1971) came up with the concept of the 
‘bureaucratic utility function’, whereby government officials weigh their decisions based on 
salary, the prerequisites of office, public reputation, power, patronage, the output of an office, 
ease of making changes and ease of managing an office. In other words, these theories suggest 
that without adequate accountability mechanisms and with too much bureaucratic insulation, 
officials will not act in the best interests of citizens. This is because, they argue, bureaucrats 
fundamentally act out of self-interest. According to Schultz (2003), these issues are 
compounded because government officials are far less accountable than politicians. They 
typically cannot be removed from office due to changes in voters’ behaviour. Such theories 
argue that accountability interventions are the best way of improving service delivery. 
 
Accountability mechanisms have most often been explained through principal-agent theories. 
For example, elected representatives or citizens act as ‘principals’ – they either set policies or 
vote for policies. These policies are then administered by ‘agents’ – i.e. the bureaucrats, whose 
role revolves around policy implementation (Olsen, 2015). Agents can be adequately 
supervised when there is transparency around the performance of government offices and 
officials (Minelli and Ruffini, 2018). The core argument is that, through accountability 
interventions, citizens and elected representatives are able to monitor bureaucrats – holding 
them to account. This prevents them from acting in self-interested ways. Moreover, when the 
performance of government offices is publicised, this also creates a sense of competition 
between offices who are interested in performing better to ‘beat’ other offices. In this sense, 
accountability measures can simultaneously facilitate a form of self-regulation through this 
‘competition effect’ (Dijkman and Kenagh, 2021).  
 
14 Drawing on Boven’s (2007) work, accountability is defined as the requirement for government officials to 
have their conduct scrutinised, and an obligation for them to justify their conduct. 
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Based on these theories, there have been a handful of accountability interventions in the form 
of citizen feedback mechanisms conducted over the past two decades. Gaventa and Barrett 
(2012) conducted a meta-analysis of 100 studies focused on citizen feedback initiatives and 
found mixed results. On the one hand, citizen feedback could lead to greater access to services 
and resources (Ho et al., 2015), greater protection of legal rights (Björkman & Svensson, 2009) 
and enhanced state responsiveness and accountability (Callen and Hasanain; 2011). However, 
on the other hand, citizen feedback programs could also lead to a denial of state services 
(Mahmud, 2010); social economic and political reprisals (Osaghae, 2010), or violence or 
coercive government responses (Mohanty, 2010). As a result, the literature is far from clear on 
whether accountability mechanisms, in the form of citizen feedback initiatives, are truly able 
to improve service delivery – particularly in places like Kampala which do not possess 
bureaucratic insulation. 
 
To summarise, once controlling for factors such as resource constraints and technical capacity 
constraints, the academic literature is divided on how best to improve service delivery. 
Moreover, the empirical evidence for accountability interventions (in the form of citizen 
feedback mechanisms) similarly appears to be divided. As a result, this paper aims to bring 
greater clarity to whether accountability interventions can be a useful method of improving 
service delivery in a context characterised by limited bureaucratic insulation. 
 
3. Context and Method 
 
3.1 Overview of SEMA’s citizen feedback intervention 
 
For the purpose of this paper, ‘service delivery’ captures services that are administered by both 
the national government, as well as local governments in Greater Kampala, such as the 
Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), Mukono District local government, Wakiso District 
local government and Jinja District local government. The main services assessed in this paper 
are local police stations (administered by the national government), and local health centres 
(administered by local government). 
 
The intervention analysed is a form of citizen feedback that has been facilitated by an NGO, 
SEMA, in Greater Kampala. SEMA records citizens’ feedback on their experiences with local 
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government officials. They do this by mobilising volunteers to conduct on-site interviews with 
citizens. Their volunteer data collectors are located at the exits of local government offices. 
Upon leaving the office, citizens are asked about their experiences, wait time, and overall 
satisfaction. Volunteers are trained in survey collection methods – for example ensuring 
leading questions are avoided and to read body language of respondents. 
 
Information gathered through the surveys and devices is aggregated into a monthly one-page 
report, which is delivered to the head of each local government office. The report provides a 
grade, shows performance compared to the previous month, compares the office to other 
offices, and explains where an office performed well and where it needs to improve. The report 
is deliberately written in an easy-to-understand manner so that officials who did not finish a 
secondary school degree are able to interpret it (SEMA, 2020). In order to build trust with 
government officials, SEMA does not publish these reports. Additionally, at the end of the 
year, a local government office of the year is announced to further incentivise better 
performance.  
 
The program’s hypothesis is that if citizen feedback is presented to government offices 
regularly and in an easy-to-understand format, this will increase accountability, and incentivise 
service delivery improvements while simultaneously providing a mechanism to monitor and 
evaluate the quality of services over time. Since launching in March 2018, SEMA has obtained 
over 50,000 survey responses (SEMA, 2019). SEMA’s citizen feedback was conducted at 18 




The paper draws on three rounds of semi-structured interviews over five years. As such, this 
enables me to both triangulate across different sets of informants and to investigate the impact 
of the intervention over time. In doing so, the paper draws on the hermeneutic tools of ‘thematic 
analysis’ to identify the impact of SEMA’s accountability interventions on service delivery in 
Greater Kampala. Three rounds of interviews were conducted. The first in June-July 2016 to 
understand the level of service delivery and the impacts it was having on citizens and 
businesses; the second set of interviews were, given the COVID-19 pandemic, conducted by a 
third-party, Busara, in-person between August-September 2020; while the third set of 
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interviews involved virtually interviewing key informants who worked for SEMA in January 
2021. No respondent was interviewed more than once. I provide further details below.  
 
3.2.1 Interviews in 2016 
 
In 2016, I conducted 42 semi-structured interviews with citizens on their interactions with 
government officials. In addition, I conducted a number of elite key informant interviews: two 
with Kampala local government (KCCA) officials, one from the Ugandan central government 
(Uganda Investment Authority), and one from the Buganda Kingdom (Buganda Land Board). 
The interviews were conducted in English by the author, along with two Ugandan research 
assistants from Makerere University.15 The author’s status as an outsider may have potentially 
limited the desire of individuals to share their experiences openly, however this may have been 
mitigated by the presence of Ugandan counterparts. There was an initial concern that three 
interviewers could intimidate respondents, however it appeared not to be an issue with over 
90% of respondents eager to continue discussing issues after our allotted time and questionnaire 
had been exhausted. 
 
To gain trust and build rapport, interviewees were called prior to the interviews, whereby the 
purpose of the questionnaire was explained. Upon the interviewers’ arrival, respondents were 
presented with a letter that reiterated the purpose of the study. Recordings were not taken given 
the sensitivity of the questions asked. Respondents were contacted given their frequent 
interaction with government offices. They were then asked to provide further contacts. A 
snowball selection of interviewees was therefore used in the sampling strategy.  
 
3.2.2 Interviews from 2020 
 
The second source is a set of interviews conducted in 2020 by the Busara Centre for 
Behavioural Economics, who performed an evaluation of SEMA’s program in Kampala. Given 
the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic and the associated travel restrictions, I was unable to conduct 
in-person interviews. As a result, I undertook secondary analysis of Busara’s survey responses. 
 
15 Funding for these interviews was from the World Bank’s Enhancing the Economic 
Performance of African Cities Activity. 
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Busara’s objective was to explore perceptions of the citizen feedback intervention, and its 
effectiveness in helping improve public service delivery. 
 
40 in-depth interviews and one focus group discussion were conducted in total. This involved 
20 interviews with citizens, 10 interviews with government officials, 10 interviews with SEMA 
volunteers and one focus group discussion with nine volunteers, and 12 public officers. All 
citizens interviewed had been those who had visited government offices where SEMA operates. 
Likewise, government officials comprised of municipal council workers, police station staff 
and health centre staff to capture variations across different types of local government offices 
that work with SEMA. 
 
In-depth interview questions were open ended and exploratory. This ensured respondents were 
not asked any leading questions that would bias results. Interviews were conducted by Ugandan 
interviewers in English and audio was recorded with the consent of respondents. Interviewers 
captured information on responses, but also observational information such as body language 
and tone of voice. This information was included in transcriptions. 
 
3.2.3 Interviews from 2021 
 
Finally, to triangulate the results from 2020, I conducted five in-depth interviews with key-
informants from SEMA. Given the COVID-19 pandemic, interviews were conducted remotely 
through videoconferencing. Moreover, due to issues with internet connectivity in Uganda 
following the 2021 presidential elections, two interviews were conducted without video. 
Interviews were semi-structured and conducted in English with a range of staff including senior 
managers and training staff.  
 
Given the sample sizes used in this study, the analysis does not claim to conclusively measure 
the full impact of citizen feedback on all citizens of Kampala. This would require significantly 
more resources, coupled with quantitative data that can be disaggregated to control for various 
factors such as distance of respondents’ homes to government offices and their socio-economic 
status (which cannot be addressed with a small sample). Instead, this paper’s more modest aim 
is to provide new empirical analysis on whether accountability interventions can improve 




4. Empirical Analysis 
 
4.1 The state of service delivery in Kampala 
 
Service delivery in Kampala, prior to 2018 (the first year of SEMA’s intervention) was widely 
reported by respondents to be poor, while bureaucratic insulation was virtually non-existent. 
Uganda is characterised by a dominant, authoritarian political party, the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM), which controls the government apparatus. NRM and its leader, President 
Yoweri Museveni, have been in power since 1986. The President not only possesses the 
authority to nominate heads of national government agencies, but also the leaders of local 
government institutions, such as the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA). As such, 
government offices are seen to respond to the political wills of the autocracy. In other words, 
in settings such as Uganda, which are characterised by lower levels of electoral accountability, 
the lack of bureaucratic insulation heightens concerns about politicians interfering in the 
running of the bureaucracy (Martin and Raffler, 2021). This in turn disseminates a culture of 
political interference throughout the government apparatus. With this context in mind, 
respondents in 2016 identified three main issues related to service delivery: corruption, 
unmotivated staff, and resource constraints. 
 
Respondents viewed corruption as something of a cultural norm within Ugandan governments. 
As one respondent stated, “there is systemic corruption from top to bottom which is making 
service provision hard” (Key Informant Interview #8, 2016). In this context of poor 
bureaucratic insulation, one government official admitted that they experience “political 
interference in the way we perform our tasks” (Key Informant Interview #3, 2016). These 
findings are widespread. For instance, Nangoli et al. (2015), conducted a survey with 250 
respondents in Kampala during 2014. They found that corruption and nepotism within 
governments was ubiquitous. Another respondent, who works for KCCA, stated that 70% of 
all court cases are related to land disputes, most of which involve corruption among 
government officials (Key Informant Interview #5, 2016). These findings are further 
triangulated in analysing survey responses from Afrobarometer – a large sample survey of the 
perceptions of African citizens – on citizens’ perceptions of corruption. Citizens’ mean 
perception of the quality of the police (administered by the national government), deteriorated 
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over the same period (see Figure 1 - 100 is highest level of police quality, 1 is poor level of 
police quality). 
 
Figure 1: Perceptions of Police Quality in Kampala 
 
 
One of the most widely reported issues with service delivery, however, related to unmotivated 
staff. Almost all citizens discussed experiences at government offices where they were either 
ignored by staff, or where staff had come into work late, taken long lunch breaks, or left work 
early. One respondent stated “time management is a big issue. You come to an office and its 
9am and staff are having breakfast. But there is a very long line waiting” (Interview #12, 2016). 
Another citizen stated that “some [officials] are rude before they even know what you want. 
They treat you like you’re not important.” (Interview #7, 2016). Part of the reason for this 
behaviour is that officials are not incentivised to provide better services – particularly in terms 
of financial compensation. They do the bare minimum required to keep their job.16 One key 
 
16 A key informant (Informant #2, 2021) described how it is difficult for government officials to lose their job 
due to bad performance: “Government employees do not easily lose their jobs. It takes like a big corruption 
scandal or a big case like murder for someone to be sacked. Even then the person temporarily resigns until they 
are proved guilty…Basically these guys are never really under pressure to lose their jobs. All their contracts are 

















informant – a local government official – stated that if officials were better compensated, their 
attitude to work would change: 
“if you looked at the benefits to the staff like recruitment benefits like if you give a 
person medical insurance, promotional opportunities, holiday packages the person will 
really be happy and will definitely change attitude towards service delivery” (Key 
Informant Interview #5, 2016). 
While it may seem obvious that officials would argue for better pay for themselves, numerous 
reports demonstrate the stark inequities of compensation for Ugandan government officials. 
For instance, the Ugandan Equal Opportunities Commission found in 2015 that in some 
agencies the highest paid employee received 50 times more than the lowest paid employee 
(EOC, 2016). By 2017, this figure had grown to the highest paid government employees 
receiving 277 times the lowest employees (East African, 2017). This growing civil servant 
wage inequality, and the broader issues of inadequate incentives for officials, therefore 
culminates in a lack of motivation to improve their performance (Key Informant Interview #7, 
2016). 
 
Third is the ongoing issue of inadequate resourcing for government offices. For 
instance, local governments in Uganda receive the majority of their funds through 
direct transfers from the central government. The Ugandan Auditor-General (Office of 
the Auditor General, 2016), found that the allocation of conditional grants to local 
governments is not in line with the formula agreed upon by the central government’s 
Local Government Finance Commission, or that which is enshrined in Article 193 of 
the Constitution. As a result, local governments have not received the expected 
increases in transfers to match the rising cost of delivering services. This was an issue 
raised by a number of informants. One stated:  
“Funds are not enough. Sometimes we want to do something but we are limited with 
budget. If development partners don’t come in its [services are] stopped. …Look at the 
hospitals. If we had enough funds, the hospitals here would be having an ambulance.” 
(Key Informant Interview #1, 2016). 
There is a relationship between corruption and inadequate funding. There have been 
reports that, while funding is allocated to government offices and local governments, 
this funding ends up becoming lost. For example, in 2018, despite the central 
government increasing funding for road infrastructure development, the quality of 
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roads deteriorated. This was reportedly due to widespread corruption in local 
governments (Bainomugisha et al., 2020). 
 
Inadequate resourcing also plays a significant role in entrenching human capital 
constraints. Most of the respondents I spoke with who worked for government 
described their desire to have opportunities to receive training and to develop their 
skills. However, resources have not been adequately freed up to promote capacity 
building programs. One key informant stated: 
“Maybe I could be performing badly because of lack of capacity but if I can be given an 
opportunity to train to perform better; that would help us on various issues.” (Key 
Informant Interview 3). 
These findings are not new. The lack of technical capacity in service delivery has been 
widely studied in the realm of Uganda’s health system (Nannyonjo and Okot, 2013; 
and Akin et al., 2005), rural development projects (Nsingo and Kakmba, 2008); 
environmental policy (Turyahabwe et al., 2006); and procurement planning (Basheka, 
2008).  
 
In summary, prior to 2018, there appeared to be three primary reasons why service 
delivery was deteriorating in Kampala: corruption, disenfranchisement of government 
officials, and inadequate resources. These issues take place within a government 
architecture that has a clear lack of bureaucratic insulation. The next sub-section 
examines how accountability mechanisms can impact service delivery in the context 
of Kampala’s environment of limited bureaucratic insulation. 
 
4.2 SEMA’s Citizen Feedback Accountability Intervention 
 
Contrary to the belief that bureaucratic insulation is the key to improving service delivery (once 
controlling for funding and capacity), SEMA conducted an in-depth accountability intervention 
by collecting feedback on citizens’ experiences with government offices. This feedback was 
given back to government officials in the form of monthly progress reports. A key informant 
from SEMA stated that, prior to 2018, “the incentive structure didn’t exist in the [Ugandan] 
public sector system” (Interview #4, 2021). Hence, accountability, through the form of citizen 
feedback, can establish incentives for government officials to improve the quality of the service 
they provide. This section examines whether, in the context of limited bureaucratic insulation, 
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accountability interventions were able to address the aforementioned factors that impede 
service delivery in Kampala.  
 
Corruption, as discussed previously, is sewn within the fabric of Uganda’s governmental 
architecture. As one police officer stated: “there is systematic corruption from top to bottom, 
which is making service provision hard” (Interview #7, 2020). Corruption in Kampala comes 
from three places: (1) a normalised expectation of clientelism and nepotism – as a key 
informant from SEMA explained, “it starts early on in the smallest places…you’re expected to 
give a job to someone because you’re related” (Interview #1, 2021), (2) top-down political 
interventions – a police officer described how “there is political interference in the way we 
perform our tasks” (Interview #1, 2020), or (3) bottom-up – e.g. citizens who want to cut a 
queue at an office, or want a favourable outcome may offer bribes to officials. From this, there 
appear to be two root causes of corruption – culture, and low compensation of government 
officials. 
 
These issues related to corruption are structural. As such, the results of SEMA’s accountability 
intervention have been mixed with regards to addressing corruption. Given the pervasive nature 
of corruption, the full extent of corruption cannot be adequately measured solely through 
citizen feedback. This is because corruption can take place behind the scenes and at higher 
levels, without citizens directly experiencing it (e.g. from top-down political pressures) 
(Interview #2, 2021). A key informant from SEMA therefore thought that bureaucratic 
insulation would be helpful in shielding government officials from being influenced by the 
culture of corruption. This is because, “if people say it’s alright to take a bribe because 
everyone’s doing it and nobody’s saying anything about it, then you start doing the same” 
(Interview #4, 2021). Nevertheless, accountability interventions have had some impact. In one 
example, a local police chief had utilised citizen feedback from SEMA’s intervention to fire 
police officers who were accused of corruption. However, the problem is that:  
“those corrupt officers [who were fired from an office, still] remain in the system. Then 
one way or another, during rotations, they come back to other departments where they 
can access citizens and ask for money again.” (Interview #1, 2021).  
In other words, while this intervention may address corruption in one office, when a corrupt 
official is re-assigned to a different office, this ends up re-distributing corruption rather than 
eradicating it.  
 
 168 
With regards to the second root cause of corruption, key informants described how government 
officials would accept bribes and participate in corruption because their salaries are so low 
(Interviews #1, 3, 5, 7 & 8; 2020). As one police officer stated, “money is a factor” that leads 
to corrupt behaviour within police stations (Interview #5, 2020). In these instances, while 
accountability interventions can provide certain incentives to promote less-corrupt behaviour 
and slowly change culture over time, it does not directly address the other root cause of the 
problem – the need for better pay and conditions for staff. As a result, accountability 
mechanisms on their own are unlikely to make long-term improvements in corruption within 
service delivery in Kampala. 
 
The second service delivery issue raised by respondents in 2016 was related to government 
officials being unmotivated to help citizens. In 2020, numerous citizens similarly discussed 
experiences where government officials would ignore whoever came into their office or would 
take long breaks throughout the day while people were lining up to be served (Interviews #9, 
10, 13, 14, 16, 19, 22, 24, 25 and 26; 2020). This points to a broader underlying problem within 
the Ugandan civil service: the lack of an incentive structure. Officials do not get compensated 
adequately, and similarly complain about the lack of a defined career trajectory with ongoing 
promotion opportunities (Interview #7, 2020). However, aside from inadequate wages, there is 
a significant lack of non-financial incentives to drive performance. 
 
Bureaucratic insulation interventions – i.e. simply shielding officials from perverse incentives 
that come either top-down (from higher ranking officials), or bottom-up (from citizens) – are 
not able to manufacture incentives where incentives are largely absent (Mueller, 2015). 
However, in bureaucratic systems where there are adequate incentives (e.g. financial 
compensation or promotion opportunities) which incentivise and reward technical 
performance, bureaucratic insulation can be an effective tool to mitigate perverse incentives 
and improve service delivery (Jiminez, 2020). Given Uganda lacks such an incentive structure, 
bureaucratic insulation is unlikely to address the motivation of officials. 
 
Creating incentives has been the primary achievement of SEMA’s citizen feedback 
intervention. SEMA has managed to create incentives in two ways: first, by facilitating 
feedback of citizens on the performance of officials, and second by creating a sense of 
competition to drive performance improvements. 
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In terms of facilitating feedback, SEMA’s monthly report provides information on the 
performance of individual government officials (based on the assessments gathered from 
citizens). This feedback quantifies performance, while also providing a useful benchmark. As 
a result, officials (and their managers) can track whether the service they provide to citizens is 
improving or deteriorating each month. Government respondents described how they are 
incentivised to act because they do not want their managers to see that their performance is 
declining (Interviews #1, 2, 3 & 5; 2020). Moreover, government officials stated that they also 
looked forward to seeing the positive pieces of feedback they receive from citizens. As one 
official described:  
“Both sides encourage us. When there is a declined performance, we have to work hard 
to see that that image is improved. When there is a good performance, it also motivates 
us to continue performing. So either way pushes us” (Interview #3, 2020).  
This feeling was echoed by another key informant who was enthusiastic that “these reports 
give credit where it is due” (Interview #1, 2020). 
 
In relation to creating a sense of competition, SEMA’s monthly reports rank the performance 
of various areas within a government office (e.g. finance or HR), while also ranking the 
performance of a government office in relation to other government offices in the 
neighbourhood. One key informant called this ranking feature a “motivating structure” for them 
(Interview #5, 2020), and this was further heightened by ‘winners’ being recognised for good 
performance through awards. This aligns with some of the literature in behavioural psychology 
which emphasises the need for a rewards framework in order to incentivise performance 
improvements in organisations (see Cappa et al., 2020; and Vandevijvere et al., 2019). 
 
Taken together, the facilitation of feedback and the competition framework, has been 
responsible for motivating staff – filling the vacuum of inadequate incentives for performance. 
A key informant from SEMA stated that:  
“We’ve been most successful at changing the culture at the local office…staff are 
laughing more often when they see you as a client, they’re showing basic friendliness, 
because they feel like someone is actually watching them and they’re going to be rated 
at the end of the month…as a result we’ve been able to influence civil services at a very 
local level to service their clients in a better way.” (Interview #4, 2021). 
These findings were confirmed by another SEMA staff member who said:  
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“we’ve been very successful at changing the mentality of public officers. It gets to the 
point where public officers get a sense of ownership over their work…Now they 
understand that their job directly impacts citizens.” 
 
The final service delivery issue which respondents raised in 2016 related to inadequate 
resourcing of government offices. Inadequate resourcing has had three main effects: low pay 
for government officials, a lack of training to improve technical capacity, and under-funded 
services. These have respectively led to unmotivated staff, staff lacking key competencies, and 
citizens who are denied access to basic services.  
 
The literature on bureaucratic insulation is not clear on whether further insulation can allow 
officials to obtain further resources when required. On the one hand, bureaucratic insulation 
could lead to more efficiency gains as bureaucrats are free to provide services in the most 
efficient way possible (Schneider, 1993; Jimenez, 2019). As a result, this may mitigate the need 
to ask for further resources. However, on the other hand, in many developing countries, 
efficiency gains are unlikely to alleviate the need for further resources (Robinson, 2007). In 
other words, potential efficiency gains are not likely to offset the degree of under-funding. 
Accountability mechanisms on the other hand, appear to have more promising results with 
addressing resource constraints – particularly in the long term. 
 
Under-resourcing is a structural issue with service delivery, which makes it difficult to be 
addressed by accountability mechanisms in the short-term. One key informant from SEMA 
described an incident where: 
“One of the complaints [at a small police station] was that the suspects who were 
arrested were not getting food. So that meant the police force were not providing the 
suspects with lunch, some tea, or some water or anything… So when we raised that 
complaint we told them [the manager of the local police station that] suspects are hungry 
all the time. They told us that they're not in position to offer them food. So they asked 
us to raise it to headquarters… We raised the issue to police headquarters. The police 
headquarters said they don't have a budget to provide food for small police offices 
located in the communities…because the money they get from the Ministry of Finance 
isn't enough to provide food…So most of the managers really do what can be done 
within their office…but sometimes they're not able to do some of these things, especially 
if something needs money. These are things they're not addressing.” (Interview #2, 
2021). 
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As such, it is evident these types of citizen-feedback accountability mechanisms are more 
impactful in situations where the manager of an office can address resource-constraints 
directly. When resources are constrained by factors outside of the manager’s immediate 
control, it becomes more challenging to enact change.  
 
However, there have been some cases where citizen feedback reports were used by government 
officials as evidence to lobby headquarters for further resources. For example, there have been 
instances where offices have obtained SEMA reports describing how citizens would get lost in 
their building, or that citizens were having issues accessing official forms and documents. 
Using these reports, officials were able to lobby headquarters for funding to procure navigation 
signs for buildings, and purchase printers to print the respective documents (Interview #3, 
2021).  
 
Similarly, officials have been able to use SEMA reports to address technical capacity 
constraints. Through reading SEMA reports, government headquarters have begun to 
understand the extent to which citizen-facing staff lack adequate training in customer service 
and client care. As a result, they are now considering providing more tailored training programs 
to address these issues (Interview #4, 2021). So while SEMA is unable to directly influence 
the level of resourcing provided to government offices, their reports help offices build their 
case and lobby for improvements. This process takes time, but the results are beginning to 
unfold after three years of their intervention. As a key informant from SEMA said, “we’ve now 
had a few cases where we’ve had an effect [in helping offices lobby for more resources]” 
(Interview #4, 2021). 
 
Finally, while accountability mechanisms in the form of SEMA’s citizen feedback intervention 
has contributed to improving service delivery, there is a degree of endogeneity. This is because 
SEMA requires managers of government offices to consent to SEMA volunteers collecting 
feedback from citizens. As a result, the offices that consent to SEMA’s presence, are typically 
run by those who are most dedicated to improving service delivery. In other words, the efficacy 
of SEMA’s intervention is influenced by the desire of managers to enact change. 
 
As a result, citizen feedback initiatives like SEMA, need to cultivate ‘champions’ within 
government offices. Champions – in other words, reformers – play a role in lobbying managers 
and other staff members to try out their accountability intervention (Busara, 2020). However, 
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one of the biggest challenges these champions face is that some officials and many citizens are 
sceptical that service delivery can actually be improved. One key informant from SEMA 
mentioned that “many citizens say, ‘dream on, things are never going to change’… [as] most 
citizens are rather negative about the government ever changing” (Interview #4, 2021). Hence 
the onus lies on these government ‘champions’ and organisations like SEMA to shift the 
attitude of people into believing that service delivery can in fact improve. 
 
 












Date of Last 
Survey Difference 
1 3.25926 Apr-18 3.83333 Feb-20 0.57407 
2 3.89431 Sep-19 3.58333 Feb-20 -0.31098 
3 2.93182 Aug-18 3.39815 Jan-20 0.46633 
4 2.90909 May-18 3.36723 May-19 0.45814 
5 3.1 Aug-18 3.28704 May-19 0.18704 
6 3.0625 Mar-18 3.43165 May-19 0.36915 
7 3.09032 May-18 3.86957 Jan-20 0.77925 
8 3.94211 Sep-19 3.03066 Jan-20 -0.91145 
9 3.81065 Sep-19 3.54745 Jan-20 -0.2632 
10 3.98148 Sep-19 3.81818 Feb-20 -0.1633 
11 3.74694 Sep-19 3.9 Feb-20 0.15306 
12 3.91667 Nov-19 3.91753 Jan-20 0.00086 
13 3.87879 Sep-19 3.97222 Jan-20 0.09343 
14 4.01571 Oct-19 3.97802 Jan-20 -0.03769 
15 2.94904 Mar-18 3.68421 Feb-20 0.73517 
16 3.15584 Mar-18 3.40336 Jan-20 0.24752 
 
 
The raw citizen feedback data for all offices (Table 1) indicates that 69% of offices experienced 
an improvement in citizen feedback between the first and last month of the intervention 
(author’s aggregation of data from SEMA’s citizen feedback surveys, 2021)17. Moreover, 75% 
of offices saw an improvement in service delivery within the first 12 months of the intervention 
 
17 This is the raw data collected by SEMA volunteers who asked citizens to quantify how 
satisfied they were upon being served at a government office. See section 3.1 for more 
information. 
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(ibid.). While these findings suggest that most offices improved their delivery of services 
through the intervention, this data is purely descriptive and causality cannot be directly 
assigned from these numbers. However, when triangulating these figures with the 
aforementioned responses from government officials during the 2020 interviews, the evidence 
suggests that cultural change has been possible through accountability mechanisms – though 
this was not an overnight process. This cultural change means that citizens and government 
officials alike are beginning to realise that local service delivery can indeed be improved. This, 
in turn, may lead to further improvements in service delivery in the future. 
 
In summary, while further research is required in this area, accountability interventions in 
contexts characterised by both poor bureaucratic insulation and inadequate incentive structures 
for government officials, appear to be a promising way of driving improvements in service 
delivery. Much of this is spurred by the creation of new, non-financial incentives that were 
previously missing in Kampala’s governmental architecture. However, some of the problems 
in service delivery are systemic – such as inadequate government funding of local offices, and 
a pervasive culture of corruption, clientelism and patronage. Accountability mechanisms on 
their own are unlikely to be able to address some of the root causes of corruption – at least in 
the short-term, however in the medium to long term they can play an important role in driving 





This paper aimed to qualitatively study the impact of accountability interventions on service 
delivery in a context characterised by poor service delivery: Kampala. In doing so, I sought to 
shed light on the academic debate that exists on what the best methods of promoting service 
delivery are (once controlling for resource and capacity constraints): either increasing 
bureaucratic insulation or improving accountability measures. The research used SEMA’s 
citizen feedback intervention in Kampala as a case study. Confirming some of the key insights 
from the accountability literature (Ho et al., 2015; Björkman & Svensson, 2009 and Callen and 
Hasanain; 2011), results demonstrate that accountability interventions are most effective in 
creating non-financial incentives to motivate staff to improve the quality of services they 
deliver. This is particularly important in a context like Kampala that has an evident lack of 
incentives to encourage the performance of government officials. The analysis found that 
 174 
SEMA’s incentives appear to drive cultural change in the attitude of government officials, 
while also playing a role in addressing some of the structural problems of poor service delivery 
such as inadequate funding and technical capacity. This works by providing an evidence base 
that government officials can draw on to lobby for more resources. The analysis finds that 
while bureaucratic insulation would help shield officials from top-down and bottom-up 
influences of corruption, without establishing incentives for service delivery, bureaucratic 
insulation on its own would not be effective in a context like Kampala.  
 
While the analysis highlights the importance of citizen feedback mechanisms in improving 
service delivery, it cannot be solely relied upon to effectively address all structural problems. 
This is because citizen feedback only gathers feedback on citizens’ direct experiences with 
government officials. However not all factors that deteriorate service delivery may take place 
in front of citizens. For instance, corruption can occur in the higher levels of government where 
citizens cannot not directly witness it. Thus citizen feedback is unable to capture the full range 
of issues that impact service delivery. The analysis also finds that many citizens are sceptical 
that services can be improved after having witnessed decades of poor service delivery. If 
individuals cannot be convinced that change is possible, citizens will be reluctant to provide 
their feedback, while government officials may be unwilling to experiment with the 
intervention. This is a core barrier that needs to be overcome. However, with the steady cultural 
change SEMA’s intervention appears to have on service delivery, these impacts may culminate 
in a broader understanding that positive change in service delivery is not only possible, but that 
it is currently taking place. 
 
The policy takeaway from this analysis is that, in contexts that lack adequate incentive 
structures for government officials, accountability interventions may be the first step that is 
required to improve service delivery. However, in order to adequately address some of the root 
causes of corruption, bureaucratic insulation could be a promising next step. This is because 
once bureaucrats are incentivised to perform better (through accountability measures), they 
then need to be shielded from perverse incentives – for example top-down pressures to cave 
into political interference, clientelism, or corruption. 
 
Nevertheless, given the sample sizes of respondents in this study, this analysis cannot 
conclusively measure the full impact of citizen feedback on all citizens in Kampala. Thus, 
further research could be conducted to understand whether citizen feedback measures can 
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improve service delivery in more remote areas, or to better understand whether service delivery 
is being improved for citizens who cannot physically visit government offices (e.g. due to 
disabilities). Moreover, the external validity of citizen feedback could not be measured as this 
analysis was focussed solely on Kampala. Therefore, further studies could be conducted to 
examine the impact of such interventions in other regions and countries both in East Africa, 
and the African context more broadly. It is only then that we will be able to develop a much 
more holistic understanding of whether accountability mechanisms or bureaucratic insulation 
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